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Deputy Foreign Minister Karpov on Arms Treaties

LD3005203991 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1230 GMT 30 May 91

[Interview with V.P. Karpov, deputy foreign minister, by Vladimir Pasko, from the "Point of View" program—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Pasko] Good day, comrades. Tomorrow, 31 May, is the last day of action within the U.S.-USSR treaty on liquidation of medium and short-range missiles. [passage omitted]

European countries and the United States, as well as our country, are trying to get rid of an excess of weapons. All this has prompted us to arrange a new meeting with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Karpov, one of the leading experts in the sphere of arms control.

Viktor Pavlovich, the report on the progress of negotiations on arms control evokes many questions. The first question I would like to ask you is about the progress of talks in Vienna and Geneva. Can one expect new breakthroughs in curbing the arms race in the near future? If the answer is yes, then in what directions?

[Karpov] As for Vienna, one must recognize the fact that currently, the center of gravity is not one on negotiations themselves, on their next stage, but the implementation of the Paris treaty on conventional weapons in Europe, which was concluded as a result of the Vienna talks. Differences emerged between our country and other participants of the treaty with regard to Article 3, namely, what is covered by the treaty and what is not. [passage omitted]

There is currently a break in the Vienna talks, but one can say that when talks are resumed, the main attention will be devoted to issues of cuts in the personnel of armed forces of the European states—which are taking place in negotiations—on the one hand, and confidence-building measures on the other, the next stage in confidence-building between 34 participants of the pan-European process. [passage omitted]

The West sensed that we can come to common agreements with regard to conventional weapons cuts, both on the part of NATO, and on the part of the Soviet Union and countries of eastern Europe which would lead to a more stable Europe, which could actually ensure a situation in the future whereby neither the West nor the East can use their armed forces to start a wide-scale offensive. With this in view one can understand why the West is so interested in implementing this aspect of negotiations first and foremost. We are also interested. You see, we cannot afford to keep the army we have had so far. We must ensure our security in some other ways, based on accords on setting up a system of collective security in Europe, through bilateral agreements with European countries, which would also lead to the improvement of the security system in Europe. Economic integration should also guarantee that there would be no return to a hostile bipolar, so to speak, peace in Europe. [passage omitted]

[Pasko] Viktor Pavlovich, the question of the change in NATO strategy is very interesting. This issue is currently being discussed. There have been no conclusions, but what possibilities do you see opening up here for us, proceeding from what has been said about the new NATO strategy in the post-confrontation period?

[Karpov] I think that the phenomena which could be currently observed in NATO's activities, starting with last year's NATO Council session in London, give us grounds to believe that this process of the revision, so to speak, of the strategy, will not cease. It will continue. It all started with the USSR's announcement of its new defensive doctrine—a tendency toward developing a new strategy, a strategy of nonconfrontation, a defensive strategy. With regard to this I think that the seminar on issues of military doctrine which took place at the beginning of this year, with NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries participating, provided an additional impetus for developing positions in this regard. I think that the treaty on conventional weapons in Europe is currently a powerful factor in favor of the revision of NATO strategy, and that emphasis on nuclear weapons, which has always been present in NATO strategy, is superfluous, so to speak, in present conditions. [passage omitted]

[Pasko] Speaking about negotiations on disarmament, we would like to see the possibilities of reductions of arms expenditure, so that they do not amount to 18 percent of gross national product, according to our press, and that this expenditure is brought down to the level maintained in the West in the 1 to 6 percent bracket. What, in your opinion, are the possibilities of our military spending being reduced to such a level?

[Karpov] I think this will depend on the progress of implementation of treaties, first and foremost, on conventional weapons, and then on strategic forces. Possibilities of reducing military spending will also depend on the general atmosphere of relations between the West and the East, since there must be guarantees that there will be no revival of the cold war and that there will be no return by NATO to the doctrine of aggression. There are many factors here. I think that one can say already that the tendency toward the reduction of military spending has begun. [passage omitted]

[Pasko] Some publications claim that Soviet-U.S. relations have experienced a period of stagnation over recent months. It was explained by the fact that the situation in the Soviet Union is not clear to Americans. A question arises here about the link between the progress in the sphere of disarmament and the situation in our country. How strong is the influence of the situation in our country on the progress of talks, from your point of view, the person who is directly involved in talks daily?

[Karpov] There is of course a direct link between the two. The West closely watches the development of the situation in the Soviet Union, and notes the slightest nuances of changes in any direction. The period of uncertainty you mentioned did not remain unnoticed in the West. I think

that it is this uncertainty, and the uncertainty from their point of view of the position of the president of the Soviet Union, that showed. Their question, and which they kept asking us, was whether Gorbachev has the necessary powers to conclude treaties and ensure their implementation. At present, I think the situation has changed. I think that the Nine plus One statement that was recently achieved can be a crucial moment in the development of our own interpolitical situation. The West, I think, assesses it exactly the same way. So one can count on animation—of contacts, animation of talks—though I think there is still an element of waiting to see whether Gorbachev will succeed in stabilizing the situation in the country. This is a very serious factor, which is taken into account in the West. [passage omitted]

Official on Joint Tests, Future of Semipalatinsk

LD3005142191 Moscow TASS in English 1410 GMT 30 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Valentin Pavlov]

[Text] Barnaul May 30 TASS— Soviet Deputy Minister of the Nuclear Power-Generating Industry Viktor Mikhaylov did not rule out the possibility of conducting, jointly with the United States, two small-scale nuclear explosions to test verification methods. "However, the final decision on this issue is yet to be made. Normal and businesslike negotiations are being conducted in the Cabinet of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR," Mikhaylov told a group of journalists from Altay, a region of Russia bordering on Kazakhstan, in a telephone interview.

In any case, Mikhaylov said, "nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk test range will be halted" starting from January, 1992 and explosions planned for this year cannot be considered as nuclear weapon tests.

"Under the treaty limiting underground nuclear weapon tests, we should carry out two experiments with measurements both in the United States and by our specialists to test verification measures as a step towards further limiting and halting nuclear tests," Mikhaylov stressed.

Faced with pressure from public organisations, the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted the decision to terminate nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk range. The international antinuclear organisation Nevada-Semipalatinsk has been one of the most active organisations that has been pressing for the closure of the Semipalatinsk test range for several years.

U.S. Missile Plans Would Require Treaty Change

PM3005113091 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 May 91 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "1,200 Missiles to the Launch Pads!"]

[Text] New York, 27 May—The White House and influential U.S. legislators are discussing a plan to create a land-based ABM system capable of defending U.S. territory against a limited missile strike, NEWSWEEK reports. Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and L. Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, support this.

It is envisioned that 1,200 ground-launched interceptor missiles would be sited at six complexes in various regions of the United States. It is planned to deploy the first such complex at Grand Forks (North Dakota). And, as the magazine points out, the 1972 ABM Treaty will have to be amended if the new plan is to be implemented.

Norway's Holst Charges Kola Weapons Buildup

PM3005141091 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 29 May 91 First Edition p 5

[IAN correspondent V. Ilyashevich report: "Demarche Before the Visit—Will the Norwegians Sign the Treaty on Arms Reductions?"]

[Text] Helsinki—Norway will not sign the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty if the Soviet Union continues military preparations in the Kola Peninsula. As the Finnish newspaper HELSINGIN SANOMAT reports, such is the view of Norwegian Defense Minister Jorgen Holst. In the minister's opinion, the Soviet Union is allegedly participating in talks on arms reductions in Europe while at the same time increasing its military presence in the Kola Peninsula near the Norwegian and Finnish borders. The issue centers on the USSR's alleged efforts to exempt some of its ground forces from the agreement by putting them under naval command. What is more, as the Norwegians see it, amphibious assault force units should also be the subject of talks and be reduced. If the United States and the Soviet Union do not arrive at a common decision soon on the question of existing differences of opinion then, in Holst's words, Norway, which is a member of NATO, will itself raise these questions during USSR President M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Oslo. As we know, the Soviet leader intends to visit the country 5 June to participate in the Nobel Peace Prize awards ceremony.

Evidently the Norwegian Government member thought it appropriate to express "military" grievances on the threshold of the visit by the Nobel Prize winner, M.S. Gorbachev. Incidentally, very recently the Scandinavian and Finnish media recounted in detail the facts that have become known regarding secret activities by Norway's Armed Forces on Finnish territory in the postwar years. In Urho Kaleva Kekkonen's unpublished diary notes, information was discovered relating to the fact that at the end of the 1940's and beginning of the 1950's the Norwegians established a network of secret weapons and ammunition dumps in Finnish Lapland and also recruited Finnish servicemen to spy in USSR regions adjacent to Norway.

IZVESTIYA Continues KAL Investigation

Ninth Installment

91UF0791A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 May 91 Union Edition p 7

["IZVESTIYA Investigation. Part Two" by Andrey Illesh: "Mystery of the Korean Boeing-747"; ninth article in current series]

[Text]

IX.

In the previous articles of our investigation we presented to the reader the points of view on the events surrounding the Boeing affair that we had elicited from pilots, the military, intelligence officers, and journalists—both witnesses and volunteer experts. It appears to me that with their help much of what transpired in the fall of 1983, both on land and at sea, became more clear. In the next issues we will give the podium to direct participants in the events. First of all, to naval officer B. Kurkov, who confirms in a factual and documentary manner much of what our consultants had discussed.

"At that time (September 1983) I was detached to the TOF (Pacific Fleet) headquarters and was directly associated with the search for the Korean Boeing. Many questions remained (for me) unanswered then; your publications made it possible to answer them

"The first and most important one: Were there people there? Now it seems unbelievable, but at that time we could not provide an unequivocal answer because we could not preclude the possibility of a provocation on the part of the Americans. We, meaning the special search post that was set up at the Pacific Fleet headquarters, which had the information and coordinated the progress of search activities.

"For instance, there was the Air Force commission's final report, which I quote from memory: 'The Boeing-747 was **falling** (after the weapons had been used against it) at a **pitching angle of 70 to 80 degrees** (that is, almost vertically) from an **altitude of about 9,000 meters.** It exploded when it hit the water. At that point, the people—if they were there—were **torn into small and minuscule pieces**...' I guarantee the underlined passages, since I memorized them on purpose.

"If you read attentively the entire text of the Air Force commission's report, it is easy to see that the presence of people was put in doubt. Maybe they were there, maybe they were not... At the headquarters we also had a list of items fished out of the water and recovered from the bottom. The items on the list were mostly clothing. But there were also body parts (not many, though). For instance: half a head, a hand, female hair. Besides that, a driver's license, a birth certificate, a baptism certificate. And clothing (there was a lot of it)—raincoats, coats, a denim suit, etc. I think that by comparing thoroughly the list of recovered items and the experts' report, it was possible to come to the following conclusion even then: There were people there. But we still thought (or, to be precise, we wanted so much to think) that this was an American provocation and that the aircraft was flying empty..."

So, here we have it—albeit not through an official route—confirmation of the conclusion our experts arrived at: The aircraft could not have been falling for 10 minutes! The reference to the pitching angle makes this conclusion indisputable. But why was the 10-minute version needed so much? This is why: If the descent took that much time, passengers' bodies should have remained intact—the descent is sufficiently smooth, people have time to fasten seatbelts, and the aircraft nearly glides into the water... What, there are no bodies? That means that there were not any in the aircraft! What was there, however, was a provocation by American special services...

Our files contain many testimonies of pilots and aviation engineers on all kinds of catastrophes that occurred over the sea. The disappearance, the "evaporation" of people in similar tragic situations is a fact, described and known to many specialists. It is hard to imagine that the military leadership that participated in the investigation in the fall of 1983 did not know this. It means that the ignorance of the people who participated in the search and came to believe that it was possible to have no victims was to somebody's benefit. This is how the theory of an "empty plane" was planted (intentionally, I am convinced) in the press, and in the heads of many functionaries and ordinary citizens.

Here, however, B. Kurkov continues his testimony:

"The second question: Why did the Boeing captain choose to be shot at rather than land, although (this was reported even then by KYODO TSUSHIN) he was a former military pilot, and such a specialist could not fail to know the consequences of the interceptors' warning? Now it is clear (from the testimony of the Su-15 pilot) that most likely the Boeing crew did not see the warning shots at all; neither had it received any warning over the radio. Having noticed the interceptor nearby, the Korean pilot tried to get rid of it by reducing speed. The Boeing pilot assumed that a passenger plane would not be shot at (in any case, not without warning); besides, it was only a little further until they would exit Soviet airspace... The aircraft fell outside USSR territorial waters, although it had been shot down over them." (One more remark. An attentive reader undoubtedly noticed: The information about the exact location of the crash (and where exactly it was shot down) is quite contradictory. We have the information about the coordinates of the Boeing's crash. They are completely documentary. We will leave, however, the tale of how the newspaper obtained this information, not published anywhere in the world, to our later installments—Author.).

"Third question: Why we did not publish the contents of the recovered 'black boxes'? I will try to present my version, or,rather, two of them.

"First—they could not be deciphered at all: The recordings, or 'boxes,' on that aircraft were turned off (more about that later). Or, perhaps, they were never recovered, but a similar-looking object was raised instead? In regard to the last sentence, I want to clarify: The newspaper writes that there were only two "boxes" on the Boeing. According to our information (as of 1983), there should have been seven. Three were sent to Moscow on the Il-76 plane. I talked at TOF headquarters with a man who accompanied them. He said that as soon as the Il-76 landed in Moscow and the ramp opened, five Air Force generals rushed into the section and immediately headed toward the rubber sacks. He stopped them and demanded proper transfer documentation. So they quickly wrote a transfer paper right there, on their lap. At that time this officer was a Captain-Lieutenant and he served on Sakhalin. You can find him if you want to.

"The second version—the recordings were deciphered but not published, and probably will not be, since they conflict with the official Soviet version. A high-ranking naval official ruminates in IZVESTIYA that this is because of the Americans: '...the text was not favorable to the Americans... the Soviet and American sides simply reached an agreement...' I do not agree! I do not agree because during that period relations between the two countries were tense, and there was a noisy campaign against the USSR going on in the world. If there were something detrimental to the Americans in that 'black box,' it would have made sense to give it to the press. Most likely, however, there was nothing in there 'compromising' the Americans. There was, probably, quite a lot that went against our official version. If you recall, the Boeing crew, for all practical purposes, had not been warned of the impending attack, as customary in international practice. They had no idea that they would be shot at shortly, and therefore remarks such as: 'He is warning us... I see tracers... He wants us to land at his airfield, and so on' were not in the conversations of the Boeing crew. The missile hit was a complete surprise altogether. If the recording of the crew's conversations among themselves had been published at that time, it would have become clear to the whole world that the USSR PVO [Air Defense] had shot down a passenger aircraft without warning. Even though it had strayed off course... It is clear that the USSR government would never have dared to make such information available to the press.

"Now, after the IZVESTIYA investigation, one can explain with a great degree of probability almost all the facts and events of that time. Here is my point of view. On the night of 31 August-1 September 1983 a South Korean Boeing-747 aircraft, on a passenger flight, deliberately strayed off course and entered USSR airspace. Parallel to it, but in "neutral" air space, an RS-135 was flying. A U.S. intelligence satellite was hanging over the region (this is the information that went through TOF headquarters). The Boeing flight over our territory had been prepared by U.S. intelligence. It appears that the task had been formulated in this way: the Boeing, by violating USSR airspace, brings all PVO response systems into action. The RS-135 and the intelligence satellite register them and determine their characteristics, clarify their locations, and so forth. (You have already written about this.) The passengers are the cover.

"But then events took a turn that U.S. intelligence most likely had not foreseen. They were certain that during the Boeing interception Soviet PVO fighters would conduct a visual identification. They would find out that it was a passenger aircraft and would not shoot. But it happened differently. During neither the first intercept (what really happened in the sky over Kamchatka and what kind of 'intercept' was organized when the Boeing was crossing the peninsula, the reader will learn from subsequent reports—Author), nor the second, over Sakhalin, did our fighters look at the intruder from a short distance. This is a great tragedy, since the incident immediately grew into something else.

"That the intruder aircraft was not visually identified is the fault of the organization of our PVO system, not of any one person in particular. My assumption is that while the Boeing was flying over Sakhalin, the PVO commanders had only two tasks. The first: to make sure that fighter-interceptors do not lose it; and the second: to report to their superiors on the incident and wait for a decision from above. There is nothing more in the instructions. It appears that the Su-15 pilot did not receive an order to conduct a visual identification. He was not even asked what type of aircraft he was seeing. (From the recording of conversations between Osipovich and the ground, which we have, it is also clear: There were no requests to identify the aircraft type; neither did anybody ask the pilot to contact the Boeing crew on the 'civilian' international frequency.—Author)

"It had not even occurred to anybody that it could be a foreign passenger craft under intercept: Everybody was firmly convinced—**only a military reconnaissance aircraft could follow that route.** And a military intruder does not deserve a long conversation—a pro forma burst, flash the lights—he should understand the situation, he knows where he is flying, so the responsibility lies with him. Especially considering that our PVO were really sick and tired of these RS-135's by then. So, as soon as approval was received from above, the pilot was given an order: 'Destroy the target,' since there was only a short distance left to neutral airspace; if the intruder reached it, it could not be shot at.

"Then the search for the 'black box' started. I already told you that the Americans behaved in an extremely insolent manner at sea near Moneron island. This is true! They interfered with trawlers, crossed their course close to bow, intruded on our territorial waters, and used sonar devices, thus jeopardizing the lives of divers from the Mikhail Mirchik drilling platform...

"I recall: There was a moment when Japanese search vessel Keiko-Maru No. 3 (or Kaiko-Maru No. 3) dropped anchor next to Mirchik; this vessel had a self-propelled underwater search apparatus, controlled from the vessel via cable. The operational radius of this apparatus from the mother vessel is, if I am not mistaken, two to 2.5 kilometers. The Japanese could, in fact, reach the wreckage over which Mirchik was stationed. At that time the TOF commander, Admiral Sidorov, gave an order—immediately equip a trawler stationed on Sakhalin with grapnels (devices to cut mine mooring cables or hawsers) and send it to a station next to the Keiko-Maru. As soon as the vessel lowered its apparatus, the trawler was supposed to cut the control cable of the Japanese... See how far it went: This was outright banditry! The only thing that saved the Keiko-Maru was the false 'pincher' planted by our Navy. The Japanese also took the bait of its beacon signal and went to the wrong area.

"Why was this 'sea battle' going on? Because at that time the Americans were considered enemies; their ships used to violate the Soviet border in the area of Vladivostok and Sovetskaya Gavan (sometimes it required warning shots of jet-propelled depth bombs detonated ahead of them on their course). Their reconnaissance planes regularly violated our airspace; they conducted grandiose military maneuvers in the Sea of Japan zone, during which the ships and airplanes of the U.S., Japanese, and Korean Navies practice attacking our Pacific Fleet. So, at that time we did not have even a shred of trust in them. Therefore, what kind of cooperation in raising the 'black boxes' could we talk about!

"Yes, we and the Americans did not trust each other. If we recovered the 'black boxes,' then they could suspect that the recordings would be tampered with by us. In short, it was not in the interests of the U.S. Government, from any point of view, to fan up the Boeing incident for long.

"The same went for us, by the way. Had we published a full transcript of the conversations between the PVO interceptor pilots and the ground, this would have led—as much as the contents of the 'black boxes'—to an unequivocal conclusion: The official Soviet version was a lie. First, the Su-15 pilot reported that the intruder aircraft was flying with identification lights and flashers on. Second, the Su-15 pilot was not given an order to conduct visual identification of the target and to warn the Boeing crew on the 121.5 mHz frequency. I am convinced that it is to the benefit of neither us nor America to rehash this episode even now: It comes out that both sides were guilty of the passengers' deaths..."

I ended my preceding installment with the words: Secrets jealously guarded by the powers that be of this world often hide not strength but weakness. Officer Kurkov's logic is a testimony to that; it seems to be closer to the truth than the hypothesis of a secret deal between the Soviet and American special services. Although, like Kurkov, I cannot preclude the possibility that the special services "shepherded" this affair from both sides (what is more, they still are "shepherding" it!), but still, the secrecy covers not their might but, alas, their shortcomings. The deficiency of the PVO system, informational helplessness, the squalor (with all its aggressiveness) of the authoritarian political system... How much effort and how many resources does the masking of this weakness require! Would it not be more wise to admit their mistake right away, instead of building mountains of lies—giving, at the same time, all the trump cards to the other side. The latter, however, is far from being limited only to the Boeing affair...

In addition to valuable testimony and letters, the IZVESTIYA dossier is also accumulating unique photographic material. In subsequent publications we will show some of the photos and tell the story of how they came to be in our possession.

Tenth Installment

91UF0792A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 May 91 Union Edition p 6

["IZVESTIYA Investigation. Part Two" by Andrey Illesh: "Mystery of the Korean Boeing-747 "; tenth article in current series]

[Text] A stern female voice comes through the telephone receiver:

"This is Svetlana Petrovna Girs, Captain Girs' wife, calling from Leningrad. My husband has authorized me to tell you that the newspaper investigation is one-sided."

I recorded this telephone call, just as I did scores of others, but, frankly, did not pay much attention to it. Especially considering that at that moment we were busy with something entirely different—we were getting ready for a trip to Sevastopol, where we had been invited. This signal intrigued the reporters far more than a call from Leningrad. The people from Sevastopol told us that they also had been working at the bottom of the Sea of Japan. On top of that, even earlier than the divers from Murmansk!

A sensation was in the making. Getting ready to go to Sevastopol, we knew: We were going to the underwater research department of the Hydronaut base. In the folder we had the first photographs showing manned underwater craft Tinro-2. That was about it...

The question hydronaut-researcher Vyacheslav Popov asked us as soon as we arrived betrayed the grievance of Sevastopol submariners:

"Why did the military not tell you precisely and specifically whom they had involved in this operation? When you started your investigation, should Vice Admiral Sidorov or Rear Admiral Apollonov not have given the newspaper the names of all participants in the expedition?"

And not only the military! Even the Murmansk colleague of the Sevastopol researchers, Vladimir Zakharchenko, a detailed interview with whom IZVESTIYA has already published, did not even give us a hint about them. So, there is no reason to hold a grudge against the newspaper; quite the opposite, it is in our interests to learn as much as possible about the 1983 events. But, alas: Far from everybody is open with the reporters. And the official echelons still pretend that nothing is going on...

In addition to V. Popov, other participants in our conversation in Sevastopol were Vladimir Bondarev, science assistant to the captain, and Vladimir Yaglov, senior engineer of the science group on the fishing and search vessel Hydronaut. All three are participants in the large-scale operation to search for the Boeing's wreckage.

The Tinro-2 craft is a kind of miniature submarine, with two people on board—a captain and an observer. The latter, as a rule, is a biologist or an ichthyologist, since the Sevastopol craft are usually used for searching for fish and other sea riches. The craft's potential, however, is much greater—it can be used in any type of underwater observation. Just observation, since the Tinro-2 does not carry divers, and in 1983—during the time of the search for the Boeing at the bottom of the Sea of Japan—it did not even have a manipulator "hand." All the small crew had at their disposal were movie cameras and still cameras. Thanks, to it, our archives have acquired some unique photos from the bottom of the sea. Let us take things in the proper order, though.

Vyacheslav Popov tells us:

"In September 1983 our Hydronaut was moored in Vladivostok. Our voyage to sea was repeatedly delayed—there was a continuous shortage of some or other supplies on board. Then one day some black Volgas drove up to the vessel. People wearing identical shoes emerged from them and went straight to the captain. That same day we were told: We are going out to sea.

"'But we do not have this and that and the other,' we objected. 'We will get everything,' the captain assured us. And it was true—by the morning we had everything we needed, and we set out to sea. This was 9 September, and on 13 September we arrived at our destination.

"The first submergence was on 15 September, two weeks after the aircraft had been shot down. As we learned then, before us the trawlers had done some "work" in the designated quadrant. It is hard to understand what sense the military saw in the trawling operation. First drag everything haphazardly around the bottom by the trawls, and then send in the submersibles?... It is clear that things should have been done in the reverse order! Or maybe they were in such a hurry to get immediate results? Who knows... Whether they had lifted anything important or not—we do not know. Had they obtained something right away, however, they would not have kept us in the search area for two (!) months.

"In addition to us, there was also Okeanolog—an underwater craft that belongs to the Far Eastern Scientific Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences, which you called, not quite correctly, a Bumblebee; also, divers from Murmansk and Navy divers; a hydrographic vessel Perseus, port of registration Vladivostok; and a military vessel that was equipped with magnetometers, the instrumentation used to detect metal. They were searching for the mass of debris. There was also the military ship Kozmin, with its submersibles—they were also mainly looking for metal. We were working in different quadrants. We were not allowed to approach the center, not in the beginning, not until it became clear that we were bringing up valuable information—photographs.

"At first, they tried to "harness" the Tinro crew in military fashion, too: They even wanted to make us talk in coded language. They came up with a special coding scheme, which was quite a hassle for our submariners...

"We had, for instance, such designations as: human remains were called a gobius. Aircraft debris, a pollock. And so on... They were planning to use only fish names. Our observers were supposed to report to the surface in this manner. We were always getting confused with this coding scheme. They asked us: What are you observing? We saw, for instance, a book. How do we say that? Or a mink pelt. It is impossible to foresee everything; otherwise, you have to put together a whole dictionary. Finally they gave up and permitted us to talk in open text. Otherwise, the situations that were occurring were simply ugly. I remember Volodya saw a human hand. 'What are you observing?' they asked from the surface. 'A gobius.' 'A whole one?' 'No...'

"Radio beacons, on Moneron and Sakhalin, were sending a signal to an antenna set up on the Hydronaut. The military used received coordinates to draw field maps and made the submariners follow these maps. When the Tinro was moving underwater the craft was easily seen from the Hydronaut, since it had an orange buoy tied to it by a halyard. Those on the surface were dictating down the course that had to be followed. Those below reported whatever interesting they saw at the bottom."

"All conversations without exception were being recorded on tape," continued the submariner, "then all of this was verified, clarified, and sent to the 'center,' set up on the Petropavlovsk, a large antisubmarine ship. We managed to make 17 submergences. Two shift crews participated in them—captains and observers. Four people in all.

"I will confess that we felt great relief when we found out that there were no bodies at the bottom. Not only no bodies; there were also no suitcases or large bags. Sometimes the thought even occurred: Was it really a passenger plane, or is that a deception? I remember we put together this independent version (we had to explain the situation to ourselves somehow): They did have an

accident with a specific Boeing somewhere out there, but then they 'covered' it with this forgery—this spy plane."

Vladimir Bondare :

"I discovered this human hand," he extends a horrifying photo toward us, "during the second or third submergence—between 17 and 20 September. When I saw it, I decided to make sure that it was not a plaster cast—I asked the captain to zoom in on it. That was the only way to make sure that it could not be a fake. The same happened when we saw this (Vladimir shows another photo)—we were making circles around this find until it became absolutely clear—these were human remains...

"We had instructions from the very beginning to look for the 'black boxes.' But it was not until later, on 4 October, that we were given the blueprint of the aircraft. It showed very clearly where the 'black boxes' were located—near the toilets, on the sides. The blueprint was sent to us by the military from the antisubmarine ship Petropavlovsk. There are two boxes; they are orange in color (by the way, at sea all rescue-related equipment, buoys—in short, everything that needs to be seen from afar—is orange). The dimensions of the 'boxes' were also indicated—they were different, one larger than the other. But we still have not located them..."

The main job and the main headache of the Tinro crews was the photographing of material evidence. They had to surrender all negatives and test prints in the end of the assignment, of course. Still, they kept "a few of this and that..."

Vladimir Yaglov (on that assignment he was responsible for all photographic work; he developed the film and made the prints), says:

"The military 'pushed' us tremendously. As soon as the guys would come up, they had to go to the captain for a conference. Meanwhile, in a matter of two hours I had to develop all the film, dry it, make prints, put it in a pouch, and deliver it to a speedboat that would take it to the Petropavlovsk. From there, we heard, the material went to Moscow. If you want to find the negatives, ask the military—they should have everything. Nobody knew that we also kept a few things for ourselves. But how could one resist the temptation?"

The interest in the work of the Sevastopol specialists was growing daily. At first the military were demanding two prints of everything. Then three, and then five. When some book was discovered at the bottom, they demanded that the photo be enlarged until it was possible to read the text.

"Actually," recalls Vladimir Nikolayevich, "it turned out that there were some tables and graphs in that book that we photographed at a depth of 170 meters..."

In our conversation our interlocutors expressed regret more than once that two people were not in Sevastopol on the day the reporters came to visit—the captains who went underwater with them: Yuriy Mikhaylovich Sidorenko and Captain-Instructor Mikhail Igorevich Girs. "Girs went both to the Murmansk (already known to IZVESTIYA readers) divers on the Mirchink and the military. In general, he has to know quite a lot. You should really make a point of meeting with him."

That is when the telephone call to the editorial offices surfaced in our memory. The captain's wife criticized our work on her husband's behalf. But would the captain himself want to talk to us?.. (To be continued)

Eleventh Installment

91UF0793A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 May 91 Union Edition p 8

["IZVESTIYA Investigation. Part Two" by Andrey Illesh: "Mystery of the Korean Boeing-747"; eleventh article in current series]

[Text] So, will the captain of the submersible, who is so important to our investigation, agree to meet with our correspondent?

This question was plaguing us all the way from Sevastopol to Moscow. It turned out, however, that our worries were groundless—Captain Girs came to the editorial offices on his own. The only obstacle to the newspaper's receiving complete information turned out to be Mikhail Igorevich's own book "Over Three Oceans and Eleven Seas," in which one of the chapters will be devoted to the search for the downed Boeing. Captain Girs' story is based on his diary, which he was able to save after the 1983 events.

"At first I was afraid to keep notes and did it very sparsely—literally in one phrase. Why? I was afraid that it would end badly for me (if we recall the fact that the diary of the diver service leader, V. Zakharchenko, was confiscated along with the films taken deep under water it is clear that the captain's fears were not groundless.—A.I.). There were quite a few KGB people around, and Navy officers appeared on our strictly civilian vessel. Even today, I would not be completely truthful if I told you that the fear that had stayed since that "special job" was completely gone..."

In addition to the diary, the captain produced a worn-out notebook covered with sea water and machine oil stains. It contains the records of all the submergences of the underwater craft Tinro-2, of which Girs has been the captain (and, by the way, one of the designers) for many years.

"Alas, I do not have a complete picture of the events; neither could I have, because the military did not hold any joint meetings or overall coordination with us. This was quite frustrating since the forces that gathered that fall near Moneron were formidable! But the efforts were often wasted; we duplicated each other... Do understand: What we received from the military were directives, not instructions—these are two principally different things!

An instruction says what is to be done and why. A directive says only: Do it and report. In reality, it amounts to an order."

"Still, who, other than Murmansk divers—who were unquestionably doing unique work there—went into the deep near Moneron Island?

"The military had two manned submersibles on the ship Kozmin, which had arrived at the Boeing crash site before us. When we got to the search area, we were told that the military submersibles had already been down there. Their specialists had found out that the current was strong and that the operating conditions would be extremely difficult. But the water transparency was very good. Yes, the military craft were doing the same work as we did. But they had trouble with photography; their photos were turning out to be of poor quality. For us, however, photographing underwater objects is the main job.

"To sum up, there were two submersibles from the Kozmin, our Tinro-2, and the Okeanolog (although this one only went down two times). All in all, four manned craft. The military made 24 submergences in two craft. In addition, two unmanned craft were used in this work. Military mother ships of the unmanned craft were equipped with television and acoustic cameras and still cameras.

"Let me tell you, having two unmanned and four manned craft—as well as very experienced divers—on hand it should have been possible to find the plane wreckage in 10 days. It was found only after a month, however! What needed to be done in the beginning? Send the unmanned craft that are capable of covering a very large area and determine suspicious spots. Then send our submersibles to those spots. And only after that send divers. This is how a search is conducted all over the world, and it is done fairly quickly. And, of course, do not let the trawlers even come close to the search site! The idea of sending fishing trawlers and mine sweepers into the area belonged to the military. As a result, they dragged the Boeing debris over a large area, turned everything upside down... We saw the results of this 'work.'

"The current near the bottom in that area is constant; our ship captain Boris Bass and I put together a 'current rose' [roza techeniy] after about ten submergences. Then we analyzed the position of the items and their number. On the basis of this we concluded where the bulk of the plane debris might be located. We told the military about it: Stop sending us where there is nothing. Send us to this—specific—point! We did not even get a reply."

From Captain Girs' diary: "Submergence 10 October. Aircraft pieces, wing spars, pieces of aircraft skin, wiring, and clothing. But—no people. The impression is that all of this has been dragged here by a trawl rather than falling down from the sky. Spent half of the submergence trying to escape from the trawlers, which were trawling right there and could have caught us."

"You see," he continued, "there was such chaos that the military was giving the same search area to us and to the trawlers at the same time!

"I remember that the captain was giving me commands—where to move and where to submerge to a maximum depth... But not for searching—to avoid being caught in a trawl!.. At the same time, the trawlers ignored our pleas to change course. 'We have our orders,' was their reply.

"Yes, the interference was on both sides—ours and others: Sometimes we narrowly escaped our own trawls, and sometimes the foreigners were stepping on our toes. Then we complained and we finally got protection—the little ship, I must tell you, did not know what fear was! Every morning we went to a certain point. We would arrive to the point of submergence, and the Japanese would already be waiting for us there. How these foreigners found out before us the site of future work, I do not understand. Communications were closed ten times over, everything was coded, but... We were constantly 'shepherded' by two ships—an American and a Japanese.

"Keep in mind: We came to the search area as fishermen (the ship's stack has yellow stripes indicating that it belongs to the fishing fleet.—A.I.). Therefore, in the beginning nobody paid any attention to us—big deal, a small boat, only a thousand tonnes. But when we opened the hangar and it turned out that we had the craft—then everybody got excited. Helicopters came; the Badger—an American military ship—moved very close to us; and buoys were being dropped behind us constantly. In this way, every submergence became an event. That is when we needed personal protection: It sometimes happened that the Americans would not even let us put the craft down. The work was being done in neutral waters, although it is our economic zone. Nobody had the right to chase foreigners out of there. But they, in turn, did not have the right to work all the way down at the bottom. Therefore, although they have excellent divers and submersible craft—many times better than ours—the foreigners could not use this advantage. They could only observe our work. And eavesdrop...

"Once, while I was underwater, an American helicopter went down. I remember that the captain told me on the radio from the surface: 'Misha, pay attention down there. See—maybe there is a helicopter flying by.' I told him: 'Are you out of your mind?' 'No,' he says, 'an American just crashed, right before our eyes...'

"In short, for a peaceful man the situation was almost like being at war—the ships stood with gun covers removed; everybody was watching each other constantly. Once in a while, while we were surfacing, I could see our own Hydronaut and the American Badger rushing toward our craft from each side. In such a situation, all I could do was to watch, openly amused: Who would get to us first—ours or the Americans'?..

"During a storm we were hiding from the wind behind Moneron. All the vessels gathered there. And here natural barter would start: Some ran out of coffee, some out of cigarettes. We also exchanged information while we were at it—not information received from the military, of course. It was during one of these exchanges that we met the military divers."

An entry in Captain Girs' diary: "During the day, spent some time with the rescue divers. They clarified a lot of things, but it looks like our work is not over yet. They found the fuselage, closer to the tail, and there are many remains there. It was standing vertically between the reefs. They first lowered it down, and then got inside."

"To be honest," continued Mikhail Igorevich, "I did not completely believe those divers. According to them, they found the tail part of the aircraft standing upright. But this is a very large fragment of the Boeing. They said that they found it in the reefs. I also went to the reefs, but there, too, I saw only small fragments—but they were everywhere. The biggest parts I encountered were the chassis, wheels, engines, and pieces of the aircraft body. I do not know where the military divers went and how many times, but I doubt that they could work at considerable depths. Therefore the entry in the diary, although it is quite sensational, is not, unfortunately, subsequently confirmed by facts.

"We were working up to the maximum submergence depth—250 to 270 meters. Once, Breeze and Pegasus (ships with unmanned submersibles) were suddenly moved out of the search area—behind the heap, to work at a depth of over 1,000 meters. They worked there for a very long time—why, and what they found, I do not know."

Mikhail Igorevich was asked the same question as all the other eyewitnesses: Were the passengers' bodies found?

"I will start from afar. Our first submergence at the point given to us was to a depth of 215 meters. And we immediately saw a multitude of clothing labels, paper money, and a book. Small paper stuff was carried by the current like trash over asphalt. During the first submergence, however, we did not yet have a clear idea of exactly what we were supposed to see.

"Deep inside we were all preparing ourselves to encounter human remains. And true enough, I immediately bumped into a scalp. It was laying on a rock, with black hair flowing in the current... A terrible sight! I think it was not the same one the guys from the Mirchink reported, since we were submerged in a completely different place.

"So, we were ready to encounter a virtual cemetery. But one submergence went by, then the second, and the third... During the entire rather lengthy period of our work near Moneron, I and my people had maybe ten encounters with the remains of Boeing passengers. No more than that.

"Something else was inexplicable to us—zipped-up clothes. For instance, a coat, slacks, shorts, a sweater with zippers—the items were different, but—zipped up. And nothing inside. We came to this conclusion then: Most likely, the passengers had been pulled out of the plane by decompression, and they fell in a completely different place from where we found the debris. They had been spread out over a much larger area. The current also did its work.

"One of the most depressing impressions were the glasses. All kinds of frames. It is known that many Koreans are nearsighted. Also toys. Small stuffed animals. Women's shoes, children's clothing, little shorts. Many books—of the kind people take to read on the road, paperbacks...

"The 13th submergence, which fell to my partner Yuriy Sidorenko, was, as expected, a very unlucky one. They saw a long object of some kind—it turned out to be an unwound roll of fabric. The captain crossed over this roll and accidentally wound it around the screw. They had to surface. The item that interfered with the work turned out to be drapery fabric. American-made, green, with a floral pattern. It was all soaked in kerosene and fell apart in our hands..."

One more entry in Girs' diary: "On the night of 5 November, the Mirchink said goodbye to everybody and left the search area. On the 7th, we too were told to leave. During the two months we spent there, an area of about 1,500 square kilometers had been searched."

The captain closed his diary and the notebook with the work schedule of the Tinro-2. And added:

"We were warned many times: Not a word to anybody! True, they never told us how long this warning would be in force. Awards, bonuses? You must be kidding... When we came back to Sevastopol after this voyage—we were at sea, as usual, for four and a half months (of which we spent two searching for the Boeing), we found out that the crew was in danger of being deprived of their regular 40-percent bonus. Were it not for the persistence of our captain, the men would have been left without their usual earnings. Some time later, though, Bass and I were presented with certificates of merit signed by Commander in Chief Gorshkov—in gratitude for carrying out the task assigned to us by the commander of the Navy... (To Be Continued)

'Studio Nine' on Cold War Legacy, Aftermath

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["Studio Nine" program with V.M. Falin and V.V. Zhurkin, doctor of historical sciences and academician, presented by Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin]

[Text] [Zorin] Hello, comrades. Today we have invited major authorities on international policy, prominent scientists Valentin Mikhaylovich Falin and Academician

Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin, doctor of historical sciences, to take part in "Studio Nine" at the Ostankino television center. We have invited them to try and get to the bottom of a problem that is not simple.

This is how I would phrase the question: Has public opinion, as well as politicians, made errors during the last six months in its assessment of the situation in the international arena, or have there been no such mistakes? We are talking of the declaration of the end of the cold war, made in Paris last November during the meeting of the leaders of the CSCE participant countries. The initial period following the announcement or, to be more precise, the statement to the effect that the cold war had ended, was marked by what was, after all, a completely understandable euphoria and by great hopes linked with it. It must be said that there were grounds for such optimism and, in general, they exist now, too. The cold war, which had lasted for many years—for several decades, all in all, since the end of the war—this cold war between the East and the West left a most serious mark on the entire course of affairs in the international arena and, naturally, its end raised great expectations. However—and it proved to be unexpected for many people—the end of the cold war, the cessation of what was linked with it, certainly did not result in an automatic resolution of the many difficult and, at times, painful and festering problems that continue to make themselves felt.

An analysis of the "Studio Nine" mailbag is very interesting from this viewpoint. In general, we attach no small significance to your letters, because the "Studio Nine" audience consists of people who are abreast of things, people who think and know a lot about the international arena and who do not confine themselves to current information alone. That is why it is a sort of reliable indicator. At the beginning, soon after Paris, the predominant tone of the letters was one of optimism. There were optimistic and positive appraisals of what was taking place. But recently our mailbag has contained more and more letters in which the writers express quite definite concern. There are quite a few of these letters, and I will just cite a typical comment from one of our television viewers.

Yaroslavl lecturer Aleksandr Nikolayevich Serebrov writes: The war in the Persian Gulf, the impasse in the Near East from which no way out is in sight, the lull in Soviet-U.S. relations compel us to ponder the question: Have we not been carried away by unjustified and groundless optimism? Are we not embellishing the real state of affairs, as is our old, ingrained habit? Are we not engaging in wishful thinking? It is a direct question and I believe it deserves a similiar reply, Valentin Mikhaylovich.

[Falin] It seems to me that on the one hand the question is direct but on the other it is extremely complicated, for the Cold War is an extremely heavy legacy. Essentially it was the third world war, if one takes the number of countries drawn into it, the resources wasted on it, and the number of casualties in the direct sense, the human sacrifices that were made. It exceeds, surpasses World War I by a large amount as far as these indicators are concerned, and accordingly we cannot view the end of the Gulf War as the act of one single moment in time, as something that can be completed at the stroke of a pen, or even with the signature of the most authoritative political figures between one day and the next.

It is a process, and a process which accordingly comprises many elements, many components. Within this process there is the economic aspect of the matter. The ending of the cold war in the economy is still quite a long way off. Completing everything that is connected with dismantling the huge machine of destruction and the military potentials of the states will also take a great deal of time. Here, too, we must not expect a miracle. Several stops have to be taken before we come to the creation of a situation in which wars become impossible no matter which regime governs events in which country and at which specific time.

In short, here we may find the correct answer to this fundamental question: Are we in a state of euphoria after Paris? Or are we deliberately confusing the issue—to use a good, sound Russian expression—having only read accurately all the facts, all the facts indeed, in the form in which they exist, regardless of ourselves. Let us remember the famous saying of Montaigne: It is madness to judge what is true and what is false solely on the grounds of the information we have. We must sort out many details and understand, in particular, the test with which mankind and those very same participants in the cold war found themselves faced when they had to decide for themselves and for the world as a whole how to act in connection with the Persian Gulf crisis, which began on 2 August 1990 following Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. It was here—this state of cold war or of absence of cold war, or more precisely the prospect of overcoming everything that engendered the cold war—it was here that the issue was decided of what mankind was to be like. It is possible to judge the point at which we stand today by the conclusions that have already been drawn from this first practical application of solutions which should have testified to new policy, to a new will, and to new goals of states.

[Zorin] Vitaliy Vladimirovich, did you want to say something?

[Zhurkin] I would like to respond to one aspect of this letter from our respected television viewer that produced a deep impression upon me, Valentin Sergeyevich. This is the social and psychological aspect of the matter, if I can put it like that, where he speaks about euphoria. It seems to me that we—no doubt we should not say we, everyone should speak for himself, expressing his own viewpoint—nevertheless it is making great efforts to eradicate the black and white vision of the world. Indeed, once again I am talking about myself. I, for example, was in a state of some euphoria about the Paris

summit, although I agree with Valentin Mikhaylovich that the situation is always far more complicated.

The question arises here, now that certain complexities have undoubtedly manifested themselves in the world situation at the beginning of this year—they have already been mentioned: So will the pendulum now swing to the other side, and will we once again have to return to that gloomy assessment of the international situation? While we are talking about the process we must not, of course, forget that we really are in the process of ending the cold war and have already covered a considerable distance. Undoubtedly quite a lot of time has yet to pass before we learn to give a truly realistically balanced assessment of the international situation, to give the balance of the pluses and the minuses. Nevertheless, in answer to the television viewer, I consider that it is the positive elements that predominate in this balance, even though I am also convinced that the process will be lengthy and difficult.

[Zorin] Valentin Mikhaylovich introduced a new element here, because the saying, the cold war is over, had already (?earlier) become a stereotype in our press. I find convincing your reasoning that this will not happen just with one stroke of the pen. It is a process. You are right, I believe, that there is more in this process that is positive.

Nevertheless, I want to bring you back to another aspect, to the results of the cold war, whether it has ended or is ending, as you will. There is a story that is widely doing the rounds of the Western press, that in the cold war there are both victors and vanquished, just as in any other war which has lasted for several decades and, as you said, having more casualties than World War I. The West is making earnest efforts to try and say that it is we who proved to be the vanquished. What do you say about this, Valentin Mikhaylovich?

[Falin] If we repeat the mistake of many previous wars and divide the community into these two camps, then we will thereby sow the seeds of future wars and future conflicts, or other cases of future hostile rivalry; to do so would ensure the repetition of much that we would wish to see disappear into the past, disappear forever. If we take who has suffered most in this war, I would put it like this: It is the future generation, and maybe more than one generation, that has to live on earth that suffered most. Lost and destroyed in this war were many resources that should by right have belonged to the people who are to live in the 21st century. Ecology suffered most terribly in this war, the environment was disfigured and partly destroyed—and what is more, thoughout the world. Because of that war many issues determining the face of continents such as Africa, Latin America, and the major part of Asia were set aside and today await solution in an exacerbated form.

If we take the direct participants, or the main participants of the cold war, then it is the Soviet Union and the United States that suffered most, in my view, if only because it was these two great powers that from the 1970s, at the latest, waged the cold war against themselves. Under equal conditions, accumulating new mountains of weapons and developing a military force of systems already capable of destroying all that lives on earth are nothing but madness. Yet we engaged in this madness, and as a result it turned out that the Soviet Union spent in the military sphere most of the material prerequisites it should have had to help it resolve socio-economic tasks for the population, for its prosperity. The United States spent on the arms race a huge share of its potential, and today is one of those trying to catch up with states like Japan, the FRG, and to a certain extent France, Italy, and others. That is a fact, too.

This brings to mind an assessment made by U.S. scientists: For the United States to reach the level of its main competitors, Japan and others, in terms of scientific and technical and economic development, it has to spend almost $1 trillion on modernization. But where is that $1 trillion? Nowhere. The United States today lives in debt. This is a problem the United States will absolutely have to cope with if it wants to remain a great power. For it knows, and we have come to realize, that greatness today is determined not so much by the level of armaments as by the state of the scientific, production, and cultural strength of a nation, of any nation without exception, regardless of the system where you live.

But whoever lost and won in this war, though everything is theoretical as in any other war, I would like to believe that those who lost the war sometimes, or even mostly, draw more correct conclusions about what has happened than the victors do. That is in some measure encouraging.

[Zorin] Let us put it this way: It is a consolation, but we do not necessarily have to agree with all that because, even if you are wise after the event, it is still surely less pleasant to be in the position of having lost. But, in connection with what you have been saying, I want to ask you a question, Vitaliy Vladimirovich. Valentin Mikhaylovich was talking of the period after the cold war and about the cold war itself. Do you see any sort of difference between how President Reagan was pursuing his political line and what George Bush is now doing with regard to what we are talking about?

[Zhurkin] You know, Valentin Sergeyevich, it seems to me that throughout the eighties all political forces of the world underwent some kind of process of self-education and self-upbringing—our Soviet political forces, our political leadership and, of course, the U.S. political forces and the U.S. political leadership. When all is said and done, President Bush is President in a period when the cold war was indeed beginning to come to an end and when fundamental and fairly organic foundations for East-West cooperation were arising, although in this are some not inconsiderable difficulties and elements of confrontation.

President Reagan, all the same, was active in another period, a period when the cold war was under way. My personal view is that a political figure who began by talking of the evil empire and of casting it onto the garbage heap of history and who, over a relatively short period of time, developed toward cooperating with the Soviet Union, which is at the very least an attempt to reach mutual understanding, it seems to me deserves the utmost respect. In this sense the question of what he was prior to that—movie actor, or a governor of one state or another—is of no consequence. We know him as a president of the United States, and it seems to me that he will be remembered by history as the president under whom this watershed began.

[Zorin] Valentin Mikhaylovich, continuing the idea expressed by Vitaliy Vladimirovich, I want to say that I too gained the impression that Reagan was acting more resolutely when he eventually began to act in terms of burying the cold war than the current U.S. President is acting, although we hear quite a number of good statements from the White House now, too.

[Falin] One can agree with you and one can argue with you. Goethe once said: We are equal to those we understand. If we fail to understand Bush and the motives behind his present actions, we will surely fail to create preconditions for continuing the forward-looking development in our relations.

I would, however, like to draw attention to something else. The Bush administration is, to a certain extent, in a unique position after the war. Let us chart the development of events. The Democrats used to replace the Republicans after four- or eight-year periods and so forth, but here, after eight years of Reagan's presidency, it is his vice president who became President and, consequently, the present head of the administration has more opportunities for continuity, for implementing the main, the chief, the most interesting concepts that were worked out with his participation under the previous president. Opportunity, however, is not necessarily tantamount to reality. Everything depends on what perspective is being developed and what goals are being pursued.

It always worries me when I look at various schools of U.S. politics—they are always present, the United States should not be regarded as some sort of monolithic society lest what has already happened, and what very nearly ended in tragedy, should happen again. You recall the first detente. What a lot of talk there was about the irreversibility of what was happening then. What plans we and the whole world made in connection with that detente. Then we read Kissinger's memoirs, and it turns out that the end of that detente was programmed at the very start of it. I will permit myself to cite Kissinger, merely to keep our discussion short. He declared that detente, the first detente, was created for practical considerations connected with the attempt to outplay the Soviet Union, because owing to the Vietnam war the United States was unable to advance its strategic programs quickly enough, and it was necessary in some way to halt the Soviet buildup without concluding permanent agreements, in order to keep U.S. hands free for future modernization. Second, to weaken the pressure by U.S. peace advocates; and third, to avoid a nuclear catastrophe. In his second book Kissinger adds: Under cover of detente we promoted our policy of curtailing and where possible removing Soviet influence, in particular in the Near East.

Well, if a major policy, a major undertaking, is built upon a basis where the goals are limited and exclude a balance of interests then, of course, disappointment, and deep disappointment at that, is virtually inevitable. I would like to add to this some thoughts by George Shultz, a very wise and, as our contacts with him and our diplomacy showed, a man of very constructive thought. Shultz asserted that illogic is a trait of democracy. In historical terms the United States reveals itself first in one extreme and then in another. We strive at one moment to rattle sabers, and the next to hold negotiations, and to do both at the same time, beyond our capabilities. This was said by the secretary of state under Reagan.

It is possible, it may well be possible, that the illogic of democracy, as seen in the United States, will explain some of the present difficulties Soviet-U.S. relations are experiencing. Even though the scope of these difficulties is limited, they are nevertheless being experienced. I would like, however, to proceeed from the fact that currently the choice of long-term partnership and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States, calculated to extend into the 21st century, has been made in Washington in earnest and without reservations.

[Zhurkin] True, but we could add the following here. Nevertheless, we too are guilty of these attempts somehow to make a choice oriented toward a long-term future, toward the end of this and the beginning of the next century but, all in all, the situation is so dynamic that I do not know how realistic, generally, the formulation of such a long-term course is. Maybe the question revolves around some general outline, maybe in the form of a desire on the part of the United States; I agree with that. Indeed it is maybe the first time since World War II that we have encountered a conscientious desire to have relations with us in earnest and for a long time, and we ourselves manifest this desire, too. At the same time, these unpredictable phenomena of one kind or another that constantly occur, such as the crisis in the Persian Gulf, constantly gnaw at this desire to work out some kind of long-term, fundamental strategy. That is just a little aside in the process of affairs.

[Zorin] In this regard I want to ask you a question, Vitaliy Vladimirovich. Valentin Mikhaylovich formed the conclusion that the Americans are at the moment seriously planning a long-term policy of detente. But it is doubtful that it just came into Valentin Mikhaylovich's head to quote both Kissenger and Schultz. What impression did these quotations make on you, and do you see any undesirable analogy with today?

[Zhurkin] In the first place, Valentin Sergeyevich, I think that when we talk about such large-scale events it is necessary to speak about all aspects, and it is necessary to think not only about the Americans, but about us as well. The Soviet Union at that time, the time of detente, although there was a huge amount of euphoria, also conducted a policy which did not correspond, so to speak, with all the principles agreed. You remember the support for the war in Angola, let us say, and in other parts of the world. In general when any claim was made against the Soviet Union—that it was trying to undermine detente, or was objectively undermining detente, by burrowing into one part of the world or another—there was an element of justice in this criticism. So evidently at that time when nevertheless the cold war was really raging in actuality and in people's heads, probably in fact the world and people were not mature enough to carry out this turnabout on a large scale. Have mankind, the United States, and the Soviet Union matured enough now? It seems to me that there is a much greater basis to say that they have. In this sense I am completely in agreement with Valentin Mikhaylovich's basic premise.

[Zorin] Nevertheless—excuse me for my insistence, it's a journalist's duty—I want to press you fully, as they say here, by asking you the question in connection with the topic about which you talked: Is it possible to agree with those who maintain that the present difficulties in Soviet-U.S. relations did not arise spontaneously but were planned by Washington? This is the analogy I saw in your quotations.

[Falin] If you view Washington not just as the president or the vice president but understand Washington as consisting of the most varied currents that exist in Congress, around the administration, and partly even probably within the administration itself, then someone probably has viewed the Soviet Union not only as a partner, but also as a very dangerous rival until the end of the century and in the 21st century. I do not know if they have given us a chance for the 22d century. In any case, they saw us for the foreseeable future, in the first place, as a competitor who prevents the United States from achieving certain political goals declared in the previous era.

This, I believe, is a question which U.S. politicians answer themselves, and it is not necessary to quote what they say. But if we turn to the main thing, which in my view still dominates and determines the nature of U.S. actions—I repeat, in the main—then I believe that there is no basis to see in the actions of the President, first and foremost the President, signs that should concern and compel us to curtail those efforts that were made in previous years and allowed movement from a dead stop on the major issues of the modern world and mark the positive prospects, first and foremost in the sphere of disarmament. If we do not see this, and if we make sacrifices to suspicion—I do not want to quote the great Frenchmen; I express myself on this topic fairly frequently—then we will impoverish not only our own policies, but we will close in the face of our country the possibilities created by us, or which have arisen with our help, and we will also damage the world community.

For example, a few days ago Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu, speaking about the significance of Soviet-U.S. efforts to make the world less armed and more stable and on the significance of what has already been done, for Europe in particular, stressed, I believe, one very interesting thought. By holding these talks the United States and the Soviet Union are not only responsible to themselves, they must consider not only their own interests, including security interests, they must realize their greatness and power by demonstrating their sense of the responsibility incumbent on them for developing civilization as a whole. If this sense of responsibility is inherent to the required degree on both sides, then I am convinced that it will be possible to find a way out for even the most difficult problems. It will be possible to overcome the impasses which exist in the heads of politicians, because objectively there are no impasses. It will be possible to find settlements, including for the Near East, the Middle East, which do not put one country in confrontation with another, and do not exclude someone's interests to please another interest. This is the only path which leads to a genuine, firm and long-term peace.

[Zorin] It is interesting that in the discussion of the period following the end of the cold war—that is what we will call it—both of you moved on to talk about the problem of the Persian Gulf. Both you, Valentin Mikhaylovich, and you, Vitaliy Vladimirovich, spoke of this. You really spoke in general about the key events of this period, which allows us to think of the way affairs are progressing and where they are progressing now that the height of the cold war is behind us. Therefore, I would like to focus our attention a little on these problems, asking the question in the following way:

One point of view held by those who analyze the political results of the war in the Persian Gulf—specifically the political ones, as the military ones are in this instance clear and there is no real need to discuss them. One view is that the main political result of the war in the Persian Gulf was that the Soviet Union and the United States acted jointly during the war and are currently acting together in attempts to resolve the Near East problem, and that here at last the ending of the cold war has materialized and a new situation has arisen. That is one viewpoint.

The other view is that the main result of the war is that a situation has arisen in which one power has a dominant role, and if previously the starting point of politics was what scientists called the bipolar world, two centers, then now the obvious predominance of the United States means politics has one center, and this is the main result of the new arrangement of forces and what has taken place recently. Vitaliy Vladimirovich, what do you say?

[Zhurkin] First and foremost, Valentin Sergeyevich, it seems to me that there is a grain of truth in the words that over a short period of time a single superpower has taken shape, that is the United States. But it seems to me that for a whole series of reasons, one cannot seriously speak about a long period of time with a single superpower. Incidentally, we mentioned some of them at the start of our conversation.

First and foremost, economically the United States cannot hold the position of a single power. On the one hand it is propped up by Japan, and on the other hand the European Community is starting to make its presence felt. The economic situation in the United States is fairly complex. Can the United States check this objective fall in its world role by leaning on the military lever, if I may express myself thus, that is, by once again strengthening its military role in NATO, for example, and by somehow capitalizing further on the military victory it enjoyed in the Persian Gulf?

Frankly, it seems to me that presently this is unrealistic, and it is unlikely that anyone will want to make the Soviet Union's mistake of focusing significant efforts in the area of military balance in the battle of the two systems, placing all its resources in this, then, having attained military parity, find itself to have lost a great deal in the economic, social, and even moral spheres, and so forth. I believe that our historical experience will be a lesson to many, and it is being analyzed quite seriously in the United States. Therefore it seems to me that that second way or version, that evaluation, is just unrealistic, and at the same time I also believe that we have still not completely understood the depth of the cooperaton that took place, incidentally not just of the United States and the Soviet Union, but of the entire world community. An unprecedented and completely new role for the United Nations emerged in the Persian Gulf.

It seems to me that all the same, there is some foundation for talking of the conflict or war in the Persian Gulf as the first military conflict of the period dating from the end of the cold war.

[Zorin] Valentin Mikhaylovich, what are your thoughts on this issue?

[Falin] First of all, I would like to make one observation. In my view, it is not strictly correct to say that we, the Soviet Union, chose the arms race as the main criterion for measuring the correlation of forces between the two systems. It was a decision forced upon us, but at some stage we just stopped opposing this choice which had been forced upon us, and we got sidetracked and went too far on this track, impoverishing and sapping the lifeblood of our own economy. But this is an incidental observation.

As for your question, my answer depends on its relationship to another question. What was the war in the Persian Gulf? The last war of the 20th century [words indistinct], or the last, the very last, or one of the last wars of the 20th, and also the 21st century? Here it was politics rather than the military that governed the actions of the military, if we take the community opposing Iraqi aggression as acting politically. This is a fundamental issue. For the main thing defining thoughts on many matters during the cold war was that policy was not made in political headquarters, but as one U.S. researcher very precisely expressed it, in the laboratories where new weapons systems were created.

If we make comparisons, and there is a temptation to do so, there are powerful circles urging the United States, and not just the United States, toward movement along this path. If we do not resist this temptation, then unfortunately as a result of the war in the Persian Gulf and as a result of the crisis which we have all witnessed and which could become the launchpad for a qualitatively new stage in international relations in which agreement between states rejecting the use of force for the achivement of their national goals would be more important and stronger than the stance of circles that seek the implementation of their ambitions, or whatever else, by means of war—if this mandate, this, in fact, is what the UN mandate amounted to; this, in fact, is what the role of the United Nations as a peacemaking organization amounted to—then we will erase what is maybe the most important chance we have all been given as a result, once again, of joint efforts. It is thus a question that remains unanswered, for the struggle around the various tendencies in the United States continues. Today it is of concern to Soviet people, too. I believe it is of concern to everyone, and not least, undoubtedly, to the Americans themselves because with them is linked not just the present but the medium- and long-term future. We must be wiser as we enter the 21st century, and wisdom first and foremost in our having to throw out once and for all the belief in strength.

[Zorin] Furthermore, in connection with what you have said I would like to mention one fairly specific question which is making the rounds of some newspapers, the line that Washington wanted the military action in the Persian Gulf, that Washington urged Saddam along in that direction. Is there anything in this?

[Falin] I believe that if one takes President Bush, the official chief of the state administration, I do not think that thoughts of that kind were close to him. Maybe certain latest figures, circles, or forces—whatever you call them—were at work who were seeking grounds to demonstrate the achievements of U.S. military technology. Maybe there were, although this too seems to me to be fairly speculative, although it is impossible to rule it out completely if you believe the official papers which have already been published in part. Whatever the case, even if there were people who were seeking such grounds, the events in the real dimension and in the direction they took were hardly capable of bringing anyone any serious satisfaction. For $300 billion—the war cost precisely $300 billion—to create enormous difficulties for Iraq; for restoring that country, its infrastructure, economic, social and otherwise, will take

years; and for Kuwait problems that are complex in the highest degree have arisen—I am convinced that the stakes in this game, if it was a game, were absolutely incommensurate with the actual results.

[Zorin] Thank you. In discussing the post-cold war period I cannot fail to ask the question—I want to draw your attention to it, Vitaliy Vladimirovich—of the kind of role that is played in your opinion in policy today, in Washington's policy, by the stake that is placed upon our difficulties, those difficulties that we are experiencing in our own country?

[Zhurkin] You know, I do not believe in the U.S. strategy of, so to speak, undermining us, Valentin Sergeyevich, because many of the U.S. actions do not fit in with that kind of strategy. The policy of giving aid to the Soviet Union, even though it is very cautious and far less than one would like to see, does not fit in with such a strategy. The clear desire to reach agreements on disarmament problems and on the peaceful resolution of international conflicts generally does not fit in either. The perfectly clear lack of desire on the part of, say, NATO to advance eastward toward our borders does not fit in, and the United States is still in charge to a considerable extent in NATO. And so on and so forth, we could cite a host of examples.

Undoubtedly, or so it seems to me, observing what is happening in the Soviet Union, the economic crisis and the political difficulties, the United States is evidently working out different options regarding our country. To say nothing of the fact that there are different circles. Incidentally, there is no doubt that circles exist in the United States that would like to take advantage of the difficulties in the Soviet Union in order to put the Soviet Union on to the back burner of world history to the end of this century and the beginning of the next, at least. Nevertheless, as regards policy and the balance in the United States, I believe that the U.S. leadership proceeds first and foremost from the immense anxiety that the Soviet Union's difficulties might lead to its disintegration, with all the ensuing consequence, and in their policy they are also prompted by the desire to ensure the possibility for the Soviet Union to continue to enter the world community. They often talk about the Soviet Union's return to the world community, but I don't agree with that; the Soviet Union has always been present in the world community, both positively and negatively, just like any other country. By the way, not all are part of the life of the world community in a purely positive way. So, if we make a more or less objective analysis of the whole complex of facts and actions where U.S. policy emerges, there is no room in this analysis for the idea that the United States would like to take advantage of the Soviet Union's difficulties for such an end—the United States as a power, in the balance.

[Zorin] Thank you. Time is passing, but I have prepared another pointed question, one which comes up in our mailbag, and I would like to put it to you, Valentin Mikhaylovich. The question is this: There are those who claim that the policy of new thinking proclaimed by the Soviet Union is something like unrequited love; it is a policy which the Soviet leaders, our government, take as a guide, but our partners by no means feel obliged to adhere to it. Hence the question: Are we not in the power of some sort of illusions in our policy? This has direct relevance to our talk today.

[Falin] Concerning your question, Aleksandr Sergeyevich Pushkin said: One-sidedness is the ruin for ideas. Of course, ruin for love and everything good that there can be, that is one-sidedness. I believe the question is quite complicated, because any friendship presupposes a partner, presupposes there is someone you want to be friendly with, to tackle jointly some common concerns and ones that are not in common. The question raised in this context naturally has a foundation, because such a foundation is provided, in particular, by the United States, as well. I would like to add to what Vitaliy Vladimirovich has just said, that if the United States had not attempted to take advantage of anyone's difficulties, those of the Soviet Union, or of NATO partners, or of any neutral state, it would no longer be the United States. In general, taking the broad view, we have to take the United States as it is, without making it out to be better or worse, and there are even certain advantages in this approach.

The United States is no altruist and never will be. It is a state which always looks out for its own interests and defends them very energetically, a state which knows how to calculate everything before making a decision, and that is also something we must learn from the United States, a state which has tried, of course, to gain as much as possible from our new political thinking while giving as little away as possible to the other side. But here we too could play a more active role in certain situations, play our hand more firmly, although, to speak bluntly of everything that we have been doing up until now, we have made concessions in what we have been doing up until now not to the United States, but to common sense, first and foremost. We have made allowance for the objective realities which have existed and have taken decades to emerge, and when, thanks to our changes, conditions have emerged in which these realities have developed, or have at least made themselves felt, we should have defined our position, we should have said: This is our attitude; because most of these events that I am talking about have either been our creation or have come about with our participation.

As concerns the United States, I would say this. It has waited too long in studying whether our changes are simply to the facade, repair work, whether our changes are restricted merely to cosmetic adjustments to what used to exist, and how seriously we have decided for ourselves to be different, how seriously we have decided to purge our society, our philosophy, of everything that was not only unnecessary but that was harmful to ourselves, first and foremost, to the Soviet Union and the Soviet people. In this case, naturally, our starting point and that of the United States were not the same, and

hence the consequences of the changes have also proved to be different. If we judge only by the external picture of these events, without going into things deeply, then we may regrettably arrive at inadequate conclusions, something that I think we would want to avoid, that must be avoided in order not to lose the right reference points for policy.

[Zhurkin] It seems to me, Valentin Sergeyevich, that here we have arrived at what is at once the obvious and the most important thing, that evidently cooperation is fundamental, serious and long-term when a coincidence of interests has been found. It seems to me that what is typical of today's stage of Soviet-U.S. relations is that this coincidence of interests is being found more and more, not only in the traditional sphere of arms reductions, where there have been such periods previously, as well, but also, for instance, in mutual interest in the success of reforms in the Soviet Union, in mutual interest in political stability in the world, where previously there was no such interest. I believe that only this constant search for mutual interest between ourselves and the rest of the world will provide the fundamental basis upon which it will be possible to overcome the difficulties, contradictions, and elements of confrontation which will probably always objectively exist in life.

[Zorin] I would like to thank you, Valentin Mikhaylovich, and you, Vitaliy Vladimirovich, and not simply out of pure politeness because that is the custom at the end of a program, but because it seems to me that the very tone of today's discussion, what you have said, and the way in which you have said it have given or ought to have given an answer to our television viewers who are concerned over the question of whether we are displaying excessive euphoria over the fact that the cold war has ended or is ending. The position of eminent Soviet specialists in my opinion indicates that no, we are not in a state of euphoria of that kind. The situation is being analyzed in a sufficiently well-considered and sober way. We see the positive things that have entered international life. The ending of the cold war is a fact, there's no getting away from it and we are glad about that. But there are some absolutely serious problems. We see them, too, and I believe that we will be discussing this on more than one occasion here in "Studio Nine" in the future. Therefore I once again give you my thanks. I thank our viewers for their attention. Until we meet again in "Studio Nine." Thank you.

Kvitsinskiy, Europeans Discuss CSCE Issues

PM2705142591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 May 91 Union Edition p 5

[Unattributed report: "USSR-EC Dialogue Developing"; names of EC officials as transliterated]

[Text] On 24 May Yu.A. Kvitsinskiy, USSR first deputy foreign minister, held consultations at the USSR Foreign Ministry with representatives of the foreign ministries of EC member states (the EC "troika"): Zh.-Zh. Kazel, director of the Luxembourg Foreign Ministry Political Department, D.-M. Borg, director of the Italian Foreign Ministry Political Department, and S. Krener, special envoy of the Netherlands Foreign Ministry.

Discussion centered on questions of deepening the all-European process in the light of the first session of the CSCE Foreign Ministers Council, set for Berlin on 19 and 20 June.

There was also an exchange of opinions on questions of a Near East settlement and problems of southern Africa and Central America.

Independent Humanitarians Congress Ends in Moscow

LD3105021191 Moscow TASS in English 1820 GMT 30 May 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Mikhail Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow May 30 TASS—The first international congress for humanitarian studies and the formation of a new intellectual environment, which was held in the olympian youth centre outside Moscow from May 28-30, was intended as the first step towards working out a new scientific world view capable of adequately reflecting modern social development tendencies in the Soviet Union.

The congress was organised by Moscow's Epokha Centre for Humanitarian Studies and the Fund of Independent Humanitarian Studies.

Among foreign participants in the forum were Mark Teetor, deputy head of the U.S. Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, and representatives of some alternative research organisations from East European countries, including Bulgarian Economy 2000, the Czechoslovak Institute for Liberal Studies and the Polish International Research Fund.

An organizing committee chairman, Aleksey Titov, told TASS that one of the main results of the forum was "the organizational formation of the coordinating committee to coordinate the activities of more than 100 Soviet brain trusts".

The committee will handle preparations for the next congress scheduled for next May in Kazakhstan. Invitations to attend will be sent to representatives of 15 Western universities, including the British Universities of Cambridge and Oxford and the U.S. Georgetown, Columbia, Princeton and Stanford Universities.

United States & Canada

Talks on Asia-Pacific Region To Open 31 May

LD3005142291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1325 GMT 30 May 91

[Text] Moscow, 30 May (TASS)—It was officially announced here today that the next Soviet-U.S. consultations on the problems of the Asian Pacific region will be held in Luxembourg on 31 May-1 June. On the U.S. side, the talks will be led by Richard Soloman, U.S. assistant secretary of state for the East Asia and the Pacific affairs; and on the Soviet side, by Igor Rogachev, USSR deputy foreign minister.

Among the questions under discussion will be the prospects of the settlement in Cambodia, situation in the North Eastern Asia and the Korean Peninsula, the regional trade and economic cooperation, USSR and U.S. contacts with the countries of this region.

Commentator Welcomes Bush Middle East Initiative

LD3005133191 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 30 May 91

[Commentary by analyst Yuriy Solton]

[Excerpts] President Bush of the United States has come up with an initiative to control weapons in the Middle East. [passage omitted] Our analyst, Yuriy Solton, has this comment:

Without doubt the President's initiative is worthy of the most serious consideration. If translated into reality it will reduce essentially the potential threat of more armed clashes. The American initiative will undoubtedly be welcomed in Soviet official quarters.

I'd like to recall at this point that during the talk between Mikhail Gorbachev and the American secretary of state, James Baker, in Moscow on 15 March a document was handed over to the American official containing the Soviet Union's considerations about the fundamental principles of a postwar settlement in the Persian Gulf zone. The document gave much attention to the need to curb the arms race in the Middle East and in Southwest Asia. It proposes that a zone be set up in those regions free from weapons of mass destruction. The level of armaments in regional countries should be reduced to defense sufficiency level and the question about curtailing the delivery of weapons there, offensive weapons above all, should be solved.

As you may see, the Soviet proposals and the American President's initiative have much in common. They have been influenced, I believe, by the recent cooperation between the two countries in search of a settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict of long standing. The road between the proclamation of the proposals and their implementation is, of course, hard to negotiate.

When President Bush was putting forward his initiative he said he did that after consulting governments of regional countries and of some other states. Israel's immediate reaction to it was, if not negative, then very reserved. In principle Tel Aviv seems to have no objection to curtailing conventional weapons deliveries to the Middle East. This concerns Israel in a much lesser degree. Israel itself produces tanks and missiles and is an exporter of weapons.

But when it comes to nuclear weapons, Israel was given to understand that the proposed approach is unacceptable. It confirms thereby calculations by Western, above all American, experts concerning Israel's nuclear program and the existence of nuclear warheads.

There is one more thing that should be stressed. The proposal by President Bush doesn't quite tally with statements by the American defense secretary, Richard Cheney. He said among other things that the support of such strategic allies as Israel was much more important for Washington than the embargo on arms deliveries to the region.

But no matter what difficulties the curbing of the arms race in the Middle East may involve, it is imperative.

Border Guards Commander on U.S. Naval Visit

LD3005115191 Moscow TASS in English 1015 GMT 30 May 91

[Text] Vladivostok May 30 TASS—"I left my heart in Vladivostok" said Captain John Parker, commander of the U.S. frigate Mellon, at the end of a visit here during which he and his crew were able to go aboard Soviet border patrol vessels, take part in Slavonic celebrations and meet local people.

"Soviet border guards and American coastal defence units have the same job of protecting the (?ocean and) rescuing people at sea" said Lieutenant-General Mikhail Baribin, chief of USSR Pacific Region Border Troops. "We used to take decisions independently. But now I think its time to build a bridge of trust and friendship between us as solid as the Golden Gate bridge in San Francisco which survived the earthquake. It is good that the border services of both countries can work together".

Gorbachev Message Read to ASTEC Session

LD3105103491 Moscow TASS in English 1014 GMT 31 May 91

[By Correspondent Igor Makurin]

[Text] Rye, New York, May 31 TASS—The 14th annual meeting of the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council (ASTEC) has opened in this northern suburb of New York.

It is being attended by about 500 directors of state-run organisations, businesses, various associations and cooperatives who represent the entire spectrum of the forms of ownership, all economic sectors and the majority of the Soviet Union's regions.

Prospects for business cooperation under the conditions of restructuring in the USSR, the development of joint ventures, and a quest for new forms of cooperation will be considered at the meeting.

Specific areas of cooperation in agriculture, the power industry, machine-building, medicine and health care, the chemical and pharmaceutical branches of industry, biotechnology, and tourism will be discussed in ASTEC committees.

Much attention will be devoted to the political, legal and financial problems that hinder the normal development of trade-and- economic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Those present were addressed by Soviet presidential adviser Anatoliy Dobrynin who read out a message of greetings from Mikhail Gorbachev. The message points out in particular that the historic changes that took place in the world have laid the foundation of the development of the world community for decades ahead.

A transition from confrontation to cooperation for the benefit of people is how one can define the essence of changes taking place in the world, the message says.

Despite inevitable difficulties along the road, the document states, the Soviet Union is fully determined to cover it and worthily respond to the challenges of the present complicated but interesting times.

The current restructuring of the Soviet economy and the transition to market methods of management, the message emphasises, open up new additional opportunities for deeper economic cooperation between the two great powers.

The Soviet president expressed the hope that ASTEC's current meeting would yield specific results in the name of raising the well-being of and building trust between the peoples of the two great powers.

In a similar message, U.S. President George Bush pointed out the importance of recent serious political and economic changes that have opened up vast opportunities for cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States and emphasised his commitment to the development of bilateral and economic relations.

Bush urged U.S. business circles to show more initiative in developing cooperation with the Soviet Union and welcomed their efforts to establish relations with Soviet republics, individual areas and cities.

Primakov, Shcherbakov Continue Talks

LD3105082991 Moscow TASS in English 0756 GMT 31 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyashin]

[Text] Washington May 31 TASS—Member of the Soviet Security Council Yevgeni Primakov and First Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Shcherbakov, who are in Washington on instructions from the Soviet president, held meetings with senior U.S. Administration officials on Thursday. [30 May]

The Soviet statesmen held the second round of consultations with Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Michael Boskin. Later, they met Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, House of Representatives Speaker Thomas Foley and the leaders of the House of Representatives.

Member of the Soviet expert group Grigoriy Yavlinskiy and Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Viktor Komplektov also participated in contacts with representatives of the U.S. Administration.

President George Bush will receive Soviet representatives today. White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater said that the White House meeting will sum up the results of discussions with U.S. Administration officials and give a chance to submit President Gorbachev's opinion to President Bush.

Describing contacts and consultations Primakov and Shcherbakov had in Washington, Fitzwater called them very good discussions on structural reforms and other changes in the Soviet Union.

The spokesman said that the United States is interested in the progress of Soviet reforms. He stressed that the sides are not discussing a specific aid programme but the process of changes in the Soviet Union.

This idea was confirmed by Primakov during a news conference after a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. He noted that the sides did not discuss "any specific financial aid to the USSR".

Fitzwater said at the same time that the administration is now considering the question of additional credits to the USSR, guaranteed by the federal government, to purchase agricultural goods and granting to the Soviet Union a Most Favoured Nation treatment status. But the final decision has not been taken, he added.

The AP news agency, referring to a senior administration official, reported that in actual fact the White House approved a decision to repeal the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which will give a chance to the USSR to get loans from American banks and credits to purchase agricultural products.

This decision is supported by the American business community and farmers, who believe that broader trade with the USSR is very profitable for the United States.

Meet with Administration Officials

LD3005225191 Moscow TASS in English 2217 GMT 30 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyashin]

[Text] Washington May 31 TASS—Visiting member of the Soviet Security Council Yevgeniy Primakov and First Prime Minister [as received] Vladimir Shcherbakov, here on the instruction of the Soviet president, on Thursday continued meetings with high-ranking U.S. administration officials.

They held the second round of talks with head of the U.S. President's Council of Economic Advisers Michael Boskin. Later, they are expected to meet U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Frederic Brady. Soviet expert Grigory Yavlinsky and Soviet Ambassador to the United States Viktor Komplektov are taking part in meetings with U.S. officials.

The White House on Thursday announced that President George Bush Will receive the Soviet envoys. White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said the meeting will allow the sides to sum up the results of discussions with administration representatives and directly convey President Bush's opinion to President Gorbachev.

Characterising contacts and consultations by Primakov and Shcherbakov in Washington, Fitzwater said they were very good discussions on structural reforms and other changes in the Soviet Union.

Fitzwater said the United States wants to help and is interested in their progress. The United States wants to be useful and has various means for this. Fitzwater noted that the sides are discussing not a specific aid programme, but exchange opinions on the process of economic reforms.

Primakov told a news conference here on Thursday after his meeting with Secretary of State James Baker, that during talks the sides did not discuss specific figures of financial aid to the Soviet Union, proposed by the Soviet side or the United States. The sides were discussing reciprocal movement, as Soviet reforms move ahead, Primakov said.

Fitzwater said the administration is discussing granting additional credits to the Soviet Union, guaranteed by the federal government,to purchase agricultural products, and a most favoured nation status in trade, but the final decision has not been taken yet.

He said that by June 2, the administration is expected to resolve the issue of extending the waiver for the Soviet Union through the Jackson-Vanik amendment, as a preparatory move towards granting it the most favoured nation status. The amendment ties the development of trade to emigration from the country.

At the end of 1990, President Bush waived [word indistinct] Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions for the Soviet for six months. The term expires on June 2.

Quoting a high-ranking administration official, the AP news agency reports that the White House has practically approved the decision on the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which would allow the Soviet Union to receive loans in U.S. banks and credits to purchase agricultural products.

U.S. business circles and farmers favour the decision, as they believe that the broadening of trade with the Soviet Union is extremely profitable first and foremost for the United States.

If the congress blocks the decision, which is unlikely, it would lay the basis for signing a new trade agreement with Moscow and bringing down trade barriers for Soviet exports. Farmers and business have lobbied successfully in support of credit guarantees, claiming that without them the United States risk to be cut off from the vast Soviet market, the agency writes.

Meet IMF Officials

PM3005104691 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 May 91 Union Edition p 4

[Unattributed roundup of reports: "Seeking Ways to Accord"]

[Excerpt] [Passage Omitted]Ye.M. Primakov, member of the USSR Security Council, and V.I. Shcherbakov, USSR first deputy prime minister, who are in Washington on the instructions of the USSR president, met with the leadership of the World Bank and the IMF. The talks with World Bank President Conable and IMF Chairman Camdessus were of a businesslike and frank nature. G.A. Yavlinskiy, who is in the United States with the group of Soviet experts, and V.G. Komplektov, USSR ambassador to the United States, also took part. [passage omitted]

Northeast Asia

Analyst Criticizes Earlier Article on PRC

PM3005152491 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 May 91 Union Edition p 4

[Article by Aleksandr Bovin under the rubric "Political Observer's Opinion": "False Alternative"]

[Text] One of the indubitable achievements of perestroyka and democracy is the possibility of discussing foreign policy problems freely and in a businesslike way: both strategic trends and the pluses and minuses of current operations. Across the spectrum of various points of view and assessments, quite stable contours of opposing foreign policy concepts are starting to be traced. Critics of the "Gorbachev-Shevardnadze policy" affirm that this policy is based on an overestimation of

the West's (United States') peace-loving nature, tends toward unilateral concessions, and replaces a class analysis of events by an abstract "common human" attitude.

It is in this context, I think, that we should review the curious article written by Ed. Gams and Yu. Selivanov, "The Eastern Alternative," published in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 23 May of this year.

Let us trace and comment on the two authors' train of thought.

"Having seized tiny Grenada, and then swallowed a tastier morsel—Panama, the United States is today 'eyeing' the whole Persian Gulf, and tomorrow the American armed forces may be faced with new, even more far-reaching tasks. In other words," the authors conclude, "capitalism has moved into the 'strategic counteroffensive.'"

I think the authors are too arbitrary in interpreting events. Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf are not links or stages in one unified strategic plan. We are not faced with a series of chess moves, where the next move is logically connected with the previous one, but the shots of a billiards player, when each shot is a reaction to the given, practically unpredictable, position of the balls.

Furthermore, Grenada and Panama were the United States' last police actions in the "cold war" period. The Persian Gulf was the first collective action, approved by all the permanent members of the UN Security Council, aimed at using arms to put an end to aggression. In taking upon itself most of the strictly military actions and dealing with them brilliantly, the United States was obviously protecting its own interests. But not only that. Objectively it was protecting the interests of all the oil importers, and the interests of many Arab states. Finally, it protected the interests of the world.

So that the two authors were clearly too hasty with their capitalist counteroffensive.

"Western strategists," Ed. Gams and Yu. Selivanov go on to report, "see no place for a 'powerful socialist Soviet state' in the future map of the world. They agree to continue their partnership with Moscow but they do so on condition that the USSR is weakened 'and even dismembered.' And not only do they impose this as a 'condition,' they are 'increasingly purposefully' working toward the disintegration of the USSR."

And again you have to state that the authors are dealing with facts and interpretations of them too arbitrarily. Of course, the United States and their allies are trying and will continue to try to use the crisis in Soviet society and the retreat of world socialism to their own ends. Of course there are people in the West who would be happy to step up the crisis process in the Soviet Union, thus further weakening our country. All this is true. But when it comes to the West's "big-time politics," it is geared to a stable Soviet Union. The disintegration of the Union and the appearance of separate "sovereign principalities" in its place, and particularly—if you bear in mind the nuclear missile aspect of the problem—the unpredictable nature of relations among them, as well as between them and their neighbors—all this will unbalance international relations to such an extent that a real threat of major and minor military conflicts will arise. Whom would that suit?

Now about "conditions." Who is laying down what condition? The West believes that if a particular republic insists on withdrawing from the Union, it should have the possibility of putting this right into practice unhindered. If Moscow applies force in order to hinder the self-determination of a particular people, this will cause sharp deterioration in its relations with the West.

Strictly speaking, formally, no one is presenting us with this "ultimatum." But—and this is perhaps more serious than formal demands—it is presented by the logic of life, the logic of the new political thinking, the logic of democracy. We ourselves must understand that if we stamp out by force freedom of choice and the right of nations to self-determination, we will sign our own verdict of "guilty," we ourselves will start a new "cold war," we ourselves will start a new spiral in the arms race.

Evidently Ed. Gams and Yu. Selivanov would not be put out by such a turn of events.

"Since," they affirm, "we cannot accept 'ultimatums,' then we have to abandon hope of further rapprochement with the West in the majority of spheres that are vitally important to us. Thus, the present orientation of Soviet foreign policy, mainly geared to the West, is proving its inferiority."

"What next? Complete international isolation? Another break with world civilization?" The authors ask these rhetorical questions in order to immediately allay readers' fears. The Soviet Union has an alternative as regards foreign policy, they assure us. "The name of this alternative is China. To be more precise, a new Soviet-Chinese rapprochement." Insisting on the beneficial nature of this rapprochement (which in itself is indisputable), Ed. Gams and Yu. Selivanov crown this with strategic cooperation in the military-political sphere, which, according to them, could radically change the existing balance of military forces, which is unfavorable to the PRC and the USSR, and create conditions for talks—based on true equal rights—on military detente and arms reduction. "It is simply amazing," the authors exclaim, "how we have been bewitched by the sweet sounds of the 'sirens' of Western democracy, and have managed to almost lose sight of our great Eastern neighbor"...

Clearly, this is being overemotional. But essentially the two authors' reproach is partially just. It seems to me too that by solving tasks of the utmost importance in the western direction, we have unjustifiably let our attention wander away from the eastern direction. It is not that we

have "lost sight of it," but we should act in a more enterprising way, more energetically and flexibly. And I am prepared to give 100 percent support to the idea of a more active approach to Soviet-Chinese rapprochement.

But I really do not like this idea of alternatives. After all, according to Ed. Gams and Yu. Selvanov, broadly speaking, the state of affairs looks like this: You will not get very far with the West, it goes on the offensive, changes the military balance to its own advantage, and demands as payment for its partnership the dismemberment of the USSR. So let us change our priorities, let us turn to the East. Let us adopt a policy of new rapprochement with China. Operating together, we can restore the global equilibrium of forces, which was on the point of being shattered, and, so to speak, put the West in its place.

In short, an about-face!

Incidentally, it would be a good idea to consult the Chinese. I fear that the idea of rapprochement with the USSR to counterbalance relations with Western states would not meet with understanding and support in Beijing. China's state interests require stable and equal relations both with the Soviet Union and with the United States (the West). Only exceptional and emergency circumstances might force China to abandon this position. At the moment I do not see such circumstances.

On the other hand, Moscow has no grounds to put the question as "either—or." Chaos in the economy, political struggle, and interethnic conflicts are weakening our foreign policy positions, as is clear to everyone. But we have a good reserve of strength. Our defense potential is quite adequate for any situation that may arise. It seems that we understand increasingly well that no internal problem of any importance whatsoever can be resolved if this is not done by democratic means. Therefore let us not make ourselves nervous and frighten ourselves with the insidiousness of various "forces" and "circles," and let us not fuss and rush about from side to side, juggling with priorities.

You cannot put it like this: China "to spite" the West. Or the West "instead of" China. We have already gone through this at political primary school. Now we have to resolve more complex tasks.

DPRK Reported Ready for Nuclear Talks

SK3105031391 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean 1200 GMT 30 May 91

[From the "Asian News" program under the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] The DPRK has told the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] that it is willing to resume talks to discuss its subscription to a nuclear inspection agreement. So said an IAEA official in Vienna. A spokesman for the IAEA pointed out that Pyongyang expressed its willingness to resume the talks in a letter to IAEA Director General Hans Brix and that Pyongyang did not mention anything about U.S. nuclear weapons in the ROK. Pyongyang had cited those weapons as a basic obstacle to signing an inspection agreement. This agreement foresees the IAEA's inspection of all nuclear facilities on the DPRK territory.

Yazov Receives DPRK Army Political Chief

PM3005112691 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 May 91 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed untitled report under general heading "Meetings at the USSR Defense Ministry"]

[Text] USSR Defense Minister Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov received on 29 May a delegation of leading Korean People's Army political workers headed by Colonel General Yi Pong-won, first deputy director of the Korean People's Army General Political Bureau.

Colonel General N.I. Shlyaga, USSR first deputy defense minister and chief of the USSR Armed Forces Main Military-Political Directorate, took part in the talk, which was held in a warm and friendly atmosphere.

General Departs for Japanese Military Conference

LD2405112391 Moscow TASS in English 0759 GMT 24 May 91

[By Correspondent Anatoliy Vostokov]

[Text] Khabarovsk May 24 TASS—Soviet representatives will take part for the first time in a meeting of high-ranking military leaders from Asian-Pacific countries. Commander of the far eastern military area Colonel-General Viktor Novozhilov left for Japan to attend the conference today.

In keeping with agreements reached during President Gorbachev's recent visit to Japan, regular contacts are to be promoted among various establishments, including military organisations. A "roundtable" is being held on the initiative of the newspaper's "YOMIURI" and "IZVESTIYA". It will be attended by military commanders from Japan, North and South Korea, China, and from the U.S. Pacific force and the Soviet far eastern military area.

Before flying for Japan, General Novozhilov told TASS: "The forthcoming 'roundtable' is the first meeting of this kind, showing that the political climate is becoming warmer. Military leaders must also seek confidence-building measures, must hold meetings, compare their views and find mutually acceptable solutions. We are already witnessing progress in this direction. We have ceased to regard each other as enemies and have begun to understand the interests of each country of this region. Such meetings will allow us to relax tension. For instance, it is still firmly believed that Soviet troops in the Far East constitute a serious threat to Japan. I will try to prove by figures and facts that our forces are of a

purely defensive nature. I have analysed the figures on our Armed Forces, published in Japan's 'white paper'. These figures are at least double the actual strength of the Soviet Armed Forces. As a matter of fact, the 'paper' does not take into account the U.S. forces, deployed in the Pacific area. However, they are as strong as our two military areas and the Pacific Fleet combined. We will try to establish the truth through an open dialogue."

General Novozhilov said that negotiations were the only way to resolve outstanding problems.

Examination of PRC View of DPRK UN Admission

SK3005113191 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean 1430 GMT 29 May 91

[Talk by station reporter from "Today's World" program]

[Text] Commenting on the decision by the DPRK on admission to the United Nations, the British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC] Radio expressed its opinion that Beijing may have influenced Pyongyang in regard to its UN admission.

All considered, China may have informed Pyongyang that it would not exercise its veto right when the ROK applies for UN admission, the BBC Radio reporter in Beijing pointed out.

According to observers of PRC-ROK relations, Beijing will not oppose the ROK's admission to the United Nations. This has been pointed out many times recently, and such reports will promote the development of relations between the PRC and ROK.

Seoul has been stressing the need for early establishment of diplomatic relations with Beijing. Taking relations with Pyongyang into consideration, the PRC has consistently displayed its carefulness. Its traditional relations with the DPRK, however, will not block development of relations between the PRC and ROK—particularly, economic cooperation.

According to publications released in Seoul, China has became the number one trade partner state, one of the states the ROK pursues by its Northern Policy to establish diplomatic relations.

For example, last year's trade results between the PRC and ROK reached $3.8 billion. During three months, the first quarter of this year, the growth rate reached 42 percent. We should remember that the two countries recently and reciprocally exchanged trade missions which serve consular functions. It cannot be said that relations should be limited to trade exchanges. The PRC and ROK have even signed a long-term treaty on the study of ecology in the Yellow Sea. In addition, talks for cooperation in fisheries will be held soon.

As reported in recent Seoul publications, talks have been held to open a direct sea route between Beijing and Seoul. In short, relations between the PRC and ROK have been kept in good stride.

It has been emphasized that relations should not infringe on the interest of other countries. For example, ROK Foreign Minister Yi Sang-ok said: We will try not to obstruct relations between the PRC and North Korea when we establish formal relations with the PRC.

How does the PRC understand the issue of the two Korea's entry into the United Nations? This is already known to us. On 28 May, a spokesman for the PRC Foreign Ministry said that the issue should be solved by a meeting between the North and South. Noting the decision by the DPRK to unilaterally enter the United Nations, he pointed out that this will help promote a dialogue between the two sides of Korea and that this also will be a step to consolidate peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.

Soviet Koreans To Attend Seoul University

PM3005143091 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 May 91 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "University Invitation"]

[Text] For the first time in the history of Soviet-South Korean relations, a delegation of teachers of Korean nationality from the USSR arrived in the South Korean capital Monday at the invitation of Seoul University. During the next two weeks they will attend a course here within the framework of a training program for Koreans living outside Korea.

As an official representative of the university noted, this is the first time they have invited citizens of a so-called "communist bloc" country for tuition. The 30 Soviet guests will attend short study courses in Korean culture, history, and language practice.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

View of Suharto's Symposium Speech

BK3105101591 Moscow Radio Moscow in Indonesian 1630 GMT 30 May 91

[Commentary by Vladimir Dolov]

[Text] Speaking at a recent symposium on state defense in Jakarta, Indonesian President Suharto said a totalitarian and centralized government system cannot grow fast enough to match progress. He said we need a system which will provide wide opportunities for the development of people's initiative and dynamism. In this connection, the Indonesian leader called for political reforms in the country.

It is an undeniable fact that a totalitarian and centralized government restricts the intellectual potential of a nation. The validity of this view is proven from the bitter experience of many countries, including those in Asia. It

is encouraging to hear a statement issued by a leader whose experience is closely related to the political life and other spheres of life in Indonesia in the last 25 years.

Let us consider the background of the decision to embark on this course of action. The well calculated and tactical move of an experienced politician on the eve of general elections in response to the changing situation and new aspirations in his country is indeed understandable in view of fresh winds blowing outside his country. The Indonesian president has certainly responded to the new aspirations in his country.

In the second half of the 1980's, President Suharto adopted a series of policies, though perhaps only half-heartedly, toward a more democratic climate in Indonesia. This can be seen from the relaxation of censorship and increase of political parties' activities. Newspapers and magazines in Indonesia began to discuss topics considered to be taboo in the past, such as the role of the military in society, leadership succession, conditions of low-income people, and others. The government has called on the people to be more vocal on domestic affairs.

This trend has given rise to the belief that fresh winds of change have begun to blow in the country as seen from President Suharto's call for further actions to consolidate the process of change.

Thai Prime Minister on ASEAN Dialogue

LD3105023391 Moscow TASS in English 1456 GMT 30 May 91

[Text] Kuala Lumpur May 30 TASS—Thai Prime Minister Anan Panyarachun today said he sees no difficulties in the participation of the Soviet Union and China in a dialogue with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Addressing a news conference in the Malaysian capital, the visiting Thai prime minister said that during talks with his Malaysian counterpart, Bin Mohamad Mahathir, they specially discussed the issue.

Panyarachun said they realised the fact that the Soviet Union and China have legal grounds for taking part in the dialogue. He said he believed that the issue will be settled soon via corresponding channels.

The dialogue within ASEAN, uniting six dynamically developing Asian countries—Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines—has been traditionally held in the form of annual meetings between the countries' foreign ministers and their counterparts from partner countries, which include Australia, the EEC, Canada, New Zealand, the United States and Japan. Recently, South Korea has become another partner.

This year, such a dialogue will be held in the Malaysian capital in July, soon after the annual meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers ends here.

Panyarachun favoured broadening the association and including Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and [word indistinct] in the regional group. He said he believed that this will happen in good time. ASEAN is not an inaccessible club, he said.

According to Panyarachun, there are no insurmountable obstacles to their joining the association. There are some practical problems, such as the existence of centralised economies in the countries, he said.

Near East & South Asia

Commentary on Settlement of Afghan Problem

TA3005152291 Moscow Radio Moscow in Dari to Afghanistan 1600 GMT 29 May 91

[Commentary by Sergey Viktorov]

[Text] Dear listeners: Sebghatollah Mojaddedi, president of the Afghan opposition interim government, has said that a political settlement of the Afghan problem is in fact possible. At the same time, however, he called for the resignation of President Najibullah. Radio Moscow commentator Sergey Viktorov writes on this:

Dear Afghan friends, greetings. Sebghatollah Mojaddedi's stance on a political settlement is, in general, not new. As in the past, the head of the Mujahidin interim government did not rule out the possibility of a peaceful solution to the Afghan problem. It is not clear whether by this he means the UN's specific plan in this respect, or whether he is basically not opposed to the political means for solving this problem. Most important of all, though, is that the leader of the interim government has raised a condition which does not seem acceptable to Kabul. The question is over the demand for the resignation of President Najibullah. Thus, in effect, Mojaddedi is calling for Kabul's capitulation, but it is very clear that even if President Najibullah were to resign, apparently this would still not be adequate. Naturally, the government would fall automatically, and then the collapse of the present government infrastructure would begin. This entails the danger of general chaos. Therefore, it is difficult to envision that the Kabul government will agree to voluntary capitulation. Hence, in this case it cannot be said that dialogue constitutes an undeniable part of the political settlement process. Which partner will engage in negotiations if he has to capitulate in advance?

It seems that, in fact, the Kabul government does not intend to capitulate. In recent months government forces have achieved certain successes on the battlefield. Therefore, the suggestion for the government's resignation as a condition for a political settlement is a step backward. Sebghatollah Mojaddedi may not be aware of this, but the positions of other Afghan opposition leaders regarding a political settlement are more specific. On behalf of five main groups, Golbuddin Hekmatyar has

rejected the UN plan which has won the backing of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Pakistan.

Among the warlike calls by leaders of the opposition some sober voices are also being heard. Seyyed Ahmad Gilani, leader of the Islamic National Front of Afghanistan, while visiting Tehran termed the UN plan positive. Moreover, the reaction of Afghan local commanders, whose stance may be more important than the positions of the Peshawar leaders, is still unknown. Therefore, even the negative stance of the majority of Afghan opposition leaders toward a political settlement of the Afghan problem on the basis of the UN plan does not mean that this process has no future.

Israel 'Pressing' USSR on New Emigration Law

TA3005135191 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 30 May p 10

[Report by Walter Ruby]

[Text] Moscow—Col. Y. Alpatov, director of the Moscow department of the USSR emigration agency, told a Jewish leader here yesterday that Jews leaving will soon require Soviet passports and not exit visas. This will delay tens of thousands planning to go after July 1 by from one to four months.

Alexander Schmuckler, head of the Vaad, the umbrella organization of Soviet Jewry, said a proviso to the recently passed emigration law means that after July 1, 1991, all Jews emigrating from the country will retain Soviet citizenship and property rights.

But because as many as 200,000 Jews want to leave, and because it will take time for the cash-pressed state to print the necessary documents, many are likely to face delays.

Both the Vaad and Israeli consulate are believed to be pressing Soviet officials about the problem.

Azerbaijan Seeks Representation in Jerusalem

TA3005133591 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 30 May 91 p 10

[Report by Walter Ruby]

[Text] Moscow—Azerbaijani President Ayaz Mutalibov wants to open an Azeri representation in Jerusalem, Science Minister Yuval Ne'eman said yesterday.

He said that in a Monday meeting, he and Mutalibov agreed in principle to establish representations in each other's capitals, and that Mutalibov made clear that the Azeri representation should be in Jerusalem, not Tel Aviv.

The two also agreed on flights between Baku and Tel Aviv, and Mutalibov said he hopes to turn Baku into the main point of embarkation for aliya from the southern part of the Soviet Union.

The Azeris expressed interest in obtaining Israeli agricultural technology, Ne'eman said, and urged close cooperation in scientific research.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Correspondent on Path to Angolan Peace

OW3105082991 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1830 GMT 30 May 91

["Angola: Farewell to Arms? by Mikhail Mayorov, Diplomatic Panorama correspondent"—INTERFAX headline]

[Text] Tomorrow, May 31, President of Angola, Jose Eduardo dos Santos and the UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, will meet in Lisbon to sign the peace agreement—an event of historic importance for a country which has been in a state of civil war for about 15 years. The ceremony will be attended by UN Secretary-General, Perez de Cuellar, by the Portugal leaders who mediated during the seven rounds of talks between the conflicting parties, and also by Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and James Baker. The Soviet Union and the U.S.A. were involved in the settlement process as observers. The Soviet and American foreign ministers are expected to use the occasion for holding their regular meeting in the Portugal capital to discuss the Gorbachev-Bush Moscow summit scheduled for the summer of 1991.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry highly estimates the contribution of third countries to the success of the inter=Angolan dialogue. Vice-Chief of the African Department, Aleksandr Smirnov, told the DP [Diplomatic Panorama] correspondent that he highly appreciated the "navigating role" of Portugal which had received the participants in the talks and, by its constructive and skillful actions, had "navigated the Angolan ship to the port of pece." We hope, said the diplomat, that the Soviet and American representatives who were always present at the talks have helped lead this ship to the right direction, by giving their advice and recommendations. Cuba's decision to complete the withdrawal of its 50,000-strong military contingent which had been present in that country since 1975 was vitally important for a noticeable political stabilization in Angola.

The talks would not have beeen successful but for the important changes that have taken place in Angola, first of all in national politics. According to Smirnov who made comments for DP, of particular importance was the introduction in Angola of a multi- party system and the dissolution of party bodies in the military. This line will gain further momentum after the country's first multi-party election set for the autumn of 1992.

The Soviet diplomat's interview to DP appears to indicate that the Soviet line grows increasingly flexible and pragmatic while Angola is pressing ahead with its settlement. One sign of this increased flexibility was the

meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and the UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi last December. Other contacts of this kind are forthcoming, claimed Smirnov who believes that the transformation of armed Angolan opposition into a political opposition is likely to help Moscow establish contacts with the entire spectrum of the nation's political forces.

Questioned about the stopping of Soviet and U.S. arms deliveries to Angola, the Soviet diplomat specified that the cease-fire agreement contains corresponding commitments for the USSR and the U.S.A. So far as Moscow is concerned, it, Smirnov said, "will be to follow faithfully all of its commitments." Hopefully, Washington will follow suit, said the diplomat.

Soviet Diplomat on Situation in South Africa

LD3105012691 Moscow TASS in English 1110 GMT 30 May 91

[By diplomatic correspondent Sergey Nikishev]

[Text] Moscow May 30 TASS—"The Soviet Union favours strengthening and developing the process of dismantling apartheid in South Africa by political means," Vladimir Kazimirov, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry African Countries Department, told TASS today.

Kazimirov believes that tangible progress has been made in this direction over the past twelve to eighteen months. He said the decisions by the De Klerk government to lift the ban on the activity of the African National Congress (ANC) and other democratic organisations, the state of emergency and annul several discriminatory laws helped achieve the goal of creating a uniform, democratic and non-racial state in the country.

Direct contacts between the government and the African National Congress as the main anti-apartheid organisation and the realism and readiness to look for mutually acceptable compromises, displayed by both sides were an all-important element of current positive changes in South Africa.

At the same time, the latest developments showed that the settlement process is not yet stable, Kazimirov stressed. The ANC justly notes that the South African Government has still to comply with all commitments assumed. A spate of violence between supporters of various political organisations, primarily between the ANC and Inkatha, poses a serious danger.

In these conditions it is important that all political forces in South Africa be aware of their responsibility for stabilising the situation in the country and preserving a sense of momentum in the [words inditinct] combatting violence, Kazimirov stressed. He believes that continuing the preliminary talks between the government and the ANC, which began in May 1990, is today the only way of moving towards democratic transformations in South Africa.

The Soviet Union is sincerely interested in the successful development of the process to achieve a political settlement in South Africa and is ready to give the necessary assistance to it alongside other members of the international community, Kazimirov said.

'Collapse' of USSR's Africa Policy Viewed

91UF0804A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 21, 29 May 91 p 4

["Viewpoint" by Aleksey Kiva, doctor of historical sciences: "Africa: From Scratch Here Too?"]

[Text] It is both gratifying and at the same time galling to observe the events and processes of recent years in Africa.

Gratifying because the peoples of the continent are on the point of finally ridding themselves of the last centers of colonialism and racism. The focal points of the endless fratricide and wanton destruction are dying out. Cuban forces have left Angola ahead of schedule, and an agreement putting an end to the bloody and incinerating strife, which had been going on for many years, is to be signed on 31 May. Albeit slowly, brutal dictatorial regimes are nonetheless passing into nonexistence. Under the influence of our perestroyka and also the fall of the totalitarian regimes of "real socialism" in Europe, Africa has begun to speak with full voice about the deficiency of one-party regimes and the need for a transition to political pluralism.

As far as the galling aspect is concerned, however, the reasons for it are more than sufficient. First, a considerable number of states of the continent have come to be in a zone of glaring backwardness and poverty.

Second, no less than 20 million persons are currently starving in Africa. Approximately 7 million of these are in Ethiopia. AIDS, which is spreading rapidly here, is starting to gather in its fearsome harvest.

Third, our involvement in many of the troubles of a whole number of countries is distressing. Several dictatorial regimes in Africa emerged with our participation. Theoretical (as substantiation of the progressive nature of "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship," "dictatorship of the working people," and even "proletarian dictatorship," given an absence of a proletariat) and practical—given our active military-political and economic support.

Fourth, we are witnessing, in fact, the collapse of our policy in Africa. The fall of "the last Marxist regime in Africa," as the press calls Mengistu Haile Mariam's Ethiopian regime, establishes the groundlessness of the policy of a whole historical stage.

In fact, we spent vast sums, depleting ourselves and bringing closer our present overly stretched condition.

We will most likely never get back the billions owed to us. But what is the result for us and the Africans? Let us be honest: minimal.

Many people are attempting to explain this by the hasty formation (in view of the "sudden" appearance of dozens of young African states) of a body of "Africanists" of varying qualifications studying Africa a la Chukovskiy; the weakness of the intellectual and moral potential of the staff of the so-called directive bodies; the super-ideologization of political and economic relations; the irresponsibility of the Brezhnev era; corruption; and so forth. Was this the case? Let those who know themselves answer this question. For it seems to me that all this is derivative. The decisive role here was performed by other factors. Which precisely?

First, the strategic miscalculation ensuing from a dogmatic vision of world processes. The purpose was: win the "battle for Africa." To what end? To direct Africa along the path toward socialism by means of a socialist orientation—noncapitalist development. The countries which we called "progressive" here found themselves at our prompting involved in a confrontation with the West which was murderous for them and for us.

Second, the utter groundlessness of barracks-yard socialism and the impossibility, despite colossal efforts and resources, either of helping others or making economic cooperation profitable for ourselves, were laid bare. Yes, we did in the past "win the battle" for a small number of African countries, but very shortly thereafter began to lose it.

Something similar to what was happening at home was essentially repeated in Africa: collectivization (in this form or the other), industrialization (without regard for actual conditions), solution of the nationality question in our fashion (frequently by means of repressive measures), limitation of private initiative, a winding up of enterprise, establishment of a most brutal one-party regime, suppression of the individual and so forth.

And the results: Economic collapse. Profound social crisis. A sharp exacerbation of ethnic-national and religious problems. An explosion of centrifugal trends and separatism. And, frequently, civil war also. The "progressive regime" gradually became an avowedly military and police regime, and all its resources would go for the pursuit of a policy of repression. It gradually approached its perdition.

Third, our Africa studies, as a sphere of social science, proved exceptionally weak. In the years of perestroyka the groundlessness of our former ideas concerning the regularities of social progress, the African countries included, has on the one hand been exposed. On the other, an objective opportunity for speaking about all this openly has finally emerged. However, the leadership of the USSR Academy of Sciences Africa Institute has continued to put at the center of attention countries of a "socialist orientation" to sow illusions in respect of their historical prospects.

It will be necessary to start from scratch to a large extent. After all, Africa was and remains a continent with whose peoples we are historically "condemned" to have the broadest and most fruitful relations.

Commentary on Angolan Peace Talks

MB3005154391 Moscow Radio Moscow in Afrikaans 1900 GMT 29 May 91

[Report on statement by Vladimir Kazimirov, head of the Africa division of the USSR Department of Foreign Affairs, with Kazimirov recording in Russian fading into Afrikaans translation—read by announcer]

[Text] On the 31 May the cease-fire agreement between the Angolan Government and UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] will be signed in Lisbon. The participation of the Soviet Union and the United States in negotiations have contributed a great deal to the development, and their representatives will also be present in Lisbon on the 31 May.

Mr. Vladimir Kazimirov, the head of the Africa division of the Soviet Department of Foreign Affairs, actively participated in discussions between the two Angolan groups.

[Begin Kazimirov recording] The cease-fire agreement in Angola, reached with great difficulty with the intervention of the Soviet and American observers, is an important event. This marked an important phase in Soviet-American cooperation on matters concerning the African continent. Unfortunately, it is in this region that much inter-state and internal conflict is presently taking place.

The talks between delegations of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] and UNITA lasted for approximately one year. The Soviet Union and the U.S. joined talks in September last year following a request by the two parties and the Portuguese mediators. One can say without false modesty that when peace talks were threatened in December, it is through the intervention of the Soviet and American diplomats, as well as other mediators, that negotiations were kept on track.

It is no secret that there was mistrust and even animosity displayed in relations between the leadership of the MPLA and the leadership of UNITA, following the civil war. The task of the observers and negotiators was to overcome this mistrust and to reach a compromise on the most serious issues. In December Soviet and American experts held very delicate, independent talks with the two Angolan parties. Delegations of these observers first departed from Lisbon to London, then to Moscow and Washington. Today we can see the benefits of these discussions.

Agreement was reached step by step on the most divergent issues surrounding the talks. On 1 May documents on the cease-fire were finally accepted. Towards the middle of May military actions in Angola finally ceased.

The process of the creation of a single defense force in Angola, as well as the holding of a democratic election and several other issues were laid down in black and white. One should not think that our task was one undertaken by workers of miracles. We repeatedly realized the colossal responsibility resting on the shoulders of the Soviets, Americans and the Portuguese.

It is difficult to comprehend what 30 years of almost continuous fighting has done to Angola. Firstly, there was the liberation of the country, thereafter, the South African aggression, and lastly, the civil war. The conflict had to end. The entire international community waited for peace in Angola. Cuba also played an important role in the peace agreement even though it was not directly involved in negotiations. The balanced and sensible policy of the Cuban Government, as well as the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, definitely assisted in the reaching of a cease-fire agreement between these warring parties.

The experience of the Namibians, and now the Angolans, indicates clearly that political solutions are the only means of ending armed conflicts. It is the only sensible way to end any situation of conflict. Do we know what hardship Africa is experiencing at present? To waste money and energy on mutual destruction under these crisis situations is simply, absurd. [end recording]

East Europe

Withdrawal From Hungary Ahead of Schedule

LD3105111291 Moscow TASS in English 1049 GMT 31 May 91

[By correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow May 31 TASS—The Soviet Union will complete the withdrawal of its troops from Hungary several days before the deadline of June 30, according to Deputy Chief of the Main Department of the Soviet General Staff Major General Vladimir Zhurbenko.

A little more than 1,500 Soviet troops and five weapons systems remain in Hungary, Zhurbenko told TASS today, commenting on the beginning of the final stage of the pull-out.

More than 14,000 troops, 214 tanks, 189 armoured vehicles, 683 artillery systems and 111 aircraft have been withdrawn from Hungary since January 1, 1991, he said.

The Soviet pull-out from Czechoslovakia is also proceeding on schedule.

"There is practically no combat hardware left there and just 1,400 troops who will leave the country by June 30," Zhurbenko said.

Former Bulgarian Security Chief Visits Moscow

PM3105120391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 May 91 Union Edition p 8

[Report by N. Burbyga: "General Todorov Has Arrived in Moscow"]

[Text] The BTA news agency has reported that General Todorov, a former Bulgarian state security leader, has arrived in Moscow.

Together with other former Bulgarian state security leaders he is accused of concealing or destroying the case of Bulgarian writer G. Markov, who lived as an emigre and died in London in 1978 in unexplained circumstances. According to the agency report, the fact of General Todorov's departure has been confirmed by Bulgarian Armed Forces Chief Prosecutor Yotsov, who said that the prosecutor's office is engaged in clarifying the circumstances of the trip.

And so, has General Todorov come to Moscow and if he has then in what connection? IZVESTIYA put this question to the KGB public relations center.

"It is news to us," a KGB officer announced. "But you can telephone a little later. We shall try to find out."

A while later we were told:

"General Todorov is indeed in Moscow. He has come here at the invitation of his relations: His mother-in-law lives here. The aim of the trip is to meet with his relations and to recover his health. That is all we can say."

West Europe

Reportage on Bessmertnykh Trip to Rome, Lisbon

Comments Before Leaving Moscow

LD3005121691 Moscow TASS in English 1203 GMT 30 May 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] Moscow May 30 TASS— "Talks in Rome will focus on issues related to the situation in Europe, the forthcoming meeting of European foreign ministers in Berlin and problems of the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Certainly, talks will concern the development of Soviet-Italian relations," Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh said at Vnukovo Airport before departing for Italy and Portugal.

According to Bessmertnykh, he also intends to discuss in Rome the Soviet president's participation in the G-7 meeting. The Italian leadership dealt specifically with this issue and "it is interesting for us to know the viewpoint on this score, which will enable us to evaluate the situation," Bessmertnykh said.

He emphasised that "the USSR is not fishing for an invitation and is not making its way to the conference." At issue is "whether the Soviet Union and the world's leading states equally understand the need to meet at this point and talk about the fundamental principles of cooperation in the economic sphere."

As for Lisbon, Bessmertnykh went on, "my trip there is linked with an historic event—the achieving of a settlement in Angola. The Angolan Government and the leaders of UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] as well as Portugal, the USSR and the United States, who were actively involved in this process, had a serious role to play in finding solutions."

Bessmertnykh said representatives of all these parties would gather for the signing of the elaborated documents. Bessmertnykh said he would also meet the president, prime minister and foreign minister of Portugal.

He said a regular meeting with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker would also take place there. According to Bessmertnykh, they will continue to discuss ways of achieving a peace settlement in the Middle East and some other issues. He expressed the hope that the discussion on conventional armaments would be finalised in Lisbon, to which, he said, the visit of Mikhail Moiseyev, Chief of the General Staff, to Washington had contributed.

Bessmertnykh arrived in Rome today.

Meets Italian Counterpart in Rome

OW3105041091 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1830 GMT 30 May 91

["Diplomatic Panorama (by Mikhail Mayorov, diplomatic correspondent)"—INTERFAX headline]

[Text] On May 30, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh arrived in Lisbon to take part in the ceremony of signing the agreement on peace in Angola. On his way to the Portugal capital, the Soviet foreign Minister stopped over in Rome to meet with his counterpart, Gianni de Michelis.

The DP [Diplomatic Panorama] correspondent was informed at the Soviet Foreign Ministry's First European Department that there was nothing strange in the fact that the two ministers met just a week after Mikhail Gorbachev and head of the Italian Government Giulio Andreotti ended their talks in Moscow. The "Roman stage" was the logical continuation of the Moscow talks, he said. Mikhail Gorbachev and Giulio Andreotti had a general discussion of the problems. Now it was the turn of the foreign ministers, who had been given corresponding instructions, to concentrate on the specifics dealing with the implementation of the agreements, reached at the summit level.

In terms of the two countries' bilateral relations, the talks dealt above all with trade and economic cooperation which is the top-priority aspect for the Soviet Union, the more so since Rome has extended more than 7 billion dollars worth of credits to Moscow (the figure was given to the DP correspondent by a Soviet Foreign Ministry executive). The two ministers were planning to discuss the implementation of a number of industrial, agricultural and other projects.

In what concerns international matters, the main accent in the Soviet Italian dialogue is being shifted to the Soviet Union's possible participation in the Big Seven's conference to be held next July which Rome, judging by all accounts, is ready to support. At all appearances, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and de Michelis did not bypass the discussion of the situation in the Middle East which the two sides have been discussing lately at various levels (during the Gorbachev-Andreotti talks and during the preceding visits to Rome by Gorbachev's special envoy, academician Yevgeniy Primakov). One can also suppose that the Italian diplomats view the Soviet Union as a supporter of their idea of holding a conference on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean. There is one more suject which the two foreign ministers were to discuss at today's talks—the conference of the foreign ministers of the countries involved in the European process, to be held on june 19 and 20, said the Soviet Foreign Ministry executive.

Holds Rome News Conference with De Michelis

LD3005224291 Moscow TASS in English 2211 GMT 30 May 91

[By correspondents Sergey Startsev and Nikolay Teterin]

[Text] Rome, May 30 TASS—Visiting Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksander Bessmertnykh and his Italian counterpart Gianni De Michelis on Thursday held a joint news conference devoted to the results of their talks in Rome.

In his opening address De Michelis said that the talks reaffirmed the splendid level of cooperation and dialogue between the two countries which had already been specially stressed during the recent visit of Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti to Moscow and his talks with President Mikhail Gorbachev.

The minister said that his talks with Bessmertnykh focused on the forthcoming London summit of the leaders of the world's leading industrial powers (G-7). He reiterated Italy's support for the Soviet Union's participation in the G-7 summit.

The Soviet foreign minister expressed satisfaction with the talks during which it transpired that the Soviet and Italian interests are very close to each other with regard to major problems that exist and arise in the world. He specially stressed that the Soviet side values the developing political dialogue between the two countries. "We regard Italy as one of our leading partners not only in Europe but in the world," Bessmertnykh said.

The Soviet minister then told journalists that there existed a certain misunderstanding with regard to the Soviet Union's participation in the G-7 summit. The Soviet Union does not intend to get itself invited to the summit in order to raise the question about direct financial assistance and the like. Mankind is now facing a choice, Bessmertnykh said, between helping the striking experiment in the Soviet Union and standing on the side-lines, watching the course of events dispassionately.

"I must say with all directness that we can certainly solve all our problems by ourselves, but this will probably take more time and efforts. The question is whether we are able to undertake joint steps to ensure a more effective transition from one system to another in the Soviet Union. When President Mikhail Gorbachev's possible participation in the G-7 summit is discussed what is meant is that it would enable him to make clear to the leaders of the world's seven leading economies his concept of reforms which he is seeking to translate into life, as well as tell them about difficulties and hopes which we have. In addition he would like to share his ideas concerning possible mutually beneficial joint projects. In the final account the question is about the Soviet Union's integration into the world economy," the minister said.

Gianni De Michelis told TASS that in order to integrate the Soviet Union into the world economy the West must shoulder part of the responsibility for the gigantic process of transformations. "We must set up a kind of joint venture where each partner will run a risk and pay the costs. This is necessary not only to the Soviet Union, to us and Europe but also to the entire world community," De Michelis said.

The Italian minister pointed to the great political significance of the recent agreement between the centre and nine Soviet republics, which proved to be of decisive influence on the West's stance. He said that a great risk would be involved, including for Europe and the West as a whole, if the perestroika process became drawn out, more painful and contradictory. De Michelis said that in the final account "we would have to pay a much heavier price".

The Soviet foreign minister told journalists that he had briefed De Michelis about the state of things with regard to the problem of removing misunderstandings relating to some provisions of the conventional arms in Europe treaty signed in Paris.

Bessmertnykh expressed hope that during his forthcoming meeting with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in Lisbon the sides would manage to "bring this problem to a solution". After this, it will be easier to solve problems concerning [as received] with finalizing the strategic arms reduction treaty. If such a prospect opens up, the prospect for a Soviet-U.S. summit will also open, Bessmertnykh said.

Asked about the possibility of resumption of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Israel the Soviet minister said that such a prospect "has come much nearer and is now a mere arm's length away".

On the Middle East settlement Bessmertnykh said that the convocation of a peace conference is now being intensively discussed with those whom it immediately concerns as well as with its two initiators. He noted that a special conversation devoted to the problem will take place with James Baker in Lisbon.

Bessmertnykh said that President George Bush's recent statement on arms supplies to the Middle East "deserves most serious study and analysis".

As regards the Soviet Union's reaction to developments in Yugoslavia, the Soviet foreign minister said "we are much worried with the situation that is arising there, first of all from the viewpoint that these events may affect the situation in Europe as a whole, especially in the region adjacent to Yugoslavia".

Talks Reported

LD3105015991 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 30 May 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh arrived in Rome today for a brief working visit. He has conducted talks with Gianni de Michelis, the head of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Correspondent Vybornov reports:

[Vybornov] A broad spectrum of issues was covered among the subjects discussed during the 90-minute talks, first closed, one-to- one, and then with the participation of the respective delegations. And, inter alia, cutting conventional arms in Europe, preparing for the conference of foreign ministers in Berlin, the situation in the region of the Horn of Africa, and Yugoslavia. The parties exchanged opinions on the acute problem of a Near East settlement.

[Begin Bessmertnykh recording] You know, we have discussed the most urgent, topical matters concerning our relations. Primarily we have discussed the problem of economic links. In this context we talked on the prospect of attendance by the Soviet Union at the sitting of the seven leading industrial states. Italy is taking a very positive, constructive stance in this regard. We have a large degree of mutual understanding here, and we highly rate the approach the Italian Government is demonstrating to these matters. As far as issues regarding the Near East are concerned, our basic approaches coincide, although, it goes without saying, there are nuances from the point of view of tactical elements, and so forth. [end recording]

[Announcer] Today, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh arrived in Lisbon.

Preview of Lisbon Visit

LD3105061291 Moscow TASS in English 0602 GMT 31 May 91

[By correspondents Vladimir Reshetilov and Mikhail Shevtsov]

[Text] Lisbon May 31 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksander Bessmertnykh arrived in the Portuguese capital on Thursday. Today he will attend a ceremony of the signing of Angolan peace accords between Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] leader Jonas Savimbi.

The ceremony will signify the end of the civil war in Angola and mark the beginning of the country's peaceful development on the principles of political pluralism and democracy.

"The signing of documents that will mark the end of the 30-years- long conflict in Angola is a very important international event," the Soviet minister told journalists upon arriving in Lisbon.

"The fact that the ceremony will be attended by several ministers of foreign affairs, the United Nations secretary-general and the leadership of Portugal shows that collective efforts are the main and, possibly, the only way to resolve conflicts of such magnitude," Bessmertnykh said.

He will meet Portuguese Prime Minister Anibal Antonio Cavaco Silva and Foreign Minister Joao de Deus Pinheiro today.

Prior to the signing ceremony on Friday, Bessmertnykh is to meet Portuguese President Mario Soares, U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, as well as Jose Eduardo Santos and Jonas Savimbi.

On Saturay Bessmertnykh will hold talks with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. Touching upon the forthcoming meeting with Baker, Bessmertnykh emphasised that he expects that problems connected with the conventional forces in Europe treaty will be settled in Lisbon. The minister voiced hope that talks with the U.S. secretary of state will be productive and useful.

The situation in the Middle East and prospects for the convocation of an international Middle East peace conference, which is being advocated by the Soviet Union and the United States, will be discussed during the meeting, Bessmertnykh said.

Italy Supports Soviet Participation in Talks

LD3105094591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0728 GMT 31 May 91

[Text] [No dateline as received] Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh carried out a brief working visit to Italy on 30 June [as received] this year. Talks took place with Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis during which topical international problems and questions of Soviet-Italian cooperation were considered.

The problem of integrating the Soviet economy into the system of world economic ties was broadly raised. In this context, the question of the USSR possibly taking part in the July meeting of leaders of the Seven industrially developed countries, was touched upon, a proposal which is actively supported by Italy. It was agreed to continue discussing concrete economic aspects at the expert level in the next few days.

The ministers exchanged views on the further dynamics of the all-European process in connection with the forthcoming first meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the CSCE. The Italian side reacted positively to new ideas on this which were formulated in a recent letter from the Soviet minister to participants in the session.

Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and Gianni de Michelis noted with concern the danger of negative effects on the situation in Europe due to the disintegration phenomenon in Yugoslavia, and expressed the hope that the Yugoslavs will find a way out of the situation which has taken shape there by peaceful democratic means.

During discussion of disarmament topics it was noted that a settlement in the near future of a few remaining questions in connection with a treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe will open up prospects for further progress in the sphere of reducing both conventional and nuclear weapons.

An exchange of views on a Middle East settlement, taking into account efforts which have been made recently to convene a peace conference, revealed a significant degree of coincidence of approaches.

Having discussed the complicated events in regions of conflict in Africa, the ministers adopted a joint Soviet-Italian statement on the Horn of Africa, and also on Angola and Mozambique.

During the talks both sides highly appraised the level and richness of Soviet-Italian dialogue and the benevolent nature of relations between the two countries.

"The results of my recent visit to Japan allow me to think that a positive decision will be taken about the participation of USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev in the forthcoming meeting of the 'Seven'," stated the Italian foreign minister to the TASS correspondent. The United States has not yet held consultations with the Italian side on this question. These consultations can take place soon at the conference of representatives of heads of states of the 'Seven.' In any event, stressed the Italian minister, Italy's position is utterly clear: We support the participation of the Soviet Union in this meeting.

Departs Rome for Lisbon

LD3005151191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1404 GMT 30 May 91

[By correspondents Sergey Startsev and Nikolay Teterin]

[Text] Rome 30 May (TASS)—USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, who was here today on a short working visit, has left for Lisbon.

He had talks in Rome with Gianni de Michelis, head of Italy's foreign political department. Leading topical problems of international politics, the development of Soviet-Italian relations, and questions connected with the forthcoming meeting in London in July of leaders of the seven leading Western industrially developed countries were discussed.

Meetings will be held in Lisbon between A. Bessmertnykh and the president, prime minister, and foreign minister of Portugal, as well as a regular meeting with U.S. Secretery of State James Baker.

Arrives in Lisbon

LD3005185291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1720 GMT 30 May 91

[By correspondents Vladimir Reshetilov and Mikhail Shevtsov]

[Text] Lisbon, 30 May (TASS)—Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, USSR minister of foreign affairs, arrived in the Portuguese capital today. He is to take part in the ceremony of the signing of agreements on the establishment of peace in Angola by Jose Eduardo dos Santos, president of Angola, and Jonas Savimbi, leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. The Soviet Union and the United States have played an active role in the process of settlement in Angola, in which Portugal was a mediator.

The USSR minister of foreign affairs is to meet today Cavaco Silva, prime minister of Portugal, and Joao de Deus Pinheiro, minister of foreign affairs.

A.A. Bessmertnykh was met at the airport by the minister of foreign affairs of Portugal and other officials. Gennadiy Gerasimov, USSR ambassador in Portugal, was among those who met him.

Meets With Portuguese Leaders

LD3105091391 Moscow TASS in English 0820 GMT 31 May 91

[Text] Lisbon May 31 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, who arrived in Lisbon from Rome on Thursday, had an extensive talk with Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco Silva of Portugal. On Thursday [30 May] evening, he met and talked with Portuguese Foreign Minister Joao de Deus Pinheiro.

The sides emphasised the historic importance of the ceremony, at which agreements ending the 30-year-old conflict in Angola will be signed in the Portuguese capital on May 31. Bessmertnykh singled out Portugal's role in forging the negotiating process in Angola.

The Portuguese side appraised the nature of the Soviet-Portuguese dialogue on this problem and also the Soviet-U.S. interaction to achieve a settlement in Southwest Africa, the significance of which should be preserved in the interests of peace and as applied to other regional conflicts.

The ministers expressed hope that the example of Angola would exert a positive influence on the situation in Mozambique and South Africa and would ultimately contribute towards improving the situation in the south of the African continent as a whole. Both the Soviet and Portuguese sides voiced interest in continuing consultations on the African theme as well as on a wider range of international issues.

The ministers extensively discussed issues pertaining to a settlement in the Middle East in the light of the intensive contacts which the Soviet Union and Portugal have had lately with the parties concerned. They are unanimous that there is a chance now to move the matter forward and convene a peace conference with the USSR and the United States acting as its co-chairmen, although major obstacles on this path remain and serious efforts will still be needed to overcome them.

The sides paid much attention to the potential for cooperation between the USSR and Portugal, the USSR and the European communities, specifically in view of the fact that Lisbon will hold the European Community's presidency in near future.

The sides emphasised the availability of several major areas for mutually beneficial cooperation in Europe, such as power-engineering and food production, the development of which could be planned for many years ahead.

The ministers agreed to impart an added political impetus to Soviet-Portuguese relations to make maximum use of opportunities inherent in them. They drafted a schedule of further meetings and contacts at different levels.

Talks between Bessmertnykh and Portuguese Government and Foreign Ministry officials passed in a warm and lively atmosphere.

Today, Bessmertnykh is expected to meet Portuguese President Mario Soares.

Defense Ministry Clarifies Kessler Trip

91UM0682A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 May 91 First Edition p 3

[USSR Ministry of Defense press center statement: "At Odds With the Spirit of Understanding"]

[Text] As reported by the mass media, on 20 May 1991 a number of members of the leadership of the former GDR—W. Stoph, H. Kessler, F. Strelets, and H. Albrecht—were arrested by the German authorities.

In connection with certain actions taken by the German side during the arrest of former GDR defense minister H. Kessler, and also attempts by certain press organs in the West to spread a version of events stating that H. Kessler had attempted to "hide at a Soviet military airfield," it is necessary to underscore the following.

The facts indicate that H. Kessler was in fact preparing to travel to the USSR with his wife at the invitation of the Memorial Museum of German Antifascists in Krasnogorsk City, with which he has collaborated for a long time. They had been issued tickets for the appropriate Aeroflot flights on 22 May and 4 June traveling from Berlin to Moscow and back. H. Kessler and his wife had, in accordance with established procedure, obtained visas to travel to the USSR and were in possession of valid FRG passports.

Nevertheless, from 1400 hours to 1910 hours on 20 May organs of the German police blocked all approach roads to the airfield at Sperenberg. Without informing the command of the Western Group of Forces, the police organized the examination of vehicles of the Western Group of Forces traveling toward the airfield and checked the identity of Soviet servicemen.

Such actions are manifestly at variance with the spirit and letter of understandings reached between the USSR and the FRG, particularly Article 2 Clause 7 and Article 11 Clauses 1 and 3 of the agreement on conditions pertaining to the temporary sojourn and planned withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the FRG.

This does not serve to strengthen mutual understanding or trust as the basis for developing Soviet-German relations at the present stage. Certain of the mass media in the FRG that knowingly disseminated false "versions" and rumors that were totally groundless are also destructive in nature.

Former Prime Minister Thatcher Continues Visit

PM3005112091 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 May 91 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed untitled report under general heading "Meetings at the USSR Defense Ministry"]

[Text] A meeting took place 28 May between USSR defense minister Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov and former British prime minister and prominent politician M. Thatcher, who is visiting our country as a guest of the Soviet leadership.

A warm and friendly talk took place. The USSR defense minister stressed that while she held the post of British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher did a great deal to normalize Soviet-British relations in the military sphere. In this respect her current visit to our country has a positive significance.

Army General M.A. Moiseyev, USSR first deputy defense minister and chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, and R. Braithwaite, British ambassador to the Soviet Union, also took part in the meeting.

Rejection of Norwegian Claim of CFE Violation

LD3005133791 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 30 May 91

[Text] A spokesman for the Soviet General Staff, General Fedor Ladygin, has told a Radio Moscow correspondent that there are two Soviet tank battalions in the regions bordering on Norway. There are no T-80 tanks in mothballs around Pechenga. In all, there are 171 Soviet tanks in the border area compared to 205 Norwegian tanks.

These figures give the lie to claims in the Norwegian news media that the Soviet Union refuses to observe the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and to keep the proper levels.

Soviet Parliament Delegation in Sweden

LD3105000191 Moscow TASS in English 2212 GMT 30 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Dmitriy Gorokhov]

[Text] Stockholm May 31 TASS—A delegation of the Soviet parliament committee for foreign affairs headed by the committee's chairman Aleksandr Dzasokhov, a secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, on Thursday met representatives of Swedish public and political circles.

They discussed the image of a new Europe as a continent of peace and cooperation, which is not divided by ideological, social, economic or trade barriers.

Soviet parliamentarians familiarised themselves with the Swedish parliament's activities and visited the country's leading scientific and political centres.

Soviet parliamentarians and their colleagues from the Swedish parliament committee for foreign affairs discussed disarmament issues, regional cooperation and inter-parliamentary ties.

Dzasokhov stressed that the Soviet Union appreciates Sweden's efforts to promote new thinking in the world. Sweden and the Soviet Union have similar visions of a common European home, which creates a good basis for pooling efforts to build it.

A Soviet-Swedish summit meeting during Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's forthcoming visit to Sweden next month will give impetus to this partnership, Dzasokhov said.

Soviet parliamentarians participated in a session of the Nordic Council. The session focused on ways to develop cooperation between Baltic countries in the context of European processes.

The Soviet Union is interested in the experience of Scandinavian countries in ecology and cultural and humanitarian exchanges.

The Soviet delegation also visited Sweden's foreign policy and Stockholm international institutes, as well as Stockholm City Council.

Among the Soviet parliamentarians participating in the meetings were writer Viktor Karpov, Cosmonaut Svetlana Savitskaya and Soviet Ambassador to Sweden Nikolay Uspenskiy.

Latin America & Caribbean

Chilean Communist Teitelboim Visits PRAVDA

PM2805115091 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 May 91 Second Edition p 5

["Own information" report under the rubric "PRAVDA's Guests": "Talking About Communists' Concerns"]

[Text] A delegation from the Communist Party of Chile [PCCh] headed by V. Teitelboim, secretary general of the PCCh, visited the PRAVDA offices yesterday.

During the exchange of opinions that took place on questions of international life, the situation in the communist movement, and interparty relations, I.T. Frolov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chief editor of PRAVDA, reaffirmed the Soviet Communists' solidarity with the Communist Party and democratic forces of Chile and spoke about the complex, diverse problems of perestroyka and the party's commitment to the course of renewal of society and the country on a socialist basis.

For his part, V. Teitelboim spoke about the situation in Chile and the Chilean Communists' struggle to deepen democratic processes in that country.

This was the first official PCCh delegation to visit the Soviet Union since the restoration of civil rule.

Political & Social

Employment Assistance Fund Established

LD3005215491 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 30 May 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Important information that will affect many people: The USSR Cabinet of Ministers has formed a state fund for the assistance of employment [gosudarstvenny fond sodeystviya zanyatosti] within the make-up of the state employment service at local, republican and union levels. It is invested with responsibility for organizing the financing of measures for implementing employment policy in the country.

Enterprises, establishments, organizations, and cooperatives, irrespective of the types of ownership and economic operation, make obligatory monthly payments to the state fund for the assistance of employment to the sum of one percent of funds for the remuneration of labor in 1991.

It has also been decided to organize a governing body of the union employment fund with a permanently functioning executive body and executive board, as well as an auditing commission.

Oil Workers Union Denies Reports of Strike Plan

PM3105083091 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 May 91 Union Edition p 2

[Report by V. Korneyev for the Federation of RSFSR Independent Trade Unions Press Service under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Oil Workers Will Not Go On Strike"]

[Text] Are strikes by oil and gas workers to follow the miners' strikes? This was the subject of discussion at a press conference organized by the Russian Trade Union for Oil and Gas Sectors of Industry and Construction.

The main suppliers of currency into the union treasury (60-70 percent of all the freely convertible currency going into the state budget)—the oil and gas producing sectors—are the ones who make a loss themselves, according to the harsh laws of the planned economy. Which is not surprising if you bear in mind the fact that of every $120 (which is how much one tonne of oil costs on the world market) the sector gets $2... The oil workers themselves earn the same amount in a month as their colleagues abroad earn in an hour, if you calculate their earnings in dollars.

Meanwhile social tension in the oil and gas workers' labor collectives is growing. Lev Mironov, chairman of the Russian Trade Union for Oil and Gas Sectors of Industry and Construction, told journalists this. He said that back in September of last year, the country's president and government were presented with demands to introduce free prices on oil and gas, improve the material and technical supply, and also double the workers' earnings. According to calculations made by trade union experts, these measures will not entail an increase in retail prices on gasoline and other oil products: The resources must be sought exclusively in the redistribution of income in favor of those who produce oil and gas.

As for RIA reports to the effect that oil workers are preparing to stage a warning strike, representatives of the trade union refuted this. The workers realize that such an action may lead to irreversible consequences in the economy, bearing in mind the continuity of the production cycle in the sector.

Expert Views Party Property Issue, Legal Points

LD3005053491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1045 GMT 29 May 91

[By unidentified TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 29 May (TASS)—In connection with the collection of signatures for submission regarding a nationwide referendum on the question of handing over CPSU property to the state, which has been started by the supporters of the Democratic Russia Movement, a TASS correspondent turned to an independent expert, N. Solovyanenko, for an explanation regarding the legality of these claims. The expert is a scientific associate of the Institute of the State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences and is neither a CPSU member nor a "Democratic Russia" supporter.

As far as the CPSU's legal status is concerned, he says, recently the Communist Party was officialy registered at the USSR Justice Ministry in accordance with the law on public associations. The CPSU also owns its property on a legal basis, in according with the law on ownership, which has assigned this right to public organizations, among others.

The initiators of the nationalization of party property call themselves a democratic movement, but in their actions I do not observe a truly democratic approach toward the problem, he said. The formulation of the question of the revision of the laws on public associations and on property could have been regarded as such an action, for the political situation in a democratic society can be influenced only through the adoption or abolition of the appropriate points of the legislation in force.

In our society the primacy of the law has been proclaimed. To abolish it by a majority of votes means continuing the 70-year-old practice where property disputes were resolved not in the name of the law but in the interests of a group of people, large or small.

I believe that the Democratic Russia Movement is creating a precedent that weakens the legal guarantees of the protection of property rights of whatever holder, including parties. Such unlawful actions lead to instability in society, he stated.

It is well known that it is precisely the democratic forces that are fighting for the transition to the market, for destatification, and for privatization, and suddenly they raise a question of a totally opposite nature—about the nationalization of property only on the basis of it belonging to the CPSU.

In order to raise the question of the confiscation of anyone's property, it is necessary to prove that it has been accumulated illegally. Such questions are decided not by a vote, not even a nationwide one, but in a legal manner. It is obvious that in order to put an end to the disputes about party property, it is necessary to widely publish the real sources of the formation of the CPSU's property.

Ligachev Denies Conservatism in Party Apparatus

PM2905135391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 May 91 Second Edition p 4

[Letter from Ye. Ligachev under the "Letter to Issue" rubric: "To Whom This Persistent Bogey Is Advantageous"]

[Text] I recently returned from a trip to Donetsk Oblast. I was invited there as a deputy from the CPSU by the miners. The aim was to meet with Communists and labor collectives and to give a report.

During the meetings the Communists drew attention to the fact that 23 April, on the eve of the CPSU Central Committee April (1991) Plenum PRAVDA published an article claiming that the party apparatus was thirsting for revenge for its defeat in the first years of perestroyka. The party apparatus was allegedly on friendly terms with the "democrats" against the president, the general secretary, and the policy of renewal. Incidentally, this story was picked up from the president's entourage (an aide's statement on television) from which I am sure it had come. I recognize the handwriting of the president's senior advisers.

In connection with the item in PRAVDA I should like to express several thoughts. The country is full of contradictions of the utmost keenness and depth. At the initial stage of the perestroyka period (when, incidentally, things were going well) the contradictions appeared between the demands of the progressive forces for the renewal of society and the conservative forces which did not want changes.

Then the situation changed and other destructive forces went into action and a certain section of the country's leadership continued to see the main danger to the policy of perestroyka in conservatism and the conservative forces, primarily in the shape of the management structures, the apparatus, and the military-industrial complex. But there were other opinions among the leadership.

As early as 1988 embryonic nationalism, separatism, and anticommunism became a real danger to perestroyka. At the time many leaders did not say the word nationalism, they called everything extremism. And finally in late 1990 at a CPSU Central Committee plenum M.S. Gorbachev said: "I shall say frankly that there is no more serious danger in the country now than double-dyed extremist nationalism."

But there are people, for instance A.N. Yakovlev, who assert to this day that "the feasibility of a coup in the country comes from the middle management echelon, from the fundamental bureaucrat who essentially still rules the country today" (MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 5 January 1991). He thus removes the national separatists and anticommunists from the firing line and sets society on the apparatus, causing great damage to management. It should be said that previously he spoke of the entire (state and party) apparatus as a conservative force, but now he speaks only of part of the apparatus. Probably because in the top echelons of executive power the apparatus has been demoralized by the endless reorganizations. The constant reshuffling of management structures, the indiscriminate attacks on the apparatus have to a certain extent led to a crisis in management. And to be honest the labor collectives and their leaders and the management structures and their apparatus are still keeping the national economy afloat.

There is no denying that conservative sentiments are making themselves felt in society. There is nostalgia for Stalin's times, for the times of lawlessness. But these are a few individual people. If we are speaking about nostalgia in society, we should say the following. Now that society is absolutely unsettled people are displaying nostalgia not for Stalin's times (some people are trying to instill that thought) but for the good traditions of our past, for the first years of perestroyka. I was convinced of this yet again when I met with the miners.

As for the party apparatus, I should like to tell the organizers and inspirers of the campaign against party workers: Surely you know that the party organization secretaries and party committee workers have been renewed several times over in the past six years and have been greatly reduced and have been joined by Communists from labor collectives on recommendations from primary organizations. One asks when they managed to degenerate and become opponents of the party's policy. The party workers are in need of support and comradely criticism, after all they are working under complex conditions. I met with many party workers, starting with Ye.V. Mironov, first secretary of the oblast CPSU committee, who are respected among the people for their clear and firm stance, their defense of the interests of the working masses, and their ability to stand up for V.I. Lenin's party.

I believe that under present conditions discrediting the apparatus means striking against the party. Those who present the state and party apparatus as a bogey are trying to lead the party and society away from the struggle against the main danger—national separatism and extremism.

And one more thing. Wherever I went, everywhere people spoke with indignation of the attempts to rename Leningrad and of A. Sobchak, the inspirer of the campaign against V.I. Lenin and the October revolution. Last year he urged Soviet people to refuse to celebrate the October anniversary. Our people divined his true intentions and rejected them. Now Sobchak has gone into the attack against V.I. Lenin. People spoke of this with revulsion. Speaking with respect of the people of Leningrad, they asked me to convey to them that it was the Soviet people who gave Lenin's name to the city on the Neva. And only the people together with the Leningraders can make a different decision.

Visa Official Comments on Entry, Exit Law

PM3005090291 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 May 91 Union Edition pp 1,2

[I. Andreyev report: "The Right to a Passport for Foreign Travel. How the Law on Entry and Exit Will Operate"]

[Text] Yu. Reshetov, chief of a Foreign Ministry administration, and R. Kuznetsov, chief of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Visas and Registrations Administration, held a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists 23 May in the USSR Foreign Ministry press center, devoted to the recently adopted USSR Law "On the Procedure for Exit From and Entry Into the USSR by USSR Citizens." The material published here also draws on a conversation between your IZVESTIYA correspondent and R. Kuznetsov, which took place in the thick of the memorable parliamentary debates.

Having noted the political, international-legal, and humanitarian significance of the law, which successfully came through a long marathon in the USSR Supreme Soviet, Yu. Reshetov gave some interesting figures concerning Soviet citizens traveling abroad. The problem of the "brain drain" which is worrying many deputies will involve half a million emigrants in this category annually, in his opinion. On the other hand, you can expect remittances from abroad of up to $10 billion annually which the specialists who leave will earn and send to their families in the Union. However, Yu. Reshetov made the reservation that the "currency" calculations were made abroad. The calculations were made by a reliable French scientific institution which analyzed this aspect of emigration from Turkey and Yugoslavia to developed European countries. Yu. Reshetov also noted that for the first time in the history of our country every citizen who receives a passport for foreign travel has the right to travel to any country for any reason without having to obtain authorization from the authorities. This does not only concern emigrants, but primarily the millions of our fellow countrymen who go abroad for a period of time for personal or business reasons.

Although, as is known, the law does not come into force until 1 January 1993, Yu. Reshetov stressed, the Cabinet of Ministers is to present within two weeks proposals for the stage-by-stage introduction of a number of its articles. One of the first amendments that will be made to existing rules will probably be the abolition of invitations from abroad, which will no longer be necessary as a basis for leaving the USSR, but will be preserved as guarantees for the countries where the person issuing the invitation lives. Certain other current restrictions will also no longer be valid.

As R. Kuznetsov, chief of the USSR MVD Administration for Visas and Registration, reported, even today many countries have adopted legislative acts which sharply restrict entry for Soviet citizens. The Italian authorities, for example, require guarantees from persons issuing invitations to the effect that the guest from the USSR will leave the country exactly as scheduled. A number of states are introducing a tougher police control than before with respect to our fellow countrymen. The Austrian authorities, for instance, are basing this on the fact that there are over 500 Soviet citizens living illegally in the country while only 42 entered the country legally in 1990.

Assessing how many Soviet citizens may appeal to the visas and registration organs for a passport for foreign travel, R. Kuznetsov expressed doubt concerning the frequently mentioned figure of 20 million. The actual statistics of people leaving to live permanently abroad testify, according to him, to a stabilization or even a fall in the flow of emigrants. Thus, in the first four months of this year, approximately 111,000 citizens with children under 18 years of age obtained visas, which is less than in the corresponding period last year. The number of Soviet citizens who obtained authorization to leave the USSR but did not make use of it has increased sharply. The number of cases of Soviet Greeks returning to Greece decreased by a factor of three. The flow of citizens who want to go through the so-called Israel channel has fallen. Although, R. Kuznetsov noted, it is possible that there will be an upsurge because of the repeal of the existing provision to the effect that the invitation can only come from close relatives abroad.

Welcoming the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution which repeals the discriminatory decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium dated 17 February 1967 under which people settling in Israel lose their Soviet citizenship, R. Kuznetsov pointed out the special cases—from a legal viewpoint—arising in this connection. According to Western sources, there are still around 200,000 citizens of this category in the USSR who have obtained authorization to leave. They no longer have Soviet passports—only an exit visa. Meanwhile, under the 1967 decree, they lose their USSR citizenship the moment they cross the state border. The repeal of this act as of 1 July of this year will automatically prohibit exit on visas and will require new authorization documents and the issue of Soviet passports for foreign travel to citizens. This is also a special case from the point of view that the visas and registration apparatus only has the right to issue passports as of 1 July. Therefore, R. Kuznetsov stressed, we urgently recommend that people in this category either

leave before the aforesaid date or else submit straight away and in good time documents for re-registering their exit after 1 July.

Broaching technical problems connected with the issue of passports for foreign travel to Soviet citizens, R. Kuznetsov named the figure of 6 million. In his opinion, that is how many forms can be prepared for issue in 1992. But even this large amount of documents will have to be prepared using a system that differs from world practice: The pages of the passport will not be sewn up with thread, but will be fastened with wire clips.

R. Kuznetsov noted that even before the adoption of the law, there were practically no restrictions on citizens' traveling abroad for a temporary period. It is another matter that prohibitions that are accepted throughout the civilized world are now clearly stipulated: maintenance paid by a person wishing to obtain a passport for foreign travel, their being privy to any secrets, problems arising between the citizen and USSR laws... Something new in this sphere is court settlements of conflicts that might arise between the person applying for a passport and the visas and registration organs.

Today courts do not examine maintenance litigations between people who want to leave and their relatives staying behind. The situation is practically insoluble if, for instance, elderly parents cannot come to an agreement with their son who is leaving about the sum of money he should pay as maintenance for the years ahead: It is not clear what will happen to prices, how far the curve of inflation will rise... The law places the task of solving this problem on the courts. But it is extremely important for us, the visa and registration organs, to know which legal body has the last word in this lawsuit. Otherwise we are the ones who will be guilty and responsible from the material point of view: We give someone a passport, he, with a clear conscience before his relatives and the law, goes off, and a higher court contests the previous decision.

It is important that in practice the law protects not just the rights of those who leave but also the relatives who stay behind and the state organizations and other organizations with which the emigrant has material and other mutual obligations that remain unresolved, R. Kuznetsov stressed.

For instance, how do you know whether the person leaving did not take out a loan at the bank or borrow money from friends? Surely we do not have to demand that the people applying for a foreign passport present a heap of references as they did before? That would mean that it might come to a situation whereby they would have to fill out a form with answers to such questions and we would have to believe them, and check in the event of any doubts arising.

Many problems like this, connected with the mechanism for implementing many articles of the law, will arise, according to R. Kuznetsov. Take, for example, the apparently clear, comprehensible, and undoubtedly humanitarian thesis guaranteeing that every USSR citizen has the right to leave the country and come back into it. As a practical person, I can see the following possible situation: A man gives up his apartment which he acquired by working for it, and leaves. Then he wants to come back. Who—and how—will return to him the apartment for which, I repeat, he worked hard for many years? Or another possibility: An emigrating Soviet citizen gives up his pension. After a certain time elapses, he comes back to spend one or two years with his grandchild who was born during that time. Who will solve his pension problem?

By law, a person who leaves to live abroad permanently has the right to keep property on USSR territory which belongs to him on the basis of the rights of ownership. That means a car, a house, or even a cow. But who will take on their upkeep if none of his relatives and friends want to?

According to R. Kuznetsov, problems may arise with people leaving to go abroad permanently if their education in a higher education establishment has been paid for by an interested enterprise. Who will provide compensation for the expenses involved in training a young specialist who decides to try his luck in a foreign firm?

However, the chief of the Visas and Registration Administration said specifically that all the questions listed are quite natural with the adoption of such a major legislative act. On the whole, as a practical man, he sees it as a good basis for the creation of a reliable and legal mechanism for the rapid issue, without delay, of passports for foreign travel for the overwhelming majority of applicants. R. Kuznetsov believes that the Soviet state organs have a long-term task in holding informed consultations with those leaving, concerning job placements abroad, social protection, health service, and legal protection for Soviet citizens who have gotten into difficult situations as a result of ignorance of the laws of the country they are staying in.

All-Union Zionists Congress Opens in Moscow

PM2805152791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 May 91 Union Edition p 2

[Lev Aleynik report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Zionists' Congress Opens"]

[Text] Moscow—The All-Union Congress of Zionists has begun its work, whose 60 delegates represent many republic organizations within the Jewish movement.

As is well-known, Zionism is a way of thinking and acting geared toward repatriation to Israel, to the historical homeland of its adherents' ancestors.

The congress delegates are discussing the project for summer health camps for children from the zone contaminated by the Chernobyl catastrophe and organizing the work of "Brit Ivrit Olamit" (the World Jewish League) in the USSR—people united by the study and

circulation of a living language, a language in which the Bible is written, a language that is one of Israel's state languages. It is planned to set up USSR Federation of Zionists' information and consultation centers and publish a newspaper, a journal, and other press organs.

Quite recently Zionism had been mercilessly persecuted in the USSR and the fate of thousands and thousands of people shattered solely because of their desire to exercise their right, enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to be free to choose where they live. A great deal is changing now—Zionist associations are being registered: "Irgun Tsioni," "Beytar," "Khabayta," "The Jewish Children's Fund," "Khazrat Tsion," "Makkabi Kryma" [names as transliterated], etc.

The next session of the World Zionist Organization's Executive Committee will raise the question of the USSR Federation of Zionists' joining. The congress' agenda includes a proposal for the USSR Supreme Soviet and the supreme organs of power in a number of republic to discuss pressing questions of repatriation.

TASS Reviews Soviet Central Press for 31 May

LD3105070691 Moscow TASS in English 0547 GMT 31 May 91

["Soviet Press Review"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow May 31 TASS—Today's newspapers open their front pages with reports about President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Kazakhstan.

On Thursday, Gorbachev toured a cotton factory in Alma-Ata.

The state has allocated 76 billion roubles to modernise the light and food industries but changes have been slow, Gorbachev told workers at the plant.

Western firms have offered their help in modernising the industry, he said.

In the afternoon, Gorbachev addressed a meeting of republican officials in the Kazakh capital.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA publishes opening remarks by Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev at the meeting.

"The time has come for decisive actions—the transition to a market, an end to bloody conflicts and many other things," Nazarbayev said.

He called for the consolidation of Soviet economy, financial stabilisation and an early division of property between the Union and republics.

"A renewed federation should become a union of sovereign national states sharing a common economic space," he said.

Later on Thursday Gorbachev met Kazakh regional leaders. After that he flew from Alma-Ata to Moscow.

Newspapers highlight the presidential election campaign in Russia.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA runs a detailed story about the campaign on its front page. On page three, it carries readers' comments on presidential candidates.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA carries an interview with presidential candidate Vadim Bakatin, who described himself as a "radical centrist".

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA publishes brief biographies of the six contenders running for the Russian presidency and their vice-presidential choices.

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA carries articles about Aleksandr Rutskiy (Boris Yeltsin's vice-presidential nominee), Ramazan Abdulatipov (Bakatin's choice) and Boris Gromov (Ryzhkov's pick).

TRUD carries an interview with Russian Prime Minister Ivan Silayev.

The Cabinet of Ministers will have to be restructured after the presidential election, Silayev said.

It will be easier to implement the economic programme prepared by the Russian Government if Boris Yeltsin wins the election, Silayev believes.

TRUD publishes a new version of the alleged killing of writer Maksim Gorkiy.

PRAVDA carries an interview with Soviet Government Communications Department chief KGB Lieutenant General Anatoliy Beda.

On page one, PRAVDA carries extracts from official archive documents about the renaming of Petrograd into Leningrad after Vladimir Lenin's death in 1924.

In its international section, PRAVDA comments on the results of Chinese Communist Parter leader Jiang Zemin's Visit to the Soviet Union. The visit gave a boost to Soviet-Chinese relations, it says.

Economic

Academician on Lack of Scientific Progress

914A0781A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 28 May 91 pp 1-2

[Interview with Academician N.P. Laverov, USSR deputy prime minister, by Vladimir Lagovskiy; place and date not given: "Why the Scientific-Technical Revolution Has Bypassed the USSR"]

[Text] **Here are several remarks to begin with. In the 1970's, the world grasped the following: It would be difficult to survive, and we would be tormented by ecological and food problems unless the scientific-technical strategy changed abruptly. In the West, the understanding of this entailed an entire revolution. Technologies saving energy and natural resources are a result of the sort**

reconstruction of industrial and agricultural production over 15 years on the basis of the latest accomplishments of scientists and specialists.

It appeared that we also woke up to this six years ago. Alas, this was merely in a matter of speaking. At the well-known conference on scientific-technical progress in June 1985, correct directions were set forth. The talk was great, but nothing was accomplished. A new government, which came along in 1989, was likewise unable to advance matters. One gets the impression that scientific-technical progress has been altogether forgotten by now. They no longer speak about it—politics has eclipsed everything. The growth of energy and material intensiveness has been the result of our "revolution." Everybody demands ever increasing quantities of fuel; there is a catastrophic lack of resources, and nature is on the brink of peril. Such is the reckoning for neglect and, if you will, the visible segment of the iceberg of problems which have accumulated in science.

[Lagovskiy] Nikolay Pavlovich, do you believe that the neglect of scientific-technical progress has been a mistake of perestroyka?

[Laverov] It is ill-starred fate rather than a mistake. It appeared to many people that politics and economics needed to be sorted out first, and that science would work itself out. For example, my speech at the last CPSU Congress did not evoke particular enthusiasm. I, for one, strove to prove that there are no miracles. We cannot advance ourselves using yesterday's technologies. Quite the contrary, this multiplies problems, programs a lag, and squanders funds and resources. Any party which holds power and embarks on a radical economic transformation should first of all proceed from a strong state scientific-technical policy. In essence, we are only now putting our bets on this in earnest.

[Lagovskiy] "Strong" and "state"—these words side by side are now perceived with apprehension.

[Laverov] Perhaps, some people will bring up a dictatorship and the dominance of the center. However, we mean something completely different: the concentration of resource and means in all-Union directions of scientific-technical progress which are equally important to all republics. We mean to create favorable conditions for advancement. Regarding data processing, production of foodstuffs, medical science, power generation, and transportation, there should not be an illusion that someone will be able to handle these problems on his own. This is when a warning is in order: The political struggle may bring about an absurd result. Science will be dispersed among republics, and the scientific-technical potential will decline still further. As a result, everyone will suffer. Fortunately, the scientific community understands this full well. It favors pooling our efforts.

[Lagovskiy] However, all-Union programs have always drawn criticism. The main rebuke was that technologies are being foisted on us which are of no consequence to the people.

[Laverov] This is justified criticism, and it has been taken into account. Instead of 250 previous programs, 18 have been adopted; they mostly have to do with social issues and ecology. The most prominent scientists and the public have taken part in selecting programs. The experience of developed countries has been taken into account. It has been acknowledged in our country and abroad that the package is optimal, and on the whole is adequate for the task of concentrating efforts on priority directions.

Twelve programs are directly geared to practical issues. They should facilitate the advancement of a number of the key industries to a qualitatively new technological level, and "bring up" scientific-research institutes, design offices, and enterprises to modern requirements.

Here is the content of the programs in brief.

"Advanced Information Technologies." It is planned to manufacture superhigh-speed computers performing up to 1,000 billion operations per second on the basis of new physical principles. These computers, together with superhigh-capacity memory devices, systems of artificial intelligence, devices for the transmission and processing of data, and mathematical models will provide a technical foundation for a broad-scale computerization of our society.

"Technologies, Machines, and Production Facilities of the Future." These are technical resources and complexes geared to material and energy-efficient technologies. An increase in labor productivity by factors between three and 10 is expected where they are applied.

"Advanced materials." The equipment and machinery of tomorrow will be manufactured from such materials with unique properties.

"Latest Methods of Biological Engineering." Having studied physical-chemical processes in animate nature, scientists hope to create unprecedented technologies, from extracting metals and ores from mine wastes to producing foodstuffs from plants and animals with desired properties. Their introduction in chemical production will reduce the input of energy by factors of between two and three.

"High-Speed Ecologically Clean Transportation." This has to do with new means of locomotion combining safety and comfort. A high-speed Center-South railway main line and magnetic levitation trains are expected to be built.

"Ecologically Pure Power Generation." The extensive use of nonconventional sources is one of its peculiarities.

"Resource Efficient and Ecologically Clean Metallurgical and Chemical Processes." For the most part, these are waste-free technologies which will make it possible to restore the purity of atmospheric air and natural waters.

"Highly Efficient Processes of Foodstuffs Production."[end bold] In this instance, it is planned to create

techniques, which are new in principle, for improving the fertility of soils, for safe systems of plant protection, for unusual foodstuffs, and for reliable methods for the storage of products.

"Fighting Most Common Diseases." New medicines and treatment techniques should reduce the level of mortality in the country by one-quarter by the year 2000.

"Progress in Construction—2000." The objective of the program is to create new construction materials and structures based on them. It is expected that the duration of the cycle of construction will be reduced by a factor of two.

"Safety of the Populace and Facilities of the National Economy in View of the Risk of the Occurrence of Natural and Technological Disasters."[end bold] A set of research projects and measures are envisaged which are geared to providing protection against natural calamities and accidents caused by human interference.

"Advanced Telecommunications Facilities and Integrated Communications Systems." Under this program, information services will be expanded on the basis of digital communications networks and fiber optic systems of data transmission. New satellite and mobile ground systems of radio communications will appear.

Six more programs are geared to basic research. They should yield new knowledge about the world around us and the structure of matter. They provide a jumping-off point of sorts for the future development of science and technology. They are **"High-Energy Physics," "High-Temperature Superconductivity," the programs "Mars," "Human Genome," "Controlled Thermonuclear Fusion and Plasma Processes," "Global Changes in the Natural Environment and Climate."** The titles of these programs speak for themselves.

So, judge for yourselves whether such research is needed or not. Let the republics keep regional programs. They should determine their priorities and tactics. In the environment of a renewed federation, it is expected that the Union republics will resolve independently all issues of scientific-technical development, except for those which they voluntarily transfer to the Union Government organs.

[Begin boxed passage published in boldface] FOR YOUR INFORMATION: A council has been set up for every all-Union program. It is headed by a prominent leader of the national economy and a leading scientist of the country in a pertinent field. The scientific council collectively administers research within the framework of projects. Projects are selected on a competitive basis. In 1990, about 1,300 such projects were carried out; more than 15,000 were submitted for the competition.[end boxed passage]

[Lagovskiy] Have you succeeded in coming to terms with the republics regarding the division of responsibilities?

[Laverov] Let me put it this way: These issues have been coordinated and inserted in the draft law on state scientific-technical policy. In addition to the development and execution of all-Union scientific-technical programs, the Union should retain the following: Legal support for scientific-technical progress, organization of key basic research, development of a unified patent service and a system of product standardization, creation of an all- Union system of scientific-technical information, development and compliance with uniform requirements for candidates seeking academic degrees and scientific titles, and coordination of international relations.

[Lagovskiy] Still, let us revisit the apprehensions. What guarantee is there that in the future, "fateful" decisions will not be made privately, and that the decisions made will be carried out?

[Laverov] In this matter, we turned to the experience of the world and attempted to create structures similar to those existing in developed countries. The initial idea is as follows: There should be no monopoly in managing a sphere as delicate as scientific- technical progress.

[Begin boxed passage published in boldface] FOR YOUR INFORMATION: In the United States, all projects are evaluated by six experts who respond to three questions: scientific timeliness of the project, the ability of the authors of the request to carry it out, and the suitability of the establishment in which they work for carrying out the project. There are 55,000 scientists in the data bank of experts of the national scientific fund. [end boxed passage]]

Of course, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the president represent the highest state organ of government. In our opinion, it would be expedient for them to have a consultative council for science and education, consisting of 10 to 15 leading scientists with different, principled political views and specialties.

We are proposing to set up a bureau for the evaluation of the priority directions of scientific-technical progress at the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Science and Technology. There are several such formations at the U.S. Congress—some are in charge of domestic technologies, and others, in charge of technologies arriving from abroad. "They" do not have to complain that equipment manufactured or purchased suddenly cannot be installed because it is harmful to health.

The prime minister has a deputy who is in charge of science and technology. The All-Union Fund for Basic Research, a patent agency, and other organs report to him. In addition, independent structures already exist—the USSR Academy of Sciences, specialized academies, and public organizations. In turn, they have set up the "Independent Public Expert Review of Projects and Programs." To my mind, this arrangement should allay the doubts which you have mentioned. There will be both democratic management and execution. There will be alternative points of view and extensive input by the

public. Here is an example: There are oil and gas fields in the Caspian Sea area that are saturated with hydrogen sulfide. The task is to extract them without harming nature. Previously, we would have signed a contract with some company, and would not have worried about the consequences. At present, we are working on variants using the new structures.

[Lagovskiy] Nikolay Pavlovich, you are a deputy prime minister, chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology [GKNT], and deputy president of the Academy of Sciences. You would agree that combining so many appointments in this day and age means deliberately inviting the fire of criticism.

[Laverov] I for one am not clinging to "the portfolios." This "package" of appointments is a reasonable minimum which fits the emerging structures. After all, the goals are quite specific: To organizationally unite fundamental science and sectors involved in implementing its accomplishments. The GKNT lost contacts with higher schools long ago and relations with the USSR Academy of Sciences were severed when Academician Marchuk left. The state structures of government are severed from basic sciences. If you will, you may consider me precisely a connecting ring. At present, personal contacts are not insignificant.

[Lagovskiy] Of course, we should discuss basic research separately. So far, it has had the status of a Cinderella here. Judging by the continuing "moaning" of scientists, there is little chance of becoming a princess.

[Laverov] Of course, funds are short. Still, I will quote several hopeful statistics. Despite economic difficulties, the percentage of total expenditures for science in the national income increased from five percent in 1986 to 7.1 percent in 1990. Funding for the development of basic science from the state budget has almost doubled in the last five years. In 1991, it will come to about 5 billion rubles [R]. In total, we spend about R30 billion from the Union budget for science and technology. In execution of a ukase of the president, a USSR Government resolution on the All-Union Fund for Basic Research has been adopted. The bulk of the monies of the fund will be drawn from the Union budget. For 1991, almost R3 billion have been allocated. A segment of the fund will be in convertible currency. The scientific community itself will distribute the funds, as is the case in the United States, Germany, and Japan. So-called commercial science—work performed by scientists for enterprises under contracts—represents another important block. R40 billion-worth of such research is done annually.

[begin boxed passage published in boldface] FOR YOUR INFORMATION: In the United States, the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Health have the most powerful research centers for basic projects. The Department of Defense is one of the largest research sponsors. [end boxed passage]

[Lagovskiy] The billions you have enumerated appear abstract to a majority of scientists, and are not reflected in pay logs. Something else is reflected in them: our attitude toward knowledge and scientific work. This is a banality, but our appreciation of talent is poor.

[Laverov] Do you know that this is a flaw not of our society alone? The prestige of research associates has declined in developed countries as well. Over there, they are also looking for ways to stop the flight of scientists to commerce. Quite a number of seminars concerning this have been held. We have thought about this and have proposed the following way out, on an experimental basis. We have introduced a system of contract pay in a number of Academy of Sciences institutes. For the first time in the history of the Soviet state, the lower level of wages of scientists is specified, whereas the upper level will be established directly by the employer. In other words, employees will receive completely different wages for different work. Wages may differ by a factor of five or seven. This decision does not have to be coordinated with any leading organ.

Alas, I cannot say that the experiment has progressed smoothly. Believe me, nobody was particularly outraged when they paid loafers and hard workers the same. As soon as incentives were given to the talented, conflicts began.

[Lagovskiy] There are enough paradoxes in our scientific- technical progress. However, if only they were the sole problem... The existing situation prompts one more figurative comparison. So, we have a car loaded with problems, and have put a steam engine in front, but have forgotten to lay the rails. After all, we do not have a single law which regulates mutual relations in the scientific-technical sphere. How are we to move ahead?

[Laverov] In all honesty, this is the sorest issue. In the United States, there are in excess of 100 laws, and in South Korea, thousands of regulations affecting the scientific-technical sphere. From Japan, they brought me a thick volume printed on thin rice paper. They have everything specified in it—from tax exemptions to rules for the use of foreign scientists. We do not have anything. However, this is not to say that we have not tried, and are not trying, to lay these "rails." Proceeding from the Stockholm convention, we have developed the drafts of a series of laws. They have to do with defending the rights to industrial property, scientific and intellectual property, copyright, scientific- technical policy, a contractual system, and many other issues. For example, the patent law recognizes the author of an invention to be its owner. This solves many problems. The right to scientific intellectual property is called upon to fight unfair competition. I will give you one example, and you will immediately understand what this is about. On one occasion, they organized a competition for computer programs in Japan. Our naive enthusiasts sent to Japan about 1,500 sound works. In a word, they almost gave them away, and said use them. It turned out that this programming product could have been sold, and millions of dollars could have been earned—but they could have only been sold had the right to them been reserved

under a law. The situation is the same with regard to approximately 20 products. We lose because we keep failing to appreciate specific scientific intellectual property, including squandering our programming products and know-how. Instead, we could be acquiring rather than losing—the West engages eagerly in cooperation primarily in the area of fundamental research.

A set of laws which should be adopted has been submitted by the government to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Finally, their turn has come, and they are now being considered in committees. Probably, they will be adopted at the fall session. They say that there are more important laws. Perhaps, but all laws which are now being accepted cost billions. Legal support for scientific-technical progress does not cost a penny...

[begin boxed passage published in boldface] FOR YOUR INFORMATION: By now, the draft USSR Law on Scientific Intellectual Property and Reinforcing Its Protection has been developed, as well as a package of draft laws associated with industrial property (on inventions in the USSR, on industrial prototypes in the USSR, on trade marks and service marks in the USSR), the draft USSR Law on State Scientific-Technical Policy, the Law on Scientific Organization, and the Law on the Status of Research Associates. [end boxed passage]

[Lagovskiy] Nikolay Petrovich, what is your view of the concept of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA? In the most primitive manner, we announced that we would be sponsoring "An Exchange of Ideas" in our newspaper, saying that they should approach us, and we would publish them, and help them to sell their inventions. We hope that small enterprises will be set up on the basis of some developments.

[Laverov] It is a good idea; you are giving the inventor a chance. We have also come up with a "counterplan" of sorts. We are thinking about setting up an agency for small enterprises and innovative companies. We are ready to provide the charter fund, and give them support. Those who go to your "exchange" may also need it. We may provide experts to evaluate ideas.

[Lagovskiy] Thank you. We accept your offer. They say that a large treasure is "stashed away" in our country—inventions that have not been implemented, or have been rejected. Why should we not sell them to the West for hard currency?

[Laverov] We tried, and they do not buy these inventions, mainly because the inventions have not been processed for patents.

[Lagovskiy] Of course, we cannot raise all issues of science in a single interview, or refer to all plans. Therefore, in summation, what good news do you have for inventors in your capacity as USSR GKNT chairman? After all, for many people your establishment is their last resort. Those who have already been turned away everywhere come to you.

[Laverov] At our own risk, we allocated R10 million from reserves, and set up the Inventor Fund. It is a small fund, but several talented people may be rescued with the help of the fund, and useful work may be supported.

Cabinet Aide on Status of Strategic Reserves

PM3005101291 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
25 May 91 Second Edition p 3

[Interview with V. Ladygin, chairman of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers Committee for State Material Reserves, by G. Bilyalitdinova in Moscow under the "Topical Interview" rubric; date not specified, first two paragraphs are PRAVDA introduction: "Strategic Stocks: Myth and Reality"]

[Text] Moscow—Now, when the economic ties between enterprises and republics have been severed and when many types of foodstuffs and prime necessities are in short supply, many readers ask: Does the state have strategic stocks [strategicheskiye zapasy]?

Indeed, the time has now come to scour the country's warehouses and granaries. What shape are the strategic stocks in? I put our readers' questions to V. Ladygin, chairman of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers Committee for State Material Reserves.

"People's concern is not unfounded," he replied. "To be frank, but for the state reserves which, incidentally, include strategic stocks, many plants and factories would have stopped working long ago. We are distributing a lot now, more than ever before. There is the most profound concern at the fact that we have recently been taking considerably more than we give back. This led to a sharp reduction of stocks. For example, our metal industry is not producing enough ferrous metal—we also supply materials to the relevant enterprises so that they can keep afloat and not stop production. Or take aluminum. Not enough of that is being produced in the country now. At the Ministry of Automotive and Agricultural Machine Building leadership's request we have had to issue a large quantity of it to keep automobile production from stopping. There is a similar situation in many other sectors.

[Bilyalitdinova] At what level is the question of issuing particular materials from the state reserves taken?

[Ladygin] Mainly at the government level. Sometimes on the recommendation of our technologists, when the storage life of a particular product is nearing its end and it needs to be replaced. That quantity of output which we replace with new stock can be transferred to the national economy. Too often recently, it must be said, our supplies have been "disappearing" long before their shelf-life expires.

[Bilyalitdinova] Who are your "petitioners"—republics or leaders of ministries and sectors?

[Ladygin] That depends on what they want. In the case of industrial materials and raw materials it is ministries,

departments, concerns, and associations. If it is foodstuffs then it is mainly oblast and kray soviet executive committees and union republics.

[Bilyalitdinova] Who is supposed to replenish those resources? Those who use them?

[Ladygin] Yes, no matter who they are—a ministry or a region—and from their own stocks strictly by the agreed date. Unfortunately, this condition is often not met. Now as a result of sovereignty and the autonomy of individual regions, many cities, rayons, oblasts, krays, and republics presume not to honor their contract. There are many examples. Last year we were effectively left without sugar. Leaving aside the small strategic stock which we managed to obtain from the Ukraine and the Russian Federation. But in the main they kept the sugar for themselves. That is why we are now having great difficulties satisfying the requests that we receive from individual oblasts and krays, especially Khabarovsk, Krasnoyarsk, Tyumen, and Perm. Previously we had up to 3 million tonnes, and issued stocks both in spring, when vitamins are needed, and summer, for making preserves, until the beet is harvested and new sugar produced.

[Bilyalitdinova] Vladimir Nikolayevich, how do foreign countries go about preserving strategic stocks? What lessons could we learn from them?

[Ladygin] We have had contacts on working with state reserves largely with the countries of Eastern Europe, Cuba, Vietnam, and Mongolia. They learned from us and we from them. As for the capitalist countries, structurally they are similar to us. Apart from foodstuffs we have virtually identical ranges of materials, raw materials, and food, apart perhaps from crude oil, which they store in the state reserve. There, too, problems often occur: the war in Vietnam, the Persian Gulf... Even during Reagan's time, according to our figures, the strategic stocks were reduced in the United States on about five occasions. Then they were replenished and reduced again. In other words, they are more sensitive to market conditions than we. Incidentally, our service dates back to 1931, America's to 1937.

[Bilyalitdinova] Some union republics today are seeking autonomy and would surely like to have similar strategic stocks in their own country and not be dependent on the center. Is this question under discussion?

[Ladygin] Yes, it is. We have specific proposals from the Ukrainian Council of Ministers and the Belorussian government. Nevertheless, we think that the state reserves must be the prerogative of the center. But the union republics must have a certain share in the state reserves. Why do we think that? Because only the Union and the center have the ability to set up state reserves, including strategic ones, on such a scale. No single republic, not even Russia, can shoulder such a burden. Take the Ukraine, for example. There is much that it does not produce, it can only contribute 30 units of output to the state stocks but receives 70 from elsewhere. Or take the Central Asian republics, they can only contribute 5 units and have a deficit of 95. In Belorussia's case the figures are 10 and 90. Not to mention other republics, such as the Baltics, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Armenia, and Georgia. Thus the strength of the union state reserves lies in their concentrated nature!

[Bilyalitdinova] Is it expensive to maintain facilities for the storage of strategic stocks?

[Ladygin] In our view, this is a very economical structure. It is three-tiered. The center has a small apparatus—around 200 people. There are territorial administrations with very limited numbers of staff: from 40 to 90 or 100. And finally there are the enterprises themselves—the storage facilities. Each has between 80 and 180 people. Unfortunately, the newspapers do not write about them, nor does television show them. Yet there are many talented engineers, technologists, and scientists there.

Our system is very disciplined and viable. It has its own access roads, power facilities, its own heating plants, everything, even down to kindergartens. We have a very high degree of independence. We also have privileges, we negotiate with the railroads for the earliest supply of transport, freightcars, and flatcars.

We can impose fines for the short supply of output or the supply of poor quality output. Our main strength is flexibility of response. In all situations, be it the Armenian earthquake, landslides in Central Asia, floods in the Far East, or Chernobyl, we give help the same day.

International Summit on Defense Conversion Ends

LD3005041591 Moscow TASS in English 2158 GMT 29 May 91

[By UKRINFORM-TASS correspondent Valentin Vernodubenko]

[Text] Kiev May 30 TASS—An international conference on defence industry conversion ended here on Wednesday. The conference, which was organised by the Ukrainian parliament and government, was attended by scientists and business people from the United States, Canada and Britain, along with Soviet specialists.

The republic's defence plants now turn out about 1,500 designations of products for the national economy, Viktor Antonov, Ukrainian minister of state for the defence sector and conversion, and other speakers pointed out at the forum.

The products include passenger planes, sea-going ships, sprinkling units, medical-, trade and light-industry equipment and many other goods. However, conversion of defence plants to civilian production acquires particular topicality in view of the crisis situation that has developed on the consumer market, Antonov said.

"The purpose of the conference was to bring together Ukrainian and Western experts to discuss prospects for

defence industry conversion in your republic," William Hogan, professor of social policy and management of the John F. Kennedy Government School at Harvard University and the director of the "Economic Reform in the Ukraine" programme, told the correspondent.

"We related successes and setbacks of defence industry conversion in the West and together with Ukranian colleagues worked out specific guidelines in this field," Hogan said.

Participants in the conference emphasised that it would not be easy to effect defence industry conversion in the republic because there are no genuine market relations here so far.

News Conference on Price Reform Held

LD3005212691 Moscow TASS in English 2112 GMT 30 May 91

[Text] Moscow May 30 TASS—Prices will soar in the country, Igor Pogosov, deputy chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Statitics, told a news conference in Thursday.

The news conference was devoted to the results of the Soviet price reform launched in April.

The economic recession, the depletion of commodity funds and the decline in the rouble's purchasing power have lately drastically aggravated the situation on the domestic consumer market.

People's earnings in January-April exceeded their expenditures by 32.7 billion roubles. If this tendency remains, the number of "hot" money will total 370-400 billion roubles by the end of the year.

To use up this money and make the rouble convertible, each per cent of increment in people's expenditures should correspond to 0.6 per cent of increment in their incomes.

There are two ways to achieve this. One way is to curb the growth of prices and immediately liberalise them, while limiting people's incomes. The Soviet Government's programme envisage similar measures.

The other way is to liberalise prices, while bringing them into proper correlation with the growth of people's incomes.

Pogosov believes the second way will be chosen. It will envisage measures to limit people's compensation or indexation payments as regards the growth of prices.

Pogosov warned that inflation will also grow in 1991.

Favored Status for Seceding Republics Endangered

OW3005084591 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1800 GMT 28 May 91

[Text] Soviet Deputy Premier Vitaliy Doguzhiev has circualted among the governments of the union republics, the USSR Justice Ministry, the Supreme Court of Arbitration of the USSR, the State Supply Committee, the Finance Ministry and State Bank, the Ministry for Foreign Economic Ties, and the Agriculture Ministry, the USSR State Planning Agency's "considerations concerning the principles of economic relations with the republics evading meeting economic agreements and reluctant to take part in the work of the Interrepublican Economic Commission." The State Planning Agency suggests modelling relations with the republics standing for complete secession (Lithuania, Latvia, and Georgia) or vacillating between secession and membership in the new Union (Armenia and Moldova) on those with the foreign countries.

These republics should either buy out all Union property on their territory or this property should be rented out on profitable terms or become joint property with the Union preserving at least a 50

share of the stock.

Loan and monetary circulation on their territories should be discontinued, says the document. Their supply with scarce raw materials and finished products should be reduced sharply, and no Union-bought imports should come to the seceding republics.

A transition to world prices or the prices of the Union commodity markets in payments with the republics staying out of the Union should be discussed.

According to the State Planning Agency, the republics participating in the new Union should review the signed republican treaties and economic agreements and withhold the most fvavoured nation status from the seceding republics.

Parliament Approves Credit to Finance Ministry

OW3005103691 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1500 GMT 29 May 91

["Banking News"]

[Text] The central parliament in Moscow has authorized the USSR State Bank, Gosbank, to open a ruble 5 billion credit line to the Soviet finance ministry to help form a national stabilization fund designed to cushion the impact to Soviet industries of new market relations that the country is heading for.

It was expected earlier that the republics would contribute to the fund. However, a number of them refused to oblige which forced the finance ministry to borrow from the State Bank.

The chairman of the State Bank, Mr. Viktor Gerashchenko, told parliament that the new credit provided at an annual 6

interest rate would cause excessive money supply running at ruble 500-750m.

The government's internal debt is put at ruble 550 billion early this year.

Agriculture

Party Agrarian Commission Discusses Food Prices

PM2805101491 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
24 May 91 Second Edition p 2

[A. Platoshkin report on "recent" session of CPSU Central Committee Agrarian Policy Commission: "Scissors? No, the Ax!"]

[Text] There is great discord in our common home. There is no counting all the words said and written about this. And about the causes. These include "growing pains," political upheavals, passions and prejudices, and simply games. We come up against the consequences every day in the harsh realities of our life. Well-oiled economic ties have been broken and production and delivery discipline has collapsed. Hence the commodity shortages and the crazy price changes.

This not only hits every one of us in the pocket, it brings entire sectors to their knees. The agro-industrial complex, for instance. The countryside is forced to chase after prices. It cannot keep up, it stumbles and falls more and more frequently.

We can tell that agro-industry is "running out of steam" from the store counters, particularly the food counters. By the beginning of May the country had failed to receive 992,000 tonnes of meat and nearly 2 million tonnes of milk. If we do manage to make ends meet, it is largely because of residues carried over. But if we cannot add to those residues and accumulate more, what will we be left with? How can we increase supplies, from what source?

These questions were discussed at a recent session of the CPSU Central Committee Agrarian Policy Commission under the chairmanship of Ye.S. Stroyev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Secretaries of republic Communist Party Central Committees, party obkoms, and raykoms, and leaders of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, ministries, departments, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and enterprises in the agro-industrial complex took part in the session. This authoritative attendance and the topicality of the subject made the discussion heated and polemical.

The agro-industrial complex, some speakers said bluntly, has always been let down. But probably never before as blatantly as today. First they increased purchase prices, and this pleased the peasant. Then they increased the cost of materials, raw materials, and machinery several times over. Whereas you used to be able to buy a K-701 tractor for 15,000-20,000 rubles [R], now it will cost you more than R57,000. A "Don-1500" combine costs nearly R70,000, instead of R39,000. A seven-ruble fuel injection nozzle for a tractor engine now costs roughly the same as a boar. Just like Marx' example of barter value: A sheep is worth two axes.

That's parity for you. It used to be the case that if a farm was strong, they undermined it with heavy taxes, so that it did not get "too big for its boots." Now they have gone even further, felling the entire agro-industrial complex at a stroke.

Here are just a few alarming reports from local representatives. In Belorussia, for instance, the economy of 60 percent of the farms will be in jeopardy. In Penza Oblast their profits will fall by 45 percent, and one-fourth of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes will fall into the category of loss-makers. In Ryazan Oblast expenditure will exceed income by R400 million. That is equivalent to the value of one-fourth of the gross output. At best, many of the country's farms will end this year at what they call "break-even" point.

Anxiety and concern greeted the account of the situation and measures to ensure price parity for the output of the countryside and other sectors of the economy. It was delivered by V. Chernoivanov, USSR minister of agriculture and food. He noted, in particular: Unless the situation is changed, this year the agro-industrial complex will sustain losses amounting to tens of billions of rubles.

This is not the scissors [reference to diverging lines of graph for agricultural and industrial prices in 1920's]. It is more like the ax, for the countryside. The path to ruin for kolkhozes and sovkhozes. As for private farming, it will simply be stifled at birth by such prices. There is no shortage of sympathy for the peasantry. But what use are words? In practice some republic leaders are using funds intended for the countryside to resolve entirely different tasks, for the sake of making themselves popular.

Look what is happening, according to A. Kamay, secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, L. Khitrun, first secretary of Ryazan CPSU Obkom [oblast committee], V. Vilchinskiy, chairman of Vinnitsa's "Druzhba" Kolkhoz, and others: We carried out industrialization at the expense of the countryside. That is understood, and may have been historically justified. And now we want to adopt market relations, once again by damaging the countryside and robbing it of parity.

Society will hardly tolerate being deprived of food. So the peasant must be helped. In any case, he must not be robbed, as has often happened before. And that means, among other things, robbing him on the pretext of all kinds of subsidies that were either returned to the state in the form of increased prices for materials and services,

or else were spent on "fattening up" industry and creating social benefits for enterprises working for the countryside.

And now we are once again making the peasant the end of the line, once again sacrificing his interests on the altar of the cities. The machine operator's and milkmaid's pay is falling. The country risks losing those who feed it, once and for all.

The countryside—and the market system does not rule this out—can retaliate. It will reduce production, work only for itself and its own needs. It will survive. The first to suffer will be those who rob the plowman of the tools of his trade.

It was Marx who wrote that the proletariat is the gravedigger of capitalism. And who are we? Do we want to be our own grave-diggers?

Today, as M. Timoshishin, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Purchases of Food Resources, told those present, the quantity of grain contracted for is less than the minimum, if you take last year as the basis for calculations. One mistake here is, of course, that procurements are in part left to look after themselves. Party organs have dissociated themselves from this, and the soviets have not taken the matter in hand.

The less grain and meat you sell, the more opportunities you have for barter. It is more advantageous to keep wheat for your livestock unit than to buy poor-quality mixed feeds from the state at extortionate prices.

The administrative edict methods of procurement have had their day, of course. Economic incentives are needed for the commodity producers, a mechanism that would encourage equivalent exchange and stimulate production and delivery of those types of food and raw materials that society needs.

How simple it all looks. And how difficult it turns out to be in practice, with all these swings from one extreme to the other.

The transition to the market, price liberalization—or to put it plainly, free pricing—should without fail apply to the countryside and ensure its protection. Among the participants in the session there were those who advocated "releasing" prices for agricultural output.

Experiments are, of course, needed here. But only experiments, not the whole country at once. Let us see what might come of it. A kilogram of pork, in the opinion of specialists, will soar in price to R30, sausage to R90, milk to R3 a liter.

What kind of index-linking of incomes can keep up with this galloping pace and protect the consumer's interests? And the recent price increases did not lead to any particular decline in demand. The fall in production is still continuing.

People seem to understand the situation. But what is needed is concrete, resolute joint actions. Things are not so good here. Because good intentions, like the many decrees and resolutions of the union and republic authorities, are not action. We do not seem to be very rich in talented economists.

At the same time the notorious barter system is showing a way out of the situation. A decline in livestock raising is in evidence even where plenty of grain has been kept to feed the livestock. The grain is not much use if you give it raw. You need crushers, feed production shops, manufacturing lines. Industry is producing very few of these. It is much the same in crop farming. Yet the workers need fat, bread, and eggs!

Practice is breaking down these barriers just as the spring waters break the ice barriers on the river. While things drag on, while the debates go on in parliament, the Nizhniy Novgorod peasants are sending their produce to Bashkortostan to exchange for herbicides. As a result they obtain not 18 quintals, but 40 or 50 quintals of grain per hectare. Uzbek, Orel, Lipetsk, Vologda, and Kharkov farms are acquiring rolled metal products and tractors, timber and cement in exchange for grain and meat.

What can the state do? It must recognize this de facto, so to speak. And that is not all. A system of economic incentives and regulators for such links must be set up. In particular, to begin with, it would be no bad thing to have a special exchange fund of scarce goods, at the USSR Ministry of Agriculture and Food. In order to stimulate the sale of grain, meat, and milk to the state. A broad transition to payment in kind for labor could also produce good results: both for kolkhoz members and for those who are enlisted to help the countryside. Because paper money is useless, and this practice could breathe life into it.

The state of the food market depends almost entirely on the agro-industrial complex. The same is true to a considerable extent of industry's raw material requirements. The country's anticrisis program could be fulfilled by putting the peasantry on its feet first and foremost. Their prosperity and well-being will guarantee everyone's emergence from the impasse. Incidentally, the West, when it was carrying out its own economic reforms, started with the countryside. So this is not just a matter of good intentions or a tribute to patriarchal sentiments—it is the harsh demand of life itself.

Pace of Spring Sowing Behind Last Year's

PM3005111691 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 30 May 91 p 1

[Report by L. Vashchukov, chief of the USSR Goskomstat (State Committee for Statistics) Agro-Industrial Complex Statistics Department, under the rubric "USSR Goskomstat Reports": "Sowings Reach the East"]

[Text] This year, weather conditions are doing farmers no favors, although it is not done to mention this. Nevertheless, the long, cold spring and frequent rainfall, especially in the European part of the country, is slowing the pace of spring field work. Nor can the insufficient level of material and technical supplies be ignored. The peasants are well aware, however, of what a spring day can bring and they are striving in difficult conditions to complete sowings in good time. Over the past week, the main assault reached the eastern regions.

As of 27 May, over 105.3 million hectares around the country were sown with spring crops. By 28 May last year, 110.6 million hectares had been sown. A gap which is equal in fact to one or two days. At the moment, farms in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] are behind (by 1.6 million hectares), as well as kolkhozes and sovkhozes in Kazakhstan (by 2.7 million hectares), and also farms in the Ukraine, Belorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

By the end of May, 61 million hectares were sown with grain crops. This is virtually the same as by this time last year. Spring wheat sowings were in progress in northern regions of Kazakhstan. By 27 May, this crop covered 9.5 million hectares in the republic and in excess of 22 million hectares across the country as a whole. There is reason to suggest that over the coming days the agricultural workers in the granaries of the east will complete priority field work. Especially as figures released by the Hydrometeorological Service indicate that almost everywhere conditions for the growth and development of plants are favorable.

Sowings are complete in sunflower seed plantations. This crop covers an area of 4.4 million hectares—100,000 hectares more than last year.

Matters in the potato field are a cause for some concern. By 27 May, 1.6 million hectares were planted with tubers, which is 24 percent down on the area devoted to potato crops in this period last year. There is a considerable shortfall in sowing on kolkhozes and sovkhozes in the RSFSR (315,000 hectares), the Ukraine (62,000 hectares), Belorussia (51,000 hectares), Latvia (13,000 hectares), Estonia (13,000 hectares), and Lithuania (7,000 hectares). The relations between the city and the countryside which developed last fall have played a definite role in reducing the area given over to potatoes.

Farms in the Russian Federation have planted 245,000 hectares with vegetable crops, and the Ukraine—250,000 hectares, which represents a fall of 16 and 13 percent respectively. In all, vegetable plantations in kolkhozes and sovkhozes around the country now cover 754,000 hectares. By the end of the 1990 spring sowings in these types of farm, the area given over to potatoes was 2.2 million hectares and to vegetables—1 million hectares.

Cotton sowings are practically complete, and everywhere the work pertaining to managing this crop is progressing well. There is as yet 200,000 hectares less flax, which covers an area of 566,000 hectares.

In the last few days of May, the pace of sowings has picked up significantly.

Scientific

IZVESTIYA Examines Research Reactor Safety

PM2205102191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 May 91 Union Edition p 8

[A. Illesh article: "How Safe Are Research Reactors?"]

[Text] Our newspaper has devoted a whole series of articles to the topic of research reactors. For example, IZVESTIYA was the first to publish details about how many nuclear reactors there are on the capital's territory and about their safety level... And now we have obtained data on a countrywide scale about the quantity and "quality" of these instruments, which are of great importance to scientists.

And so, research reactors and similar experimental installations were built mostly in the fifties and sixties. Today there are around 100 of them. Most of them belong to the USSR Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering and Industry and also to institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences (Gatchina) and the Academies of Sciences of a number of republics—Belorussia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, the Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. And also to Moscow and Tomsk educational establishments and to departmental enterprises of the USSR Ministry of the Petroleum and Gas Industry in Obninsk and the "Norilsknikel" concern.

Following our articles about research reactor incidents, particularly in connection with public alarm about the danger presented by nuclear reactors located in the capital, numerous questions have arisen. In the first place, R. Nikolskiy, chief of the Gospromatomnadzor [State Committee for Safety in Industry and Atomic Power Industry] section for scientific research reactors, believes, violations affecting safety are exceptionally rare at installations of this kind. But it is too soon to be complacent.

Too soon, indeed. Thus IZVESTIYA (No. 83) reported that a serious incident occurred on the reactor in Gatchina which gave rise to controversial rumors. We were immediately accused of "whipping up emotions." We are now giving the floor to the specialists.

True, we were told following an inspection carried out by the USSR Gospromatomnadzor that as a result of this incident there was no threat of radioactive contamination or danger to people's lives. Operations on the reactor were immediately suspended. The investigation established that "In the course of the summer (1990) repairs during transloading operations, as a result of a violation of the integrity of the assembly, a fuel element (containing approximately one gram of uranium) fell

into a zone inaccessible to inspection. Subsequently, over a period of eight months, water carried fragments of this element along a pipeline into pumps and into the heat exchanger located inside the biological shield. Instruments registered an increase in the level of radioactivity." But this is exactly what we reported! I can claim (having visited various Soviet and Western research reactors) that this type of incident is the result of gross negligence. And the specialists' conclusion: Although this is the first such incident in 30 years of the exploitation of this reactor, it demonstrates the need for greater safety on all atomic energy installations. And particularly on research reactors.

Measures are (partially) already being taken. After the Chernobyl accident the operation of 11 reactors in the country was suspended: Additional safety systems were installed on them. Now, on the instructions of the USSR Gospromatomenergo, reactors at the Kazakh and Georgian Academies of Sciences have been taken out of service because of their inadequate technical resistance to earthquakes, and the Belorussian Academy of Sciences reactor has been shut down for technical reasons.

But can all potentially dangerous installations be monitored by an unbiased (at least formally speaking) department? Alas... the Gospromatomnadzor has no jurisdiction over reactors belonging to one of the USSR's most powerful departments—the Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering and Industry.

And in general I must say that the main legal lesson of Chernobyl has not been learned in our country—to this day there is no law on atomic energy, on the utilization of nuclear technologies, on monitoring and responsibility for this extremely important work. There is a multitude of instructions and other papers. But no law. And making people really liable for outrageous things, and even developing the nuclear power industry in normal, civilized conditions is not possible as matters stand...

Meanwhile the role of the law is growing, especially in connection with the transition to market relations, when enterprises' responsibility for safe working practices should be rising and departmental influence decreasing. In our case this applies also to research reactors which are dispersed among 14 departments. Some specialists deem it expedient to establish an association of research reactor owners whose main objective would be to pool efforts to enhance the safety of these installations and also to include ecological problems within the circle of interests of this organization.

When this commentary was ready to go into print, two new reports arrived at the editorial office: The accident prevention system had been activated on research reactors in Riga and Kiev and operations on them suspended. An investigation into what had happened revealed that in both cases there was no danger to personnel, let alone the environment or the population. Let me repeat: Even in an extreme and not very likely incident on a research reactor during which radiation leaked outside the active zone, it could not cause a catastrophe comparable with Chernobyl because of the "low power" of this type of installation and the small amount of fuel which it contains. However, all this serves less as a reassurance than as a convincing argument that "machines" of this type require rigorous, constant, and—this is important—unbiased monitoring.

Debate on Semipalatinsk Nuclear Site

OW2905082591 Moscow Central Television First Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1900 GMT 19 May 91

[Video report by G. Sytykh; from the "Utro 120 + 30" program]

[Text] The Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site has been silent for the past year and a half. Testing has been discontinued temporarily, by popular demand. To be more exact, suspended. But, the acute problems connected with this test site remain unresolved. They are the subject of our correspondent Gennadiy Sytykh's report. [video shows an open grassy field and some rusting girders]

[Begin recording] [Sytykh] This land has known no peace since 1949. Initially, the detonations were in the open, on the surface and in the air. This was particularly dangerous, like Hiroshima, only considerably more powerful. What about the people who lived nearby? [video cuts to Sytykh standing beside a truck in the open field, reading from several sheets of paper]

Here is a statement by an eyewitness, Selimbekov: On the eve of the test, the population of the Abayskiy and (Abrolinskiy) rayons were evacuated 200 to 250 kilometers from the test site. Forty of us were separated from the rest and left in the village of Karaul—this is not far from the test site. We saw the flash of the nuclear bomb, the huge mushroom-shaped cloud, felt the shock wave, and never even suspected how harmful it could be to our health. Two hours after the blast, the military took us to the mountains. There, they examined us with instruments. We were kept under observation for a long time." [video cuts to an open field with cables running to, and disappearing into, what appears to be an underground entrance; a short mast-like object protrudes from the ground]

Now that a more or less safe technology has been found, for nearly three decades, nuclear devices have been detonated at a great depth underground. Here is the site of one such test blast. [video shows close-up of the mast-like marker, then cuts to the city of Kurchatov and Sytykh talking with Major General Fedor Fedorovich Safonov, deputy chief of the test site, examining a radiation dosimeter in city surroundings]

Not far away is the city of Kurchatov, where the researchers themselves live. The radiation level is

normal. The instrument shows normal background radiation levels, 10 micro-roentgens per hour. [Video cuts to Sytykh interviewing Maj. Gen. Safonov at the test site]

Well, Fedor Fedorovich, we are at the test site. What reading does the dosimeter show?

[Safonov] Fourteen micro-roentgens.

[Sytykh] Let us equate it with the standard, what would that be?

[Safonov] Well, if we speak of standards, then in the territory of the Soviet Union, 4 to 20 micro-roentgens is considered normal.

[Sytykh] In other words, that is a safe level of radiation.

[Safonov] Yes, a safe level of radiation. Now, in principle, in accordance with radiation safety standards, living is permitted in territories with levels of up to 60 micro-roentgens per hour.

[Sytykh] When the test site is in operation, does this level remain constant, or are there peaks from time to time when the radiation level rises?

[Safonov] There are occasions when the radiation level increases when gasses are released, but that is for short distances, and in very small quantities.

[Sytykh] Is it dangerous to health?

[Safonov] No, of course not. [video cuts to Sytykh interviewing B. Gusev, chief physician of the Semipalatinsk Radiation Dispensary, candidate of medical sciences]

[Gusev] I can agree with General Safonov—I respect him and his opinions very much—that the majority of underground nuclear explosions, from the standpoint of radioactive contamination of the area, do not upset the radio-ecology or have any kind of harmful effect on the health of the people. But I must point out that this concerns the majority of explosions, not all of them.

[Sytykh] How do you explain the fact that statistics tell us that, in certain categories of serious illness, Semipalatinsk Oblast ranks only fifth, and that everything here is supposedly alright?

[Gusev] An interesting question. The fact is that there was, and continues to be, controversy over this issue. So much so, that the Institute of Biophysics is even developing alternative concepts of our view that cancer—carcinogenic diseases are the gravest, the most serious long-term consequences of radiation damage—has not been affected by radiation. The fact is that ordinary statistics to which Fedor Fedorovich Safonov refers, take into consideration the aggregate population living in the region of Semipalatinsk Oblast.

If we separate the wheat from the chaff, so to speak, form separate groups of the irradiated population—children born from irradiated parents and who themselves have been irradiated, children born from irradiated parents who have not been irradiated themselves—and control groups, then the picture of carcinogenic diseases—let us speak only about this illness—changes drastically. Among people who were irradiated—true, these investigations covered only a small category of people, a small contingent of people—the cancer rate, over 30 years of our observation, was 40 percent higher. [Video cuts to Sytykh interviewing Maj. Gen. Safonov]

[Safonov] I consider underground testing is ecologically harmless. The only thing which should be done here is to reduce the yield of warheads being tested. They should be less than 150 [kilotons]. [Video cuts to Sytykh interviewing K. Boztayev, chairman of the Semipalatinsk Oblast Soviet and first secretary of the oblast committee of the Kazakhstan Communist Party]

[Boztayev] This issue has been examined for the past two years. I can say that we are now at the final stage. Currently, the republic on the one side, and the military industrial complex on the other, are examining schemes to stop nuclear testing at the Semipalatinsk Test Site. I think this will be acceptable to us and to the military industrial complex. True, we are still divided on details. I think the near future will show... [changes thought] that this issue will be finalized in the near future. Now, I consider the issue of ending nuclear testing, has been predecided. There is another issue now. That is the elimination of the consequences of nuclear testing and the health of the population.

[Sytykh] Do you consider more investigative work and more commissions are needed to clarify, once and for all, the consequences of nuclear testing, its effects on health, and to specify measures to somehow eliminate them?

[Boztayev] No commissions are necessary. Six commissions have worked over the past two years. The materials are available. What we need to do now is to develop a program on the basis of the material we have now, and material which the military industrial complex must yet provide. [Video cuts to Sytykh interviewing T. Guseva, first secretary of the Kurchatov City Committee of the Kazakhstan Communist Party and an unidentified man]

[Sytykh] The test site has been silent for the past one and a half years. I think there must have been some changes wrought in the collective?

[Guseva] Naturally, and quite substantial ones. The number of people is being reduced. There are organizations which have been reduced to where only 30 percent of the people remain in them.

[Sytykh] What is the fate of the people who have left?

[Guseva] Complicated. Many of those who have left here now are scattered in many places in the Union and are working in jobs outside their fields. Those who have remained—highly qualified specialists, for example, involved in electrical engineering—are making cages for fur breeding farms. We have cases like that.

[Sytykh] It is disappointing...

[Guseva, interrupting] Yes, very disappointing.

[Sytykh] ...to use people in such a way.

[Guseva] Very disappointing; therefore, the quicker the issue of the test site is decided—what will happen to it, and where it goes—the quicker the fate of these people will be decided. [Video cuts to Sytykh interviewing Maj. Gen. Safonov]

[Safonov] Two rayons of the Semipalatinsk Oblast have been subjected to radiation [dozovaya nagruzka] from the first nuclear explosion in 1949, and from the first thermonuclear blast. I think these people should receive the larger part of compensation. Compensation could be in rubles, or it could be mainly in the form of improving the standard of living of these people. [video cuts to a diagnostic laboratory, containing a variety of modern medical equipment]

[Sytykh] Of course, a program of compensation and health measures demands substantial expenditure. Since the nuclear shield was created for the whole state, the expenditure for this program, particularly for the improvement in medical services, must be borne mutually and not only by Semipalatinsk Oblast. As elsewhere, there is a shortage of treatment facilities here. However, at the initiative of the oblast leadership, all possible measures nonetheless are being taken and health work has begun. A children's rehabilitation center and a diagnostic center have been built in Semipalatinsk. [video cuts to Sytykh interviewing an unidentified official]

[Official] Our resources are not infinite. Of course, we pay more attention to the child population. Physically, we simply cannot offer such help to adults, because, what hinders us at present is that we do not have sufficient resources to allow us to provide additional rooms where we could have an outpatients' service. Out-patients' services would be particularly useful for this category of patient. So, the question of constructing an additional building for us is currently being decided. [video cuts to medical personnel examining a child with the aid of electronic equipment]

We find that practically every one coming to us for examination is ill. Unfortunately, there is a high percentage of malignancies among them, and a weakening of the immune system among children. [end recording]

Such is the bundle of military, scientific, social, and medical problems surrounding the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site. Of course, these problems are complex, but they need to be solved. You are aware that there is a Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement. This movement is headed by writer Olzhas Suleymenov, a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet. So, the representatives of this movement intend to appeal to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet with a proposal to organize a regional referendum among the populations of rayons which adjoin the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site, on the issue of the three remaining nuclear explosions planned for this test site. The proposal to conduct the explosions came from Dmitriy Yazov, the USSR minister of defense, and Vladimir Konovalov, the USSR minister of atomic power and industry. This was announced by Olzhas Suleymenov, president of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement.

Financing of UK-Soviet Flight Questioned

917Q0103A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 May 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel M. Rebrov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA science columnist: "Space Project 'Juno,' or the Riddle of One Commercial Transaction"]

[Text] To start with, one fact is indisputable and recognized by everyone: The Soviet Union has the most active and substantial space program in the world. If we take just the statistics of the last 20 years we see that, on the average, we launched a spacecraft every four days. The Soviet "rocket flotilla" includes several varieties of launch vehicles that are capable of putting into space cargo weighing up to 100 tons. The guarantee of success in every launch is 92-98 percent. Hence the assertion: The shortest road to space goes through the USSR.

Many of our research programs are unique. The scientists of many countries dream of using the scientific base that the Mir orbital complex represents. Interest in our projects and our experience in the field of space technology, space production, power engineering, natural history, cartography, and other fields is great. We are ready for broad cooperation and to provide services to partners, of course, on a commercial basis.

The mutual benefit of joint actions in outer space should not be underestimated. Partnership relations with the scientific centers of France, the United States, Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, India, and other countries, the placement of foreign instruments on our satellites and automatic interplanetary stations, and the exchange of scientific information... All of this already exists. The prospects are far more alluring and broader: On one condition: If we are guided in scientific-economic policy not by ideological dogmas and illusions but by common sense.

Thus, the next space flight by commercial agreement has started its countdown of workdays. On 20 May at 1725 hours a representative of Great Britain, together with experienced colleagues from the USSR, should arrive at the Soviet orbital station Mir, and, judging by television reporting, he is very pleased. But we still do not know what commercial gain our country will get from this. Moreover, when you become familiar with this aspect of project "Juno," the impression is created that we are paying ourselves. Nonsense!

Nonetheless, I came to this conclusion after conducting a brief journalistic investigation. In order to clarify the situation I made a phone call to Glavkosmos [Main Administration for the Development and Use of Space Technology for the National Economy and Science], to the scientific production association Energiya, to Litsenzintorg [Foreign Trade Licensing]... However, my roaming about the commercial labyrinth did not lead to anything. I succeeded in establishing only a certain chronology of events and the names of some "influential persons" who showed an interest in the "Juno" project. Thus, Heinz Wolff, a professor at Brunel University in London, was actively engaged in the scientific program and prepared a series of experiments; Christopher Hays, a marketing expert, oversaw the project along the "bank credit" line; Mark Ragget, an insurance broker at the Dzhordayn company [name as transliterated], held all of the administrative threads in his own hands, and, according to a statement in the newspaper INDEPENDENT ON SUNDAY, he maintained contacts with "British industry," which was ready to be a sponsor of the project.

In 1987, Ragget made a business trip to Moscow, but after returning he convinced the president of the Dzhordayn company to become the chief sponsor of the Soviet-British space flight. The English press reacted enthusiastically to this event, but soon the cheerful reporting subsided, and later even fell silent. Without explaining the motives for its actions, Dzhordayn quite unexpectedly quit the game.

However, the resourceful broker quickly found a substitute, after getting the Moscow People's Bank interested in the project (I am still unable to explain what this organization is with a name so close to the heart). In 1989 M. Ragget and the bank established a joint company, giving it the imposing name Antequera, and declared that they are ready to invest 5 million pounds sterling in the space program. Moreover, they planned to take this sum from the safes of the Moscow People's Bank.

Events unfolded further this way. In June 1989 relations between the broker and the bank, or the other way round, suddenly got sharply worse, and, as TASS' London correspondent reported, the contract between the two high parties was annulled. Why so? Although the very fact of the collapse of the commercial transaction became apparent, much in this story is unclear to this day.

But here is what is curious. The insurance broker received "compensation in the amount of 30,000 pounds sterling." For what? After all, he did not invest anything, not a penny. It turns out that this large sum was paid in exchange for Ragget's firm and confidential promise "not to provide information on the project to the mass media." The bank itself categorically refused to comment on its decision.

Meanwhile, after the "silent divorce," the bank activated its efforts in search of a sponsor, because 16 million pounds sterling had to be gathered so that a representative of the United Kingdom could fly to outer space. But here disappointment was awaiting the Moscow People's Bank. The bosses of that same "British industry," to which the INDEPENDENT ON SUNDAY referred, did not display any particular interest in the "Juno" project, giving as the reason the fact that "there is nothing that strikes the imagination in its program." An even harsher judgment was heard: "The value of the project from a scientific standpoint is the same as that of a 'Miss Universe' beauty contest." We will leave this statement to the conscience of its author (in the English press he was called "a local consultant on space technology questions").

But at the same time in foggy Albion, a selection was held for candidates for the flight, two contestants entered into training (November 1989), and business negotiations were held between Moscow and London, but in August of last year the foreign press reported that the "joint project burst like a soap bubble." The aforementioned Christopher Hays gave assurances that hope is alive, and that this was a hasty statement "of poorly informed journalists." Today, we know: The British astronaut was launched on a Soviet spacecraft and is working in orbit. But there is something we do not know: Who will pay for this expensive arrangement?

Very likely, Mark Ragget could somehow clarify this question. But on 10 May last year he took his own life—he committed suicide. The official version: because of a financial mess. However, the question itself remains: "Who?"

My mind goes back to December 1990. It was reported at that time: "A Japanese journalist took part in a joint flight according to a commercial agreement between the USSR Glavkosmos and the Japanese television corporation TBS, which paid Glavkosmos $12 million."

Afterward there was one more optimistic assurance: "Outer space is becoming commercial," and a refinement of this: "Another four are on the way (a reference to joint flights—M.R.). They will be of a commercial nature. Each such flight will bring our country approximately $12 million."

Tempting. After all, such a flight costs us 60 million rubles. But I personally doubt that it will be this way. Doubts arise not so much because of the enigmatic story about the "Juno" project but because of our approach to commerce. The country has excellent design collectives, and, it can be said without exaggeration, the intellectual cream of the nation is assembled in the space industry, and our engineering ideas can amaze and delight the world. If what we are doing is good and profitable to sell, we will benefit greatly. I dare say it is advisable to entrust this task to professional businessmen. But for some reason we are trying to combine it all in one person.

However, let us return to the questions: "Who? For whom? How much?" I think that they also disturb the reader. But... This all remains a secret for now.

Baltic Republics

Pugo Justifies Actions Against Customs Posts

LD3005151291 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1350 GMT 30 May 91

[Text] USSR Internal Affairs Minister Boris Pugo has described the actions against customs posts on the border between Lithuania and Latvia as measures to unblock the border. He regards the existence of customs houses in the Baltic republics as a violation of the laws of the USSR and the president's decree, which allows enterprises to export freely.

Baltic Council Discusses Moscow Negotiations

LD3005222791 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 30 May 91

[Excerpts] A meeting of the Baltic Council opened this evening in Vilnius, later than planned. It was attended by the chairman of the Estonian legislature Arnold Ruutel; the Estonian representative in Lithuania, Mark Tarmak; the chairman of the Latvian legislature, Anatolijs Gorbunovs; the chairman of the defense and internal affairs commission of the legislature Juris Dobelis; Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans; and the Latvian permanent representative in Lithuania, Alberts Sarakanis.

Lithuania was represented by the chairman of the legislature Vytautas Landsbergis, his deputy Ceslovas Stankevicius, and Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas. [passage omitted]

Tomorrow the chairmen of the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian legislatures will leave for Brussels where a session of the Benelux states is to take place.

Baltic Council Criticizes Soviet Actions

LD3105081391 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Russian 2030 GMT 30 May 91

[Text] We have received two documents adopted by the Baltic Council today. First, it is a statement by the Baltic Council on the USSR actions against the Baltic countries and peoples:

At the beginning of 1991 the USSR leadership, having discontinued consultative negotiating contacts with the authorized delegations of the Baltic states, has gone over to armed violence. Although it seems these contacts are being resumed, the USSR military actions against the Baltic countries and people continue. Officials and offices of the Ministries of Internal Affairs of the Baltic states, the Defense Department of the Republic of Lithuania, and school training drivers and pilots are becoming the objects of attacks. Customs control posts have been constantly subjected to attacks lately.

Thus, after the January events ever new buildings and other objects have been seized. This has been accompanied by a destruction of property and [word indistinct] and robbery of citizens. Units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs—the OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment]—are especially impudent. The USSR military and political leadership has tried more than once to dissociate itself from their actions. These attempts are completely groundless because the OMON is maintained and supplied with weapons by the USSR.

The keeping of such military formations of a terrorist type, sometimes acting the part of mercenaries, must be condemned everywhere as a continuation of the aggression of Stalinist times. It is incompatible with the USSR promises not to use force and to reform in accordance with the principles of a democratic and law abiding state. A state using force as a political means must not count on credits of many billions from the democratic states. Political organizations preserved up to now and newly formed and guided from Moscow at present must be subordinated to legal norms of the Baltic states. Their use by the USSR against the sovereignty of the Baltic states is an intolerable subversive activity. Attempts to proclaim military structures of the USSR temporarily stationed on the territory of the Baltic states as some kind of local political force called upon to decide the future of this European region are also intolerable.

New ultimatums by the USSR Armed Forces demanding that young men—citizens of the Baltic states—serve in a foreign army, the threat of a forcible call-up resembling the situation on the eve of the January invasion, provoke a new wave of tension and alarm. The peoples of the world must not remain unconcerned.

This statement was signed by Latvian Supreme Council Chairman Gorbunovs; Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Landsbergis; and Estonian Supreme Council Chairman Ruutel.

An agreement of the Baltic Council on cooperation on the way toward negotiations with the USSR was adopted, too. It is as follows:

The Baltic Council instructs the state delegations of the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, and the Republic of Estonia who are holding meetings with USSR delegations, to continue efforts in speeding up the beginning of real negotiations and inform each other in detail about the content and results of each such meeting. This must serve the coordination of the positions at present and the preparation for a closer cooperation in the coming talks with the USSR.

Latvia's Bisers Expects July Coup Attempt

LD3005182991 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1730 GMT 30 May 91

[Text] Speaking today at a news conference in Moscow, Ilmars Bisers, first deputy prime minister of Lithuania, announced that a political union with the present leadership of the Soviet Union is not possible. Such is the resolve of the Latvian people.

Replying to questions from correspondents, Mr. Bisers explained that the OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] units of Riga have done great damage in attacking Latvian customs posts. There is information at his disposal that during the recess of the legislature, in July, a real attempt at a coup d'etat can be expected in the republic.

Discussing the attitude of the government of Latvia toward financing union programs, Bisers noted that Latvia is interested in financing some of them. On the occasion of a meeting between the leaders of the governments of Latvia and the USSR, expected tomorrow in Moscow, the entire spectrum of financial relations will be touched upon. Latvia, however, has refused to allocate funds to the union budget.

Latvian Economics Minister Janis Aboltins also participated in the news conference. He expressed the opinion that Latvia is willing to join in drawing up several scientific programs.

Latvian Procurator Defends OMON Actions

LD3005213991 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1730 GMT 30 May 91

[Text] Speaking in a broadcast today on the Concord radio station of the Communist Party of Latvia, Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] First Deputy Procurator Andris Reinieks announced that the customs operations of Latvia are illegal and criminally punishable, and the Interior troops have only fulfilled the duties entrusted to them by a decree of the USSR president. Nor is any special permission required for the activity of the OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment], because that is (?their) usual job, which should have been carried out a long time ago by the local organs of the internal affairs department. No material damage has been done to the local establishments of power or the State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate, according to Reinieks, because only buildings illegally erected by the department of customs have been demolished.

True, Reinieks admits that the direct perpetrators have possibly also committed some transgressions. All the complaints will be examined in the course of investigating the criminal case started by the Latvian SSR Procuracy.

Latvian Procuracy Ordered To Prosecute OMON

LD3005214291 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2000 GMT 30 May 91

[Text] USSR Procurator General Trubin has instructed the Procuracy of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic to institute criminal proceedings against the Riga OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachments] in connection with the much-publicized attacks on customs posts.

Latvian Delegation To Meet Shevardnadze

LD3005193491 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1730 GMT 30 May 91

[Text] A delegation of the Supreme Council of Latvia left today for Moscow. It is expected that it will meet the president of the foreign policy association, Eduard Shevardnadze. It is expected that the present relations between Latvia and the USSR, before the anticipated talks with the leadership of the Soviet Union on 6 and 7 June, will be examined. In the talk with Shevardnadze the possible participation of official representatives of Latvia in the Berlin discussions of CSCE will be discussed.

Lithuania Warns Against OMON Activities

LD3005150891 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1350 GMT 30 May 91

[Text] The Lithuanian Government intends to present Special Purpose Militia Detachment [OMON] members with a demand that they break with their criminal organization.

According to the BALTIJA agency, the republic's vice premier, Zigmas Vaisvila, warned that otherwise they will be treated as criminals. In Vaisvila's opinion, it is impossible to hold talks with Internal Affairs Minister Boris Pugo. He recognizes and then denies OMON's aggressive activities.

The Lithuanian Government also intends to appeal to Soviet Premier Valentin Pavlov in connection with the fact that the Lithuanian police is not receiving weapons, while the weapons it has are being confiscated by Internal Affairs Ministry forces. It is not ruled out that it will necessary to appeal to the West for help, as there will be nothing with which to fight crime with.

Lithuania Declares OMON Units 'Unlawful'

LD3005195891 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 30 May 91

[Text] From January to May 1991 the OMON, the special purpose police unit of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, has been crudely violating the laws, using firearms in attacking state institutions of the Republic of Lithuania, and robbing and injuring residents and officials. This unit has been taking part in terrorist actions in attacking customs posts, and seizing weapons, motor vehicles, ammunition, documents, and other property.

The Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania announces that the OMON unit of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, engaged in criminal activity, and other armed formations not envisaged in the laws of the Republic of Lithuania, are unlawful in Lithuania.

The leadership of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and of the Armed Forces have assured that these terrorist attacks have not been carried out on their instructions.

Therefore the actions of this unit are regarded as a criminal outrage by an armed gang.

The Government of the Republic of Lithuania promises to help all who retire from the OMON by 7 June to find employment, and assures that they will not be discriminated against. Those who do not retire and remain in that unit will be regarded as participants in a criminal group and will be brought to book in the established manner.

The Government of the Republic of Lithuania calls on residents to be calm and not to give in to provocations. Our weapon is patience and peaceful resistance. The way to criminal activity can be barred only by the law enforcement bodies.

Lithuanian Ministry Appeals for End to Violence

LD3005210491 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 2000 GMT 30 May 91

[Text] The Ministry of Internal Affairs has published a statement on political forces and movements which have emerged lately and which are inviting open confrontation through the use of mental and physical violence against political opponents.

On 20 May explosions took place during a mass event at the Siauliai town park of culture and recreation. Only through luck were greater casualties avoided.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs invites the leaders of all political parties and movements to urge their supporters and all those holding the same views to reject violent acts towards their political opponents, stop open confrontation which is splitting society, and express their political convictions by constitutional and democratic means.

Lithuanian Warning Issued to 'Black Berets'

LD3105081891 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 30 May 91

[Text] An appeal signed by the members of the Collegium of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was handed in today to the Black Berets unit. Unfortunately, it begins with the words "former colleagues". It says:

Political tension is being fuelled and attempts are being made to destabilize social order by your actions, which have been proclaimed unlawful and criminal by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania, the appeal of the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the black berets states. Do not forget that carrying out party political orders is not the way to achieve a law-governed state. Do not make mistakes that could be decisive to your fate, the former colleagues are warned.

Commenting on this statement, Deputy Interior Minister Juozas Matonis noted that the Black Berets unit does not fulfill its function— it does not maintain public order, it does not control criminals—but is used by political forces as an instrument of violence. We would like the people of this unit to understand that after some political solutions are achieved they will become unnecessary to those who use them now, the deputy minister noted.

Lithuania's Simenas Appointed Minister of Economy

LD3105002991 Moscow TASS in English 1759 GMT 30 May 91

[Text] Vilnius May 30 TASS—Lithuanian Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius today proposed appointing Albertas Simenas to the post of minister of the economy.

During January events in Vilnius, republican Prime Minister Simenas "mysteriously disappeared".

After Kazimiera Prunskiene resigned, Simenas, 41, an economist and mathematician, was instructed to form the republican cabinet.

On the night of January 13, when the Army seized the television centre and tower, Simenas disappeared. Later, it became known that he was taking his family away from the capital. As various conjectures and forecasts were voiced, the parliament decided to appoint Vagnorius to the post.

Simenas is running for the ministerial post, recently left by Vytas Navickas, whose views on economic realities "run counter to the prime minister's views".

[Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian at 1600 GMT on 30 May adds the following: "Although the candidacy of Albertas Simenas was not supported by the liberal, center, and left-wing factions; by a majority of 58 votes he was voted to the post of minister of economy."]

RSFSR

KGB Refutes Rumors of Radioactive Accidents

PM3005220591 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 31 May 91 First Edition p 2

[M. Sashin report: "The Rumor Is That There Will Be No More Gossip...."]

[Text] Alas, don't even dream about this while officials or the mass media get involved in spreading information which, to put it mildly, does not correspond to reality. This thought was provoked when the editorial office became snowed under with telephone calls from Moscow and other cities of the Soviet Union.

"Is is true that the nuclear reactor at Stupino has blown up?"

"Have you heard that the nuclear reactor at Pushchino has malfunctioned?"

"It is said that the reactor at the Moscow Physical Engineering Institute has burned out?"

The speed with which the information tinged with radiation phobia spread forced us, too, to pick up the telephone. We telephoned people who, in our opinion, should know everything—the press service of the USSR KGB Administration for Moscow and Moscow Oblast.

"You are our two hundredth caller today," Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Mikhaylov, director of the press center, answered at the other end of the line. "The inhabitants of Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayon, journalists, and representatives of the public have telephoned us on the duty desk. We were phoned by the Union of Cinematographers and informed that a plane had blown up with a 'radioactive cloud' at Sheremetyevo. Moreover we were informed that Radio Saburovo had broadcast the information that all air vents had to be closed and people were not to go outside because of enhanced radiation. The Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayon Health Department issued an instruction to prepare the evacuation of kindergartens.

"On investigating the situation we came to the conclusion that the spread of the stories was occasioned by a real fact, one linked to the hospitalization of 146 staffers of two institutes—the Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry All-Union Chemical Technology Scientific Research Institute and All-Union Chemical Industry Scientific Research Institute—with a preliminary diagnosis of follicular tonsillitis. Presently, an official commission of specialists comprising doctors, toxicologists, and biochemists is working there. A number of specialists suggest that the symptoms of the illness are similar to the symptoms of poisoning by fluorine compounds. It is suggested that this could have resulted from a discharge of fluorine compounds, work with which is carried out in a number of the All-Union Chemical Technology Scientific Research Institute laboratories."

Incidentally, we personally decided to check out the rumor about the reactor at the Moscow Physical Engineering Institute and thus sent out a camera crew, which found the reactor in perfect health.

As for the reactors at Pushchino and Obninsk, they, too, are functioning normally. At Stupino there are no reactors at all, and that area is regarded as the most environmentally clean in the oblast.

Yeltsin Continues Tour; Visits Tula

OW3105023891 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0900 GMT 30 May 91

[Text] Chairman of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet Boris Yeltsin, who is currently making a tour of Russian cities, will spend Thursday, May 30, in Tula. He has plans to meet with the public and with the local managers, attend the all-Russia conference of rectors of higher educational establishments and visit an airborne unit.

On Wednesday evening, Yeltsin's plane landed near the city of Kaluga, on the airfield of the local branch of the Voluntary Society for Assisting the Army and Navy, because it was impossible to land in Tula. Right on the airfield, Boris Yeltsin had a meeting with residents of the neighbouring villages and with the airfield's personnel. There was an exchange of views on the current situation, during which he answered questions about his political course.

Speaking about the nationalities policy, he said he would support a policy that would never lead to bloodshed and that would never set the armed forces against civilians. We want everyone to understand, he said, that involvement in these ethnic conflicts puts the armed forces in disgrace. The army itself is not to blame because it only fulfil orders, he said.

Boris Yeltsin stated once again that the Communist Party bodies should be removed from the armed forces, the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the state authority bodies. If they are not, political plurality in them would mean that, say, ten party organizations will hold their party conference. Given this, there will be no order either in the armed forces or anywhere else. Boris Yeltsin said that party organizations "should be involved in off-the-job activity and operate in places where its members live, and after hours." But we are not prepared for such a change, he said.

Answering a woman's question about his unpredictable ways, Boris Yeltsin said that he had never changed his principles. As to individual accusations and even attempts to initimidate him, he said, it is part of a definite campaign. He said he opposed disrespectful treatment of the candidates to the post of Russia's president and assured that none of his rivals would hear from him a single disrespectful word about them.

Feels Last Year's Injury

LD3005200491 Moscow TASS in English 1917 GMT 30 May 91

[Text] Tula May 30 ROSTASS—Russian parliament head Boris Yeltsin running for Russian presidency, has visited Tula, a regional centre in Russia.

Addressing thousands of residents, who gathered in the city's central square to a rally held on the initiative of the Democratic Russia movement, Yeltsin said he considered maximum social protection of citizens as the main task during the transition to market relations. He said he will fight for it.

Yeltsin's meeting with heads of district and city councils of the region and of the city's largest industrial enterprises, scheduled for today's morning was canceled. They planned to discuss conversion at the city's military-industrial enterprises.

Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Skokov accompanying Yeltsin in his tour, told the meeting at the regional executive committee building that on the road

from Kaluga to Tula, the injury received by Yeltsin last year manifested itself, and Yeltsin was not able to attend the meeting.

Yeltsin 29 May Remarks in Petrozavadsk Reported

LD3005140691 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 30 May 91

[Report by correspondent Aleksey Abakumov]

[Text] The working trip by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet, around the republic continues. This morning Boris Nikolayevich spoke at a meeting in the center of Tula. Despite the fact that today is a working day and that it is drizzling from time to time, tens of thousands of people gathered on the square in front of the building of the oblast soviet, oblast committee, and rayon committee of the Russian Communist Party. Boris Nikolayevich spoke about the topical problems of Russia, about the problems of the region and of the city. His speech was interrupted several times due to a faulty microphone.

Unfortunately, due to communications problems, I could not contact the editorial office yesterday, and now I will say a few words about yesterday. I will start with a quote: Years of half-measures and indecisiveness, that is how Boris Nikolayevich summed up the past six years when speaking last night in Petrozavodsk. A way out of the crisis for Russia is possible only by means of effective radical reforms, the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet stressed. He spoke about the practical steps of the republic's leadership in the past few months: the duration of annual leave has been increased to 24 days, the work week has been reduced by an hour, and the minimum wage and the minimum pension in Russia is higher than suggested by Union legislation. The republic advocates a course toward sovereignty. The recognition of this course by the center makes it possible for a rapproachment to be achieved, Boris Yeltsin noted. Changes have taken place in the economy. Russian entrepreneurship is developing. More and more enterprises are being transferred to the jurisdiction of Russia. Diversity in agriculture has become a reality. About 140 laws were adopted in the past year. The time has come for their implementation and for practical solutions, Boris Yeltsin stated.

Well, it is possible to define the progress of the working trip by the chairman of the Russian parliament around the republic as days of practical decisions. I would like to remind you that two fundamentally important documents were signed (?in Murmansk) which deal with the development of the northern regions on the whole and in particular with the development of Murmansk Oblast when changing over to the market. In Petrozavodsk, the chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet stated the fact of the republic's complete rejection of payment-in-aid, so to speak, to foreign states.

Using the powers given to him by the Third Extraordinary Congress of Russian People's Deputies, Boris Yeltsin signed the document on expanding the economic independence and creating conditions for the accelerated development of Karelia. This document envisages a whole complex of financial, currency, and economic measures and allowances which are given to Karelia. It is a testing ground for perfecting economic links. The republic is given a set of rights and is independent in making decisions, Boris Nikolayevich noted in his interview to Russia's radio.

There is one more very important decision. A document abolishing restrictions on rises in wages for building enterprises in Russia was signed in a settlement of Novaya Vilga. I would like to note that this document was signed in the office of Panov, chairman of the Stroytel cooperative.

Last night Boris Yeltsin left Petrozavodsk by air. The chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet landed at the Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy training airfield some 20 km away from Kaluga. Boris Nikolayevich had a conversation with the people from a nearby village, who learned about his arrival by chance—the arrival of the chairman of the Russian parliament. Then he went to Tula by car and on the way the motocade ran into a heavy shower and a thunderstorm.

Today, as I have already mentioned, Boris Nikolayevich is in Tula. His program includes meetings and a speech at the Polytechnical Institute and a visit to the testing ground of the airborne assault troops. In the evening he is expected to fly to Voronezh.

Yeltsin Vows Not To Provide 'Disinterested Aid'

OW3005031391 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1500 GMT 29 May 91

[Text] Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian republican Supreme Soviet who is touring the Northern part of Russia has signed a document widening economic independence of Karelia and stipulating new financing regulations. Specifically, in 1991-1993 Karelia will retain part of its income and a share of stabilisation fund which were previously allocated to the Russian republican budget.

The Karelian republic will also keep 75 percent of its hard currency earnings, with the remainder going to the Russian budget. "In a sense this regulation runs counter to the recent Presidential Decree that introduced a 40 percent tax on republics' hard currency incomes. We have discussed the issue with President Mikhail Gorbachev and I did not conceal my dissatisfaction with the Decree, which I believe hinders the development of export industries in this country. This (new regulation) however should in no way be considered as a step to confrontation, but rather as a necessary measure to speed up the economic development of Karelia" said Yeltsin.

Karelia will be entitled from now on to set taxation ceilings and tax rebates for all industrial enterprises located on its territory.

A long-term agreement on economic cooperation between Karelia and Russia is to be signed shortly, enabling karelia to gain access to hard currency credits which Russia will receive from the central government. The (Karelian) republic is authorized to carry out barter trade and licence its exports (which form part of Russian exports). Karelia will preseve 15 percent of the goods produced for its own needs. Out of these 10 percent will be disposed of by the republican authorities and the remaining 5 percent—by industrial enterprises themselves. Karelia has also been granted the right to establish businesses abroad. Speaking at a meeting with workers of local industrial enterprises in the city of Petrozavodsk Boris Yeltsin said that "Russia has refused to render any aid to Afghanistan". He said he had informed about that decision both President Gorbachev and Afghan President Najibullah, and that the latter was clearly displeased by the news. Acording to Yeltsin, Russia has been appropriating $280 million a year in aid to Afghanistan, so he suggested that the countries trade goods in that amount. "By and large Russia is not going to provide disinterested aid to other countries,—Yeltsin said, adding—Charity begins at home." [sentence punctuation as received]

The visit to Petrozavodsk brought to an end Yeltsin's Northern tour, which also included trips to Murmansk and the Soviet Northern Fleet military base in Severomorsk.

Bakatin Interviewed on Candidacy 29 May

LD3005123391 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 0510 GMT 29 May 91

[Interview with Russian presidential candidate V.V. Bakatin by political observer Yuriy Semenov; place not given—live; from the "Panorama" program]

[Excerpts] [Semenov] Good morning to our audience and to you, Vadim Viktorovich. [passage omitted]

Perhaps we shall begin with this, Vadim Viktorovich. There is a lot of talk of all sorts about both your candidacy and the other candidacies, regarding the motives for standing: both the candidate's own motives for standing, and the motives for the support for that decision to stand which has come from collectives or some sort of voters' associations. Accordingly, I consider it my duty to ask you this question on behalf of our listeners. What prompted you to agree to your candidacy being put forward? Let's put it that way.

[Bakatin] First, I should like to greet Mayak's listeners. [passage omitted]

Of course, my motives are very complex, since I am actually asked this question very often. They say: you have refused the presidency, the posts of general secretary and deputy general secretary and you turned things down all your life, and you were good, as it were, when you turned them down, yet now you have suddenly become so bad that you have decided to agree. I turned them down when I had the difficult and, I would say, interesting job of interior minister. But now I consider, to a certain degree, that the work which I am doing does not satisfy me completely, and I believe that I can be more useful.

Second, regarding work in the executive authority, the leadership of executive authority in Russia: I am a Russian, I have a splendid knowledge—I think I do, perhaps, though that is a little self-confident, of course—but I think I have quite a good knowledge of Russia's problems. I have lived in various regions and have travelled about a lot, as a matter of fact. So, the situation is dreadfully serious, and it's not my way to stand aside and just criticize or give some sort of advice without having the opportunity to put it into practice. Therefore, it simply pains me to see the excellent ideas which are, perhaps, elaborated by the Russia congress and Supreme Soviet getting nowhere fast, because of the confrontation which exists now between the center and the Russian leadership. I see that as one of the reasons why we have not found our bearings on many issues and why we are making a bad job of government. That is why I responded to the fairly insistent requests from collectives and individual citizens. I also received quite a lot of telegrams, and signatures were collected, you know, so I decided that they would simply not have understood and would have said that I had been a coward if I had not gone ahead and decided to stand.

[Semenov] Fine, now, the second question is this. You know Mayak's rhythm, since you have listened to us for many years. We don't have the opportunity to present a full account of your program, so to speak, but still I think our listeners will be interested to find out some key elements of your program. Also, we have now had a telephone call from Zaytsev a Muscovite, who asks how you intend to extricate Russia from its economic crisis and requests you to spell out your views on the following points: food, taxes, your attitude to the defense complex, prevention of unemployment, and so on.

[Bakatin] I am always being reproached. I make quite a lot of appearances, and they always say that time is limited, by which they mean that I ought to present my program, although there isn't enough time for it.

[Semenov] The questions will help us.

[Bakatin] Perhaps they will. All the same, I would like to talk about the basics. I might come back to that question from Zaytsev from Moscow, if you have no objection. Still, I believe that I can sum up this program in a few words by saying that its basis is that we have to protect the individual in this transitional period when old structures are being broken and new ones created; we have to

help him to survive the problems of this transitional period. That is the most important point.

Second, as a matter of fact, we have to switch from this confusion, this lack of control and paralysis of authority, to a managed—I stress, managed—transition to the market. This is probably the main thing. Not to a managed market, but to a managed transition to the market. The main principle here is the principle of accord, not of confrontation, but of accord, and of accord based on honest, open work by the government and by executive authority as a whole, and not only by it. That is something that we very often do not have today.

Moreover, of course, we must have continuity. We must not start sweeping in a different way every time we get a new broom, so to speak, believing that everything which went before is no use and only counting the days from the moment when, as they say, somebody took on that post.

Next, we have to rely on professionals. This is what we are missing today: the ability to listen and to find professionals. We have a great many of them, competent people, in all areas. We must not think that each president has a brilliant grasp of both finance, defense, and agriculture.

Regarding food, I believe that now, in conditions of universal shortages and collapse, we have to set down a precise hierarchy of priorities. We must not snatch at everything at once. We must not make promises, you know, where whatever somebody asks for today, we try to promise him it: cut taxes—fine, we'll cut them; help the health service—fine, we'll help it. No, that is impossible. There is a first, main priority, and that is agriculture.

Today I have managed to travel around a little just in Kirov Oblast alone, at certain farms, and it is simply dying because of the totally useless financial policy, economic policy. Tomorrow, or even today, there is no money to buy (?peat), machinery and so on. So we need to work out an economic mechanism straight away which would not kill off the villages, but would have a constant effect, it has to be very flexible, but it would constantly provide normal profitability which would promote expanded reinvestment in agriculture and not crush it with these prices. I won't outline this mechanism, or the ways to work out this mechanism, right now, but it needs to be done soon. By the way, Pavlov's government examined this issue yesterday, and I think that this is going in the right direction.

To speak about taxes, in general, this is a two-edged sword. We have to have a flexible but stable, constant and predictable system of taxation. If we raise taxes too much, then by the same token we will simply destroy initiative and nobody will have any interest in doing things.

[Semenov] Which has happened.

[Bakatin] Yes. If we reduce them too much, then we reduce the tax base for tackling social problems which the state should do. Meanwhile, the tax benefits that we are engaging in are not the right method. I think that in the final analysis we create some system, and then we destroy it with the privileges, and so there needs to be a lot of searching for good specialists. That is, our tax system needs work.

On defense, I reckon that on the one hand, with the kind of economy that we have ended up with today and which really exists here, there is no getting away from it, nevertheless the military-industrial complex is too big and cumbersome, and so today this does not permit us to raise wages as we should. There are colossal reserves here in filling the consumer goods market, but to this end we need to reduce defense expenditure. Cut it, but again, sensibly, using the right yardstick everywhere, always with common sense, and not prancing about from one thing to another, starting off with a great deal of something and then virtually destroying it all, that is, reasonable sufficiency.

To talks about these expenditures, I think that while reducing the expenditure as a whole, on arms production, for example, but this must again be looked at clearly by specialists, to what extent it is possible, we should increase expenditure on social protection of servicemen who are today in quite a pitiable condition, that is simply a must. Then, to talk about defense in principle, I am an advocate of switching to a professional army.

Comrade Zaytsev asks us here about unemployment. I think that people must simply have forgotten altogether about any planning here, which we used to be so proud of, so that now, in conditions of total shortages, where there are no nails, nobody to collect the garbage, to collect scrap paper, no bricks, that at such a moment people from the working population could be taken out of production and this unemployment be permitted. There is a system of public works that should be created, there is a system, or rather there is no system, but one should be created, a system for retraining, a state system, and so there are here many methods in order to avoid unemployment, in the initial period, at any rate. When we arrive at overproduction, then we might have some unemployment, but that is another matter altogether, and then we might well talk about unemployment benefits.

[Semenov] You know, we have had two telephone calls from Lithuania. What do you intend to do—this is how the people who called put it—to protect Russians living outside Russia, and in particular in regions where the situation is fairly tense?

[Bakatin] In order to protect the Russians who live in Lithuania, first of all it is necessary to establish normal relations between the Government of Russia and the Government of Lithuania, the one that exists there now, and between the Union and Lithuania, and not inflame

the passions that we have in fact brought things to at the moment. I believe that every state, every republic, in accordance with the Constitution, has the right to secede from the Union, and that we just do not have the right to hold on to anyone by force, that is unconstitutional. I oppose any measures of a forcible nature here, but I believe that at least three conditions should be observed.

The first is a guarantee to the effect that the rights of any nationality will be observed, for the people who do not wish, for example, to leave the Soviet Union along with Lithuania. That is the first condition for negotiations. Sadly, these talks keep being prolonged and postponed, and at the end of the day this is resulting in the tension that is certainly creating abnormal living conditions both for Russians, I think, and not only for Russians but for other nationalities. So this question has to be resolved, and not deferred. But we keep deferring it, thinking we will get by somehow, or think that we will manage to make everything as it was before, the Union of a totalitarian regime that used to exist here but which can no longer now exist.

[Semenov] [passage omitted] I would like to ask a question from Comrade Smirnov. He is concerned at the fact that the process of Russia's gaining its sovereignty is acquiring a confrontational character. He blames primarily the party apparatchiks for this, as he writes, or says, and he asks: Could you ensure a peaceful process of sovereignization of Russia? What do you think?

[Bakatin] I believe that we cannot fail to have serious regard for this process, which has already been substantially completed. Every republic which is part of the Soviet Union has declared its sovereignty, and every republic is now building its statehood fully as it deems necessary. Russia always lacked a certain full statehood, quite clearly.

I myself took part in forming the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, for example. It was the only republic that did not have a Ministry of Internal Affairs. Now a KGB has been formed, and in general we must get on with seeing that Russia is a fully-fledged and equal republic in the Union.

But as for the party apparatchiks hindering this, I don't see why it should be party apparatchiks interfering. I believe that it is the will of the peoples of Russia, it is the will of the deputies who made the decision at the congress, and so this is all a natural process.

The Union will be different, the Union will be, as it were, secondary, and not primary. The republic is always the primary element, and the republics are preparing to sign a new treaty, following the emergence of the Nine plus One. It created a very good foundation for this process to go in the right direction, and so the Union should to some extent form the federal structures in the spheres which reflect the composite interest of all the republics—defense, for example—and will service in this case the interests of these republics, while Russia will be an equal republic in this Union. The one thing I would like to say is that Russia, by virtue of its historical role, if you like, should bear and will bear a greater responsibility for the preservation of the Union, because it is difficult to imagine a Union without Russia.

[Semenov] Now, maybe the last question for this part of our talk, but a serious one: What lies behind your choice of candidate for vice president, Abdulatipov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities?

[Bakatin] Ramazan Abdulatipov is one of the greatest experts, in my view, and in the practical sense not only theoretical, although he is a professor and an academic. He knows interethnic issues and first and foremost those of Russia. I reckon that the interethnic problems today—they could be put in first place, or in second place after the economy—are among the most acute problems that need tackling, and so this is what determined this choice, in fact. Apart from that, this person inspires my respect because of his honesty and decency.

[Semenov] I respect him, too. I have had occasion to work with him twice on the air. But aren't you embarrassed by the fact that he is one of the authors of the statement which focussed criticism on Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin?

[Bakatin] I am embarrassed by questions when I hear them on this topic. Why can't we criticize anyone and everyone? Why can we criticize Gorbachev—he is criticized on all sides—we can criticize Bakatin, we can criticize Ryzhkov, or whoever you like, so why can't we criticize Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin also, openly, honestly, but constructively? I believe Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin himself agrees that there is nothing criminal in that, so it doesn't embarrass me at all. [passage omitted]

[Semenov] We now continue our live interview with Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin. A large number of listeners are criticizing us for the rather general nature of our conversation, Vadim Viktorovich. But I believe that people should understand all the same that you did have to outline at least some of the basic points and features of your program. We are not going over to the short questions and answers mode. Kalugin from Lyubertsy—unfortunately he didn't give his forename and patronymic—asks you to talk about yourself in rather greater detail.

[Bakatin] To talk in greater detail, I come from Siberia where I lived for 47 years. I completed studies at the Siberian [words indistinct] in 1960. For 13 years I worked in various capacities on construction sites. Then I spent 12 years in party work. After that I spent two years as first secretary in Kirov Oblast. Then I was first secretary in Kemerovo Oblast for two years, and then for two years I was minister of internal affairs. Now for two months I have been taking part in the setting up of the Security Council. I cannot put it any more briefly. Though I don't think there's such a thing as a simple question, and there aren't any simple answers to complex questions either. That's why I'm rushing, I think.

[Semenov] No, one has to get a move on, one just has to be brief. Here is another specific question. If you become president of Russia, will you maintain the tradition of having an amnesty from time to time?

[Bakatin] I believe that it shouldn't even be just from time to time. Incidentally an amnesty for women who have been sentenced for crimes that aren't maybe that dangerous should have been granted a long time ago. I already made such a proposal some time ago when I was minister of internal affairs.

[Semenov] What is your attitude toward religion?

[Bakatin] My attitude toward religion? I respect the right of every person to believe in anyone and did not consider it necessary... [changes thought] and indeed any religion, any religion. I am very tolerant in this respect. I'm not a militant atheist. That's how one might put it.

[Semenov] And no (?secret repressions against religion)?

[Bakatin] No, but maybe one also ought to understand sometimes that we do need to help in the restoration of things that were very severely destroyed in our country, at least the churches. It simply evokes pangs of conscience when we travel through say the very same Kirov Oblast. Look at what's being done there. True, we're now dealing with this.

[Semenov] What is your attitude toward the fact that religion, like many other aspects of life, is still politicized in our country?

[Bakatin] It doesn't seem so to me because I haven't dealt specially with this issue. If it is politicized, then that is bad, of course.

[Semenov] How do you assess your experience in the sphere of foreign policy and foreign contacts?

[Bakatin] It is very difficult for me to assess my own experience in the sphere of foreign contacts but I do consider that I have a certain amount of experience. This occured especially during my time at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In so far as human rights were of interest not only, say, to my colleagues, when I was working as minister of internal affairs I was also interested in the whole structure of the United Nations and in law enforcement people in fact from Western countries. I had very many contacts, and I wouldn't say that they presented any particularly great difficulties for me. I believe I always found a common language here.

[Semenov] In the television broadcast, which is still fresh in everyone's memory—today of course we are also trying to deal with questions about which relatively little was said in that broadcast; we are working on the basis that people saw you and heard you—in that television broadcast you mentioned in particular the position of women in the country, and you were perceived as using an unfortunate expression about the one-sided nature of the development of women. I think you understand what I am talking about.

[Bakatin] That's not quite right. I said that politics without women was lopsided, without women, because in our country women do not participate actively in politics, you understand. Men decide women's issues, the whole time, women are always the object in politics. The whole time we promise to do something for them. Women themselves must be assisted a little so that they themselves engage in politics, so that they become the subjects in politics and not the objects. As far as lopsided women are concerned, God forbid such a dreadful sin: I cannot take it seriously.

[Semenov] I think it was a slight misunderstanding that has now been dispelled.

[Bakatin] What a misunderstanding!

[Semenov] Tell us what you have to say about young people. What place do attitudes toward young people occupy in your program and in your intentions? What do you think about this?

[Bakatin] I have talked about two priorities. I have said that one has to have a hierarchy of priorities in the conditions of total shortage that we now have and in conditions in which in fact the Governments both of the Union and of Russia are in this case trying to win people over in some way by promises of various kinds. In fact, nothing is happening because there are so few resources. The rural areas must take first place, as I have already said, but education must be in second place, that is, the young people in the final analysis.

Yesterday I held a very interesting and fairly sharp discussion on this problem until nearly 11 o'clock at night with representatives from nearly all the Russian oblasts. There we found a fairly big.... [Bakatin changes thought] At least, we worked out an agreed policy, that is, priority goes to education, everything from the woman and mother to encouraging enterprise among young people. These are very major problems.

[Semenov] [passage omitted] Now two questions which, to some extent, are connected with the fact that you are a CPSU Central Committee member. What is your attitude toward the socialist choice, and the second part of the question—to not interrupt you later—what is your attitude toward the call to nationalize CPSU property being made at some levels and in some regions?

[Bakatin] The second part of the question is very simple. Inasmuch as it is the CPSU's property, then to take from anyone at all, to take trade union property from the trade unions, or party property from the party, or cooperative property from the cooperatives, should surely not be done. Inasmuch as this property has come into being through party subscriptions, it belongs to the CPSU. To take it away is tantamount to picking someone's pockets, as it were, that is, it is (?theft).

As for the issue of the socialist choice, it is a very complex and long question. This is how I would put it: one must not put ideology into the economy, nor must

ideology be held to be more important than the economy. Since we are talking about common sense, it presupposes that we will do everything that is sensible and useful for people and not what is in keeping with this ism or that. Incidentally, it is this that was and continues to this very day to be fatal for us, since we are altogether unable to decide to go forward toward a normal economy, as it were, which would indeed yield considerably greater results. All we are doing is getting bogged down on the issue of which choice to go for. My view is that this is simply word games, and I would not now devote much attention to it, because it will take up a great deal of time.

[Semenov] Now one more question. It is, after all, very amazing....

[Bakatin, interrupting] Fire away, any questions.

[Semenov] Primitive though it is—but the election campaign is unfortunately becoming surrounded with rumors and information, and it is at times difficult to find out the veracity of this information—is it true that you have given the president your resignation from your current post in the Security Council? I do not know whether it is a permanent or temporary resignation.

[Bakatin] Yes, I put to the president the question of him releasing me from the duties as a member of the Security Council because I am entering the election campaign. The president said he would consider this question.

[Semenov] Now this question: What is it you want from Mayak? If you are elected president, how do you imagine a mechanism of regular contacts with the voters, with the population? (?Would we then be able to meet you, say in a radio studio? I am talking as though you were president.)

[Bakatin] You yourself gave me a hint for my answer, my answer to this question. One does not mean some sort of periodic trips which are then given broad coverage by the "Vremya" program along the lines of handshakes with the steelworkers. I have always been a little bit, you know [pauses]... this kind of artificiality and all this should not be quite the way it is. [as heard] We should have regular, genuinely regular radio addresses to the country, along with permanent briefings. I am talking about the openness of the authorities. Let me tell you: Consensus is all very well, but I mean a consensus based on the openness of the authorities, that is to say, we ought to open up. After all, we, presently, are to a large extent [pauses]... we adopt many decisions without, at the very least, even having mentioned the fact, or the motives and reasons behind them, why they were made. That is why, of course, both radio and television, and the regularity of these meetings and permanent briefings of one kind or another actually represent essential attributes of democratic authority and a law-governed state if we wish to construct, as it were, a solid edifice rather than half remaining where we once were.

[Semenov] Now a little about the way you plan, about how you see, the final stage of your election campaign, Vadim Viktorovich. There will be another question about this.

[Bakatin] I don't know whether it's the final stage or not the final stage. I began this campaign, I think, simply with the idea of having as many meetings on the air as possible, as many meetings in the mass information media as possible. That is the most important thing. I am very grateful to the people of Nizhniy Novgorod, for example; they gave me an hour and one-half of live air time, and I answered telephone calls from them. That brought me the greatest pleasure in this election campaign. There are also the trips, but during the course of these 10 days or so you can cover literally 10 regions or so, and visit 20 enterprises with trips, and that's nothing. These trips will take place. I expect my next trip will be to Leningrad. As far as going further afield is concerned I simply don't particularly want to plan things here because I very often change these decisions as things move on, and I don't have a schedule worked out in advance up to the 12th of the month.

[Semenov] A specific question: Do you hold a military rank?

[Bakatin] Yes, I do hold a military rank, which I was given when I became minister of internal of affairs. I am a Lieutenant General. They haven't taken it from me yet.

[Semenov] Another question. Having learned through many years of unfilled promises, a considerable section of our population is suspicious of what is happening in politics. Currently there are rumors about possible games being played in the election campaign process. In particular, talk crops up from time to time aobut the [word indistinct] of candiates, or the removal of candidatures by one candidate in favor of another being possible at (?some stage in the election campaign). You must excuse me—I know that you are someone of the greatest possible respect—but I have to put this question to you: Are there not (?grounds) for such an option?

[Bakatin] If you mean to say do I intend to transfer my votes....

[Semenov interrupts] To someone....

[Bakatin interrupts] ...Or do I intend to ask someone to give me his votes, I will say that I do not intend to do so, and I do not intend to ask anyone to do so. As for whether anyone is thinking about games of this kind, as you call them, that I simply do not know. I do not know. There is nothing else I can say about it. My own votes, if I... [pauses] it's not really a question of votes, because this ought to happen beforehand... [pauses] intend to go right to the end, to campaign right to the end.

[Semenov] I think that all those who support you will have been pleased to hear that. But perhaps I could put to you the last question, also one with certain subtext to it. Given the fact that we have a Union law on protecting

the honor and dignity of the president, do you intend to introduce a similar system for Russia?

[Bakatin] In the first place, in order to institute such a thing, one has to become president; nor can one do it immediately. I don't think I would start by dealing with that issue. I consider that in general, one has to be in favor of criticism but against loutishness, and that applies in politics, too. Loutish behavior is intolerable. There have to be standards, common political standards. Unfortunately, our political standards are not high enough. Take this politicking. No doubt that is what has brought about the law you mentioned. But at the same time I would like to remind people of one thing. Would it have been possible for anyone to have imagined in 1985, or even in 1987, that people could criticize the president so freely? Doubtlessly it wouldn't have been. At the same time, therefore, one can say that criticism does have to be made, but that loutishness is ruled out.

[Semenov] Indeed, I fully agree with you.

At this point we conclude our live dialogue with Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin. There are very many good wishes that have come in addressed to you. We will hand them over to you. I'll take just one from the pile. Mironova, from Moscow, says: We see no more reliable president. We've put all our hopes in you.

[Bakatin] Thank you.

[Semenov] One of the opinions.

[Bakatin] Thank you. There are a lot of good people. All the very best. Thank you.

[Semenov] All the very best, esteemed listeners. On your behalf we extend thanks to Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin.

Zhirinovskiy Outlines Presidential Platform

LD3105121291 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1000 GMT 31 May 91

[Text] Yesterday, the citizens of Voronezh had a meeting with another contender for the top post: Zhirinovskiy, chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party. The candidate told the electorate about his rivals rather simply: All of them will destroy Russia. Our much-suffering republic needs a young and energetic president with a European education. I am the only such person of all the candidates, he stated at a meeting with the collective of the Voronezh scentific and technical association of packaging machine building. Having presented the main points of his program, the speaker promised to improve the republic's economy in two to three years and remove the ethnic issue from the agenda if elected.

Central Asia

More Reportage of Gorbachev Visit to Alma-Ata

30 May Speech to Officials Cited

LD3005190991 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1626 GMT 30 May 91

[Speech by President Mikhail Gorbachev to senior Kazakh government and party officials and economic managers in Alma-Ata on 30 May—recorded]

[Text] What I would like to do is to explain a few points of principle. My first point deals with the current situation in the country, what I think about it, and what I believe is now happening.

I do not know how accurate my conclusion is. In the course of my meetings I tried to impart my views to people. Many agreed with me, others voiced their own views. But I think the situation in this country has of late undergone, literally before our eyes, notable changes which cannot be ignored especially by those responsible for policies and their implementation.

What I have in mind, comrades, is above all this: I think that the spring of 1991 brought along a very serious complication in the situation. In fact, March and April brought us, the whole country, to the brink of social upheaval. And all of us came to sense this. We sensed it. I think that that realization by society has switched on powerful underlying mechanisms for self-preservation, for the preservation of the family, land, this country, and this state. This is what has enabled and prompted us to find a way out of this crisis situation. It seems to me that this spring is precisely the time when the first glimpses have emerged of a political concord among all main political forces and the understanding that further confrontation will not be supported by the absolute majority of Soviet people, though there are still certain forces and they are even trying to close ranks. You can see them and you know them. I do not even have to name them. They have even come out of hiding. They show their faces at sessions, meetings, on the radio and on television, in interviews, and at Central Committee plenums.

This in fact shows a certain confidence and impertinence. This is perhaps because the people are rejecting this. And while they still have the opportunity, while it has not slipped away from them, they still want to try and take it. Nevertheless, the absolute majority of Soviet people do not support confrontation.

Now, when political disagreements have begun to be resolved, the next thing, I should say, that it is very important to bear in mind in our life today and that worries people is the still continuing slump in the economy. The slump in the economy, comrades, has affected us—both the base sectors, light industry in particular—and even the service sphere. Our country has never before experienced such a slump in the economy. Of course, much of what is happening could have been

envisaged and foreseen, if we had not made miscalculations in policy and practical work, and the negative tendencies that arose could have been overcome in good time. There is no getting away from that, as they say. All that happened—there were such errors, and we did not do everything, even though we saw that it was increasing. Yet we saw and sensed back in early autumn, when that contest got under way between the regions to prove who was right and who was guilty, when there were attempts by each one in isolation to emerge from the crisis situation, and those barriers appeared, and the apanage principalities [udelnyye knyazhestva], local barter: You give me motor vehicles and I will give you 10 tonnes of wheat, and so on—bricks, timber, everything. We have returned to the frockcoat and bushel, you understand, that Marx analyzed. That is what we have returned to. We saw that, but did not do anything in time. That must be viewed positively, as they say. One must accept the sin on one's soul in front of both of you and those who are listening. But let us not build illusions or deceive the people.

Such turns, such reforms, and such profound transitions, with replacement of the forms of life, including economic life, affecting ownership, production relations, and a person's position, have never occurred painlessly or easily anywhere in history. Never, and people must not be deceived. But if these transformations are not made, if we stop and, worse still, if we try to turn back, that will be the greatest mistake, and the greatest miscalculation. Then we may roll backwards a long way altogether and we will find ourselves on the sidelines of the development of modern civilization.

And one must not, for that reason, for that reason, look for enemies or plotters, and in our country now, when a plenum of the party's Central Committee draws near, then on the eve of it, a few resolutions are adopted, including some occassionally in the Kazakh party organization, but, fortunately, only rarely.

At others, resolutions are adopted. Or else plenums are held. Secretaries of primary organizations assemble. Party committee and other bodies meet to condemn what, as far as they are concerned, is almost a clique for revisionists and traitors, and so on and so forth. This, you know, is no longer a political struggle. This is not a debate nor a search for elucidation or the truth. This is all an attempt to return to the 1930's and, once again, to smear and trample on people. This is sadism of a kind, still present in some measure. Just see how Stalinism repressed our spirit and poisoned it. Under that system, if a major general had a different opinion from my own, one which did not coincide with mine, I, if I held power, would definitely have had to strip him of all his posts, at least, or imprison him as well, if a suitable opportunity presented itself.

Listen, are we really going to live that way? We cannot allow it to happen that we once again have reds and whites, blues and blacks. By their very nature, people are original and unique creations of nature. While all living together in one family, they have different views. Potential differs. There will be disputes. This is all a normal thing, comrades. This is the source of the movement. By suppressing this independence of thought, we would be suppressing society and initiative. This would extinguish society. This is the stage we reached on the eve—at the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's.

Naturally the fall in production is hard to bear. It affects everything. It demoralizes people. I have to say that, if there is one thing that can ruin and wreck us, and bring the masses out on the streets, literally, this is if we allow the situation to get out of hand. Although the miners are ringing alarm bells, despite the fact that we are arguing with them, meeting and persuading them, seeking to get at the truth, this does not, on the whole, change this understanding of the situation. We are also meeting other, third groups, and reaching agreement with them. That is what we must do, comrades, reach agreement, since.... [changes thought] Just look where the miners' strike has gotten us. We will never get back the metal. Some 5 million tonnes of rolled metal will be lost for ever. And what is 5 million tonnes of rolled metal? Just feed it into a machine, pass it through and see what you get. In Kockchetav and Chimkent we heard complaints that there was no metal. There is no metal, we were told.

[Unidentified speaker] That is Kazakhstan's yearly requirement.

[Gorbachev] What?

[Same unidentified speaker] Its yearly requirement.

[Gorbachev] Its yearly requirement. That loss is enough to deprive all of Kazakhstan.

This cannot be brought back now, because the blast furnaces—that is all over. For this reason we now need to do all this. You know, anyone who says to us, come on with indexation, come on with social security, let us solve all these questions, and so on, this is all necessary. But no one will devise and invent social security, even the most active, if the factory is not at work and people are deprived of the possibilities of working and earning. What kind of social security? After all, it rests on something, on rising profits, income; there is a budget, we pay pensions, we pay wages to teachers, science, and in the end the wages of those who work and themselves live on material production. The most powerful social security is to open up the possibilities for people to work, to show initiative, introduce powerful incentives and have work. This is the most real social security.

Saying this, I do not want to deny that everything which comprises social security—employment, indexation, and so on—all this has significance. But you understand that the fall in production, generally speaking, has fully become a political problem. And I have to say that in this regard I understand the reaction of the miners, when they raise the question of the government and the country's administration, they have this in mind. There have to be such processes—and this is to a significant

degree linked to political decisions by state authorities—which offer the possibility of giving oxygen to our economy and production collectives. Everyone understands that no one has moneybags, not because the government sits there greedy and does not understand and sits on its money. No, this must be created. But people want to move toward new forms of life more quickly.

If I further add that in April we switched to new retail prices—and that is 30 to 35 years, and some prices we have not touched for 50 years, since the war—then you can imagine what we went through in March and April. I must say that from this point of view, despite the critical and demanding conditions and the tough demands made by people to the central authorities, and our republican and local cadres, we must say that nevertheless here the endurance of our people saves us, the whole situation, and the whole course toward reform.

On the whole, people are living difficult, hard lives, suffering hardships. Therefore, we cannot protract this, the transitional period. We must move faster. In this particular situation, all this political incandescence that we lived through in April—and it was further augmented by the fact that interethnic conflicts continued, while certain forces attempted to use this severity, especially in the market, in order to push the people toward unconstitutional measures and actions, and, so to speak, to solve their own problems—well, all this incandescence led us to the understanding that, indeed, it is time to turn from confrontation to cooperation of all the forces in society. In this sense, such an appeal was voiced on 9 April at the meeting of the Federation Council, and this same idea permeates the declaration by the USSR president and leaders of the nine Union republics of 23 April. I consider it—and, it seems, I am not alone here—as a major political event which became a turning point from confrontation to cooperation, indeed, between all forces interested in a way out of the crisis.

I cannot pass over in silence the fact that this declaration was not to everybody's liking. We must see this, comrades; we must make a political analysis in order to clearly work out our stand, and to stick to it. Both on the part of extreme left and extreme right, accusations started to be heard, addressed to the participants of the April meeting. I, on the whole, find long speculations on the subject out of place here. First of all, you know, this would look like self-justification. Why do I, or the comrades who were there, have to justify ourselves for having taken a clear and honest stand and having declared it for everybody to hear? Without any political games, so to speak? But having understood the meaning of what is going on, they formulated their position at this most crucial moment in the development of the society?

Who is there to justify oneself to? To those for whom the worse things are, the better they feel? This makes no sense whatsoever. We must engage in political discussion, indeed, struggle, with them.

Generally speaking, now I think—I might have dragged out my speech a little at this point, but I think, comrades, that this is the most important thesis which I wanted to realize and to convey to you.

We need to take advantage of the chance that has opened up, the chance to consolidate society, to achieve social accord. But we have our own attachments in this country. We have parties and political movements now, and people have allegiances to various churches. As well as all these attachments, there are group interests. There are even aspirations of various kinds. This is all understandable. This is illustrated by the many programs which you can now read. But there are supreme interests, overall national interests, the interests of the state and the people, the need to reshape, to resolve tasks in the framework of perestroyka. Everybody must put this first. Everything must be subordinated to this. The fact that precisely this was stated—and stated in concrete terms—in the declaration issued on 23 April has, I think, won the support of society.

Second, we and you now have a program, a program of joint actions adopted by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers and the governments of the republics for leading the country's economy out of the crisis, in conditions of the transition to the market. What I regard as important here is the fact that this is a joint program, comrades. Because in the current situation one can reckon that only those documents that express a common position will work. There is no other mechanism capable of making everybody work in unison and adopt the same approaches, as they cooperate and support each other. In this sense, this is the main feature of this program. That is the first thing.

Second, the main burden of work to implement anticrisis measures will be borne during 1991. What do I regard as particularly important in this respect? The first thing is to prevent a further increase in the disintegration of economic ties and a further slump in production. I have to say that the miners have now done a massive amount of work. The miners already see the possibility of reaching the target set under the annual plan for coal extraction. If everything continues to go well, they may even add a bit to the score of 13 million tonnes. The metallurgical workers are now doing their bit. They have their own task. The 5 million tonnes of rolled metal which the metallurgical industry has lost will never be recovered now. But they are now working to make sure that all opportunities are taken to reach the level which we were counting on for this year, as far as the metallurgical workers are concerned.

The oil men are also working with Comrade Velichko on this matter, and there, too, there is hope for recovering the losses. All this together will obviously affect all the branches of industry. We are left with the hard problem of light industry which was based on using the raw materials purchased with foreign currency, that we were buying with this currency. But because we have reduced oil exports by half—by half!—without reducing, and

even increasing our internal expenditures, the factories remain idle. There are no polyurethane shoe soles—we were purchasing them in Italy and other places. Yet, give them this shoe sole material today—tomorrow they will produce 2 million pairs of shoes. Nevertheless, we are tackling this task. But I think that by realizing our plans in relation to the basic industries, including those mentioned in my decree, we should create incentives for all other branches of industry, especially those connected with production of goods.

And here, in the anticrisis program, different taxes and even special incentives for those who produce the consumer goods have precisely been envisaged. Thus, we should not only be suppressing inflation, carrying out a rigorous financial policy, but at the same time we should be providing incentives for the basic industries and especially for the industries producing goods. If we only suppress inflation and do not give the industrial collectives opportunities for expansion, then, comrades, we shall have production stagnation on our hands and we shall fall into a state of stagflation. This is extremely grave. We shall, nevertheless, be proceeding by maneuvering ourselves in this most complicated situation this year, which determines many things including our austerity, proceeding by using such approaches.

Nursultan Abishevich has raised the topic here about growing and harvesting the crops, and in essence, during the visit these questions were raised in Kokchetav and Chimkent Oblasts. I should like to tell you that indeed with all the difficulties, with all the strain in the economy, with the recession, we have done everything possible for agriculture in this situation. And spring farmwork, generally, went normally, apart from those places where the weather has caused damage—as in Uzbekistan—or delayed processes by one or two weeks.

But nevertheless, the main ground work for the harvest has been done. I will not talk on this topic, I just think that our greatest losses occur during the harvest. The task today is to prepare for the harvest, using all the possibilities of our towns and our industry. Here I welcome all measures, both economic and administrative. We have begun to make such decisions, and we will make them. I have already said that I most ardently welcome your search regarding advancing land reform. I think that if we go along this path throughout the country, and the process has begun, I like—you know what?—the fact that good farms have also joined in the restructuring of production relations. This is what is important.

I do not know when unprofitable collective and state farms will have an impact. I do not know; time is still necessary. Some of them will probably simply collapse, or peasant farms will leave, but we must act so that there are fewer such losses. If we offer the possibility of using new forms of farming and incentives for good farms, then we will quickly be repaid.

We have done a great deal since 1982, after the May plenum, to somehow get incentives going in the countryside, and they have begun to work. And look, over the last five-year plan, there has been an increase in cattle of 3 million tonnes, around a 10 to 12 million tonne increase in milk, and so on and so forth. In some areas we have lost, but there has been progress on these major positions, there has been movement, and last year there was around 57 billion profit in state farms.

Now the comrades have reckoned it up and said that if they have to settle accounts for deliveries of equipment, fertilizer, and building materials, then even the advanced farms will have losses. This cannot be allowed, otherwise we would be irresponsible people, and during the second quarter we will have to produce a document. There are many arguments, many discussions. Some propose a simple solution—increase procurement prices—but it does not work like this, comrades. Then procurement prices will hit the whole consumer market. After all, that is foodstuffs, raw materials for light industry. In that case we would have such a wave, you understand, in retail prices, so we have to find economic approaches which can untangle this knot for us quickly and reliably and at the same time not provoke a fever in retail prices.

The topic of removal from state control and privatization. The transfer from total state property to non-state forms of property is privatization. Here they say that privatization is definitely a transfer to private property.

But there are also joint-stock companies, collective enterprises, leasehold enterprises, family leaseholds or economic ones, and there can of course also be, particularly in the field of services and small businesses, private ownership as well. We are facing the fact that we must move toward a mixed economy. If someone will propose something which will be more successful in uniting people's interests, without reforming property relations, then we welcome it, with the one proviso that the most serious fears of our people should not prove to be justified and that this property accumulated by generations of our people should not fall into the hands of thieves. I am sure that we will find the correct solution to this problem.

Do you know what else I would like to say? There is one question about which we argue a great deal. Now we already argue about it openly, and there are some who have even already contrived to declare the results of our foreign policy activity a strategic defeat. I do not usually enter into discussion of these issues. For this is a very unqualified condemnation often dictated by some moods—and it is difficult to even say which ones—because all of this was done, all of these steps were taken within the framework of the new way of thinking, and the attainment of major agreements in foreign policy was reached on the basis of thorough studies in which our best forces involved in the implementation of foreign policy participated. But nevertheless, even now they say, why does the president involve himself so much in

foreign policy? In this case, it probably runs in the following way: When I meet someone who has arrived in our country, the newspapers write about this, the radio reports it, and the television shows it. When I meet Comrade Nazarbayev, when I meet leaders, leaseholders, peasants and whoever else, teachers or scientists, then no one writes anything about this apart from major conversations perhaps, or meetings and conferences.

This is what we do every day. The impression exists that no one is doing anything about internal affairs, neither the president nor the cabinet, although this is what we devote all our time and all our energies to, so to speak.

Comrades, now we must not slacken our attention in the direction of foreign policy. In the conditions in which we have embarked upon thoroughgoing reforms, first and foremost we need favorable conditions. This is the first thing.

In the second place, we must move along the path toward further disarmament. Other countries are taking part, to a certain point, on the basis of our new defense doctrines. We need to reduce our expenses thereby and turn our economy, which is overloaded with defense matters, in the direction of man. The best means, the very best cadres and the very best scientists are there, and enormous prospects are opening up in this area through conversion. This means that from this viewpoint, too, it is necessary to act in this way.

Finally now, when we are entering the phase of decisive changes, we need to embark upon a practical sort of synchronization for cooperation between our domestic moves for the radicalization of economic reforms and the cooperation and programs from Western countries. In connection with this, I put forward this idea that I should like to share my thoughts on this matter with G-7.

You will have noted how tortuously this process is developing, but nevertheless, nevertheless I believe that it is becoming more positive. Of course the business of perestroyka is our business, our concerns are the main ones, the main expenses are ours and it is our patience—everything. First and foremost, the responsibility must rest on us. But, I must say that this will advance more successfully if we enter into such cooperation with Western, with the developed countries.

For this, we need to create the sort of preconditions which could interest foreign capital. I am holding conversations that are behind closed doors for the time being with the leaders of these states, although I have publicly expressed myself in favor of this.

The third point is that I have carried away from my meetings on the soil of Kazakhstan the deep conviction that people understand that there will not be accord and peace in our vast land, on all its territories, in all the republics and regions of the country if we delay, prolong and even more so, if someone succeeds in torpedoing the process of reforming our national state. I spoke a lot about this with Comrade Nazarbayev during these days. I have to admit that I have also heard a lot from people here—not only proposals, but also demands—why the Union Government and the leadership, and why there is not that same kind of responsibility for resolving this cardinal issue in the life of our multinational state that we are manifesting here in Kazakhstan, and expect the same steps in all the other republics.

Yet, I have to say that I must reassure you somehow, while not reassuring you on what such an atmosphere has brought to the general situation in the country. In what way must I reassure you? You know, with all the attempts to call upon the people not to go and not to vote in the referendum—more than that: if one did go, then to vote against—the people did, first and foremost, take part in the referendum and they voted unequivocally in favor of retaining the Union and, simultaneously, for the renewing of the Union so that it becomes a living and a democratic federation of sovereign republics. This is why this is a great debit. There exists here the will of the people that nobody has the right to ignore. The framework has been determined by the referendum, and those who resort to maneuvering and dragging us into a debate on this issue will have to say frankly some day whether they are for the Union or not.

I think that we have embarked on a very important stage which promises us advance in the near future, in the direction of concluding a new Union treaty. There exists an understanding and agreement on most of the principal issues. What is needed is a living federation, not a community, not an association and not a confederation, but a living and a true federation—a new Union state with all the possibilities to serve mutual interests. Why? Our economy is integrated. People of all nationalities live throughout the country. Well, really, I have already said once—I think it was in a report delivered at the party conference—let's take Kazakhstan: Well, what are we going to do?

So what, is this a call for us to divide, to separate according to ethnic compartments? Then this means that the Russians must go away somewhere, the Ukrainians somewhere; I just do not know what could arise if such slogans and calls were suddenly to be taken up. This would signify the death of this state. Moreover, it would prove costly for our entire civilization. Comrades, no one can divide us. This is a utopia, and I have already spoken about this throughout the last few months. First of all I thought that it was still possible, but no. In connection with this, on the publication of Solzhenitsyn's thoughts on this subject, I said that I esteem him as a writer and bow to his talent, but I can only assume one stance in the face of his politics—I reject them.

Ending my speech to you, I would like to say this. In the course of talks here as well, the issue arose, somehow or other, of the party's activities in the context of the real present-day situation, in the context of the events taking place in our country. The processes of perestroyka are progressing with difficulty, as is the reform of the party

itself, and this has an effect on all the processes. But I think that we cannot do things any differently other than going along this path so that the party can absorb all the best that is within it, and can decisively throw out the traces left on its character, activities, and image by the command-administrative system. Comrades, we need to see this process through to the end, and we need to revive the party in the same way that we are reviving the whole of society, our Union and all the peoples.

A most important political institution.... [changes thought] I personally feel great responsibility in the face of all the difficulties of my position because of the difficult processes which are under way. How should we act? I think that we should follow the course of the 28th congress, as we planned to do. Now, when we have had to push things through with difficulty to see the program documents adopted and the rules [Gorbachev strikes rostrum for emphasis] at the 28th congress, these forces have not quieted down. Once more they are attempting, by means of all sorts of initiative forums and anything else possible, to once again raise these issues and pose them, and increase the tension. By doing this, they want to strike at the party itself.

At the same time as the party should now, together with the people, resolves these tasks of enormous historical importance; it is being dragged into internal discussions which, frankly speaking, are self-destructive. My raising the issue of resigning from the post of general secretary was dictated by the fact that I cannot agree with these tendencies within the party which want to turn us back, even more so since now, in accordance with the resolution of the 28th congress, we are working on the CPSU program. There is a drafting and program commission and it is working. The first version has been discussed, and it was submitted to very serious analysis and criticism. Many observations were made, and now, prior to my departure for Kazakhstan, I sent all the members of the program commission a new version of this program. This is the basis on which the party will definitively determine its position.

I should have liked to have said a lot, but I have tried to concentrate on the main things. I have spoken to you sincerely [Gorbachev thumps rostrum for emphasis], and I have left my papers on one side, and I have listened to the conversations I heard at my meetings and what was said here during these hours at this meeting. I am relying, comrades, on your support in this work; I am hoping for cooperation. To a great extent, we understand one another, and I think that this will not desert us, but on the contrary, will increase. I wish all of you success, and that you may all continue this way.

Interviewed With Nazarbayev

LD3005180191 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Network in Russian 1530 GMT 30 May 91

[Interview with President Mikhail Gorbachev and Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev by an unidentified "Vremya" correspondent in Alma-Ata on 30 May—recorded; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Correspondent] Mikhail Sergeyevich, in your first interview on your arrival in Kazakhstan you said that this republic works hard and in an interesting manner, and you are striving to support Kazakhstan. Have you become more firm in your opinion, and what are you going to make a note of?

[Gorbachev] I must say that I have become more firm in my opinion on this. If anyone thinks and imagines that there are no problems in Kazakhstan [changes thought].... No, the problems are the same, the same problems. But I like to see that people are thinking about the future. People are looking ahead. What is good is that the working class, peasants, and state bodies are working as a united whole, and the party has joined in as well. I like Nursultan Abishevich's directive to Communists. He repeated it to me several times in two oblasts. Do you know, he said, what the party needs? It is to be in the vanguard. That is, to be ahead of these transformations.

[Correspondent] Does it manage to do it?

[Gorbachev] That's all. Many things are being achieved here. I liked the position of many party members—if not the greater proportion of them. I liked what they spoke about, and how they spoke about it. That's the first thing. The second is that Kazakhstan is working. It is working and that is what is needed. There are many problems. They posed a lot of questions by way of information to be taken into account there—in the center—as it is necessary in the Union to think about what worries people today, and what prevents people from moving more quickly toward the market and new ways of living when we are tackling radical issues. This is it. But it works, and this is very important.

[Correspondent] A question to Nursultan Abishevich. You have an interesting program of your own for stabilization and for extricating oneself from the crisis. Does it mean that you are going your own way?

[Nazarbayev] I answer this question all the time, and I want to say that not a single republic in our country, given our level of integration, can extricate itself from this situation on its own. All the rest is politicking. We can move toward the great market only within a single economic space. We will be understood by the Western countries with which we want to keep contacts, and we will be understood here. It is not correct to say that some republic can exit from the crisis in general. It is another question whereby every republic is given great opportunities to act independently. Not to indulge in criticizing, but to work. That is, no one prevents us from changing the structure of power, no one prevents us from engaging in privatization, and no one stands in the way of our introducing new forms of the economy. I will also inform Mikhail Sergeyevich later today that the process of setting up peasant's holdings, lease-holdings, and share-holding in the countryside is under way in Kazakhstan.

[Gorbachev] Kazakhstan is one of the republics that actively came forward in favor of having not just an anticrisis program of the USSR Cabinet, but a joint

program of the Union Government and the governments of the republics. This reflects the point of view—and it is correct [changes thought].... These are our realities....

There are harsh and cruel realities in the economy. When we do not take them into consideration we fall into a very uncomfortable situation, here or there. First, the links would be disrupted and there would be a drop in production. I am speaking about this once again because when we say: To protect the person during the time of transition to the market, it is true indexation. True, we should think about this or that, but the most important protection for our people will be their knowing that they have a job today, and will have it tomorrow, that they are working, earning an income for themselves, showing initiative by taking advantage of the new conditions, while supporting the country. If people do not have jobs and do not have an opportunity to earn—which system could save them? No, the source is here, within our people, and they understand it very well. This is why I say Kazakhstan is working. What I have seen here has raised my optimism. This is a feeling—one feels this here especially, and the people here have the same view. As they say, we are going through the most difficult stage, yet confidence is beginning to appear, people begin to act in a new way, and the results present themselves. People expect that by adopting the new ways of work they will get different results. The ordinary people are saying this—in Chimkent, in Kokchetav, in Alma-Ata. This is the most important thing.

[Nazarbayev] We do not want to say that we have no problems. All the difficulties now facing the country, the breaking-up which is going on in the country, the vulnerability of the policy—all this is present here, too. But this time I wish to confirm this with Mikhail Sergeyevich, and support him on the three points: To go resolutely for the Union of the sovereign states—this wording belongs to Mikhail Sergeyevich—this is one question; second, to go resolutely for the market economy; and third, to enter the world economic space. In all these aspects we should proceed resolutely. People were talking about this, the leaders were talking about this, and the whole period Mikhail Sergeyevich spent in Kazakhstan should affirm his decisive actions in these directions.

[Correspondent] Thank you very much.

Talks to Cotton Workers

LD3105024791 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in russian 1530 GMT 30 May 91

[Video report by correspondent S. Medvedev from Alma-Ata—from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] [Medvedev] After visiting the northern and southern parts of the republic, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev spent the third day of his trip to Kazakhstan in Alma-Ata. We can attest to the fact that there have been no magnificent festivities or ceremonies on the occasion of his visit to the capital. The town continued to work and the USSR president, too, came here to work. He had a hard, densely packed timetable.

In the morning, after laying flowers at the Lenin monument in the city center, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev, and those accompanying them set off for one of the city's working areas where the Alma-Ata cotton combine, one of the largest in the republic and perhaps in the Union, is located. [video shows Gorbachev and Nazarbayev at Lenin monument; motorcade on the move]

Every year the combine produces about 75 million linear metres of various fabrics and over 12,000 tonnes of yarn, but this scarcely meets a third of the republic's requirements. How is output to be increased, and its quality improved and become competitive on the world market? These are the questions that the combine's collective are presently working to solve. The combine has the same problems, probably, as all the country's giant enterprises. First and foremost the combine is in need of radical modernization, but as yet there is no money for this.

The working conditions in the workshops still remain difficult. After all, 6,000 of the 8,000 workers are women. Presently, production is suffering. The main trouble is a lack of raw materials. They are being let down by their colleagues in Armenia and the Central Asian republics. At these large-scale production units one feels acutely just how close the coordination of production is between the enterprises of republics and just how painful the severance is of the old relations of partnership. Foreign links, too, are going wrong because of this. Expensive West German looms, which after all cost over 10 million [unspecified] in hard currency, have for over a year now been lying immobile and spoiling.

The discussion at the combine was about this, and social problems, of course. [video shows Gorbachev talking to workers]

[Woman worker] We then work here. Perhaps everywhere you come and ask how people are and everyone says that they are getting on well. But we are saying that our life is complicated and difficult. [passage omitted] We need hard currency to get spares for repairs, but we have no currency. [passage omitted]. Our future, you see, looks very complicated. How are we to go on working?

[Gorbachev] Regarding the arrangements we have now reached, in general everyone wanted them. If you recall, it was all of us. The question was being asked fairly demandingly throughout the country why the government was letting output go for other than hard currency, and people were saying that it was necessary to transfer to hard currency. Do you remember?

[Woman worker] Yes, I remember.

[Gorbachev] They and us have switched to hard currency, and what has happened? They are in a difficult position and so are we. For many decades we developed

together with them and engaged in joint production. Now, when both sides have tried it and have seen that we need each other, there have over the past two months been talks by us and them, with practically all countries, and we will set about preserving our basic joint production.

[Woman worker] We have just moved toward market economy.

[?Gorbachev] ...are moving.

[Woman] ...are moving, but the level of our wage remains very low. We are experiencing hardships. You see, we receive 4 percent of the cost price of output. We must raise the level of the wage fund to the level of up to 12 percent so that we can live and not just exist. We will be able to live then. All this is being looked into, but it is done very slowly.

[Gorbachev] Do you know how you are going to get this, in what way, and how others will get this? You will acquire more economic freedom on your way to the market, including freedom in the sphere of prices. But first and foremost, by virtue of changing old goods and developing new types of goods. You yourselves will live in that market in accordance with the rules, you will be thinking what to spend on wages, how you are going to live in the future, and maybe you will put everything in wages today and then tomorrow, as a result, you will all lose jobs, since you must also do repairs and....

[Woman] You are right saying that we have such a possibility.

[Gorbachev] So, I think, all the same, that it is necessary to introduce some preferential terms here in our light and food industries, which are lagging behind very much and which makes our consumer market so poor. Already this year this was reflected in the anti-crisis program which we adopted; we must tax people differently and introduce different incentives for all enterprises producing consumer goods. So, your economic situation should even out gradually. There is no way you can operate in a market producing such important goods and not being able to resolve your own issues yourselves. The task of the reconstruction of the light and food industry is the task of the entire state. We have changed 320 defense enterprises so that they make, distribute, everything, the light and food industry, between them.

[Unidentified man] Our ministry for food has been broken up....

[Unidentified woman] We don't regret this!

[Unidentified man] ...and defense—yes, they worked badly—and it has been handed over to defense, and for five years we have been receiving nothing whatsoever.

[Gorbachev] Yet we have allocated 76 billion rubles for the development, creation, of a basis for the light and food industry. We have nothing to carry out modernization. But, I have to say that there are large-scale and very interesting propositions from the West, to join in the modernisation of goods-producing industries. I think that we should also take this up. We should take this up. [passage omitted]

More on Gorbachev Visit to Chimkent Oblast

PM3005191591 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 31 May 91 p 1

[Report by TASS-KazTAG special correspondents V. Akimov, V. Bezbrezhnyy, G. Groyser, and V. Talanov: "M.S. Gorbachev's Meetings With the Rural Inhabitants of Kazakhstan"]

Chimkent, 29 May—Continuing his trip to Kazakhstan, USSR President M.S. Gorbachev today arrived in Chimkent from Kokchetav. The itinerary for the second day of his stay in the republic showed the head of state's intention to continue learning about the state of affairs in the agrarian sphere.

Chimkent Oblast is an interesting subject in this context. First, it enjoys pretty favorable conditions for farming. It is known for its stockraising and crop cultivation, including vegetable growing; and a lot of fruit is also grown on its territory.

Second, the rural workers of Chimkent have proven themselves to be active supporters of new forms of intrafarm economic relations. State cooperative and production associations on a leasing basis and associations and unions of peasant farms have been created here. Leasehold agreements with different methods of payment have been introduced in the overwhelming majority of kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkozes [state farms]. The 250 autonomous peasant farms, which produce meat, vegetables, cotton, and corn, are becoming more and more strongly established. Many of the farmers have already repaid their state loans and are ready to buy equipment and buildings out of their own pocket. The first peasant bank, financing dozens of farms, has already appeared in the republic.

The work and concerns of peasant leaseholders and their successes and problems became the main topic of Mikhail Sergeyevich's conversations with them. They were held actually in the fields. That is how it was with Sultan Zhakipbayev's vegetable-growing team on the 21st Party Congress Sovkhoz, with Altyr bek Zulpiyev, leaseholder of the S.M. Kirov state cooperative association, and the shepherds of the "Burzharskiy" Sovkhoz, where Nurmakhan Ordabekov is the foreman.

These conversations naturally contained figures, tonnes, and quintals. Without abusing them, we will cite just a few so that the picture can be understood. S. Zhakipbayev's vegetable-growing team, which consists of six families, leases 83 hectares, growing cabbages, tomatoes, cucumbers, carrots, pepper, aubergines, pumpkins, onions, and beets. It has a yield of 240 quintals per

hectare. Only five people work on leaseholder A. Zulipev's 50 hectares. Last year they obtained 78 quintals per hectare growing grain corn and plan to harvest 90 this year.

Such results deserve to be highly commended. But there is something even more noteworthy. You sensed among the people who spoke with the president that special spirit of emancipation and confidence characteristic of people who are independent and accustomed to deciding how they are going to act themselves. When Mikhail Sergeyevich asked: "How do you feel?—they answered literally in chorus "fine!" As witnesses we can assure you that the response was absolutely sincere, coming from the heart, as it were. And it was enough just to see the faces of these men, women, and children. Yes, the young help the old in their work. Mikhail Sergeyevich evaluated this by saying "it is a good thing, when children get accustomed to the land from their early years they will love it all the more."

This is, after all, an age-old peasant rule: All the family members work together. They work in a cohesive and committed way. This has now become possible thanks to the fact that conditions are being created for people whereby they cease to be hired laborers on the land, but become masters of it. And the latter possess an owner's mentality. They will not do anything for nothing, will not overlook anything, and will calculate everything in order to stay in profit. A. Zulipiyev, for example, quoted each of his numerous accounts to the president down to the last ruble. Where personal interest exists even the desert can be made to work for itself, as shown by peasant K. Yesmurzayev, who purchased a flock of sheep and began to turn the desert where his farm was located into pasture. He keeps 1,500 sheep, has opened a bank account, and has acquired his own equipment.

The president noted that the new forms of economic management are valuable precisely by virtue of the fact that, having aroused workers' initiative, they result in high yields and greater productivity for the state. That is to say, complete compatibility between personal and state interest is achieved.

But not everything, of course, goes as smoothly as you would like, and there was quite a lot said about this during the conversations. We will highlight one problem that worrries peasants everywhere: The parity of prices for agricultural and industrial output. This parity does not exist for the peasant! It is very difficult therefore for him to obtain equipment and construction materials and continue developing his work.

M.S. Gorbachev is also concerned by this. He said that the question is complex and demands careful study and the creation of appropriate mechanisms. In short, the state has this question under very close watch, as it were. And it will soon be taken under appropriate control.

A meeting with the collective of the "Chimkentshina" production association was held at the end of the day. This enterprise produces over 3 million tires for trucks, agricultural vehicles, and cars each year. It has difficulties associated with irregular supplies of raw materials and with selling some of its products. The enterprise workers told the president how they are dealing with the problems. This year, for example, they managed for the first time in a long while to overfulfil the profit plan. There was discussion about the participation of Union organs of management in solving the enterprise's difficult problems.

M.S. Gorbachev held a meeting with leaders of the oblast rayons. N.A. Nazarbayev, V.Kh. Doguzhiyev, V.I. Chernoivanov, and S.A. Tereschenko, chairman of the Chimkent Oblast Soviet, took part in it.

In the evening the USSR president, having completed his familiarization with Chimkent Oblast, arrived in Alma-Ata.